

# **2021 Distributed Energy Resources Avoided Cost Calculator Documentation**

For the California Public Utilities Commission

May 3, 2021

*Version 1a*

*Available at:*

*<https://willdan.box.com/v/2021CPUCAvoidedCosts>*

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# 1 Introduction

This document describes the inputs, assumptions and methods used in the 2021 Distributed Energy Resources (DER) Avoided Cost Calculator (ACC). The DER ACC model, documentation and supporting files are available at:

- + <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/general.aspx?id=5267>, and
- + <https://www.ethree.com/cpuc-acc-downloads-page>, and
- + <https://willdan.box.com/v/2021CPUCAvoidedCosts>

Decision (D.)19-05-019 in the Integrated Distributed Energy Resources (IDER) proceeding, R.14-10-003, initiated a process to implement major and minor updates to the Distributed Energy Resources (DER) Avoided Cost Calculator (ACC) in 2020. This process culminated in a Staff Proposal (ACC Staff Proposal) for the 2020 ACC update that was adopted in D.20-04-010, issued April 24, 2020. The process provides for major updates to occur in even-numbered years and minor updates every odd-numbered year. The 2020 ACC update implemented major changes in the CPUC's approach to estimating the avoided costs of distributed energy resources. This 2021 minor update is limited to updating inputs and making minor changes to the model.

The ACC determines the benefits of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) such as energy efficiency and demand response. DER program cost-effectiveness analysis depends on the ACC to accurately determine the benefits they provide to the electric grid and natural gas system. The ACC determines several types of benefits including avoided generation capacity, energy, ancillary services, greenhouse (GHG) emissions, and transmission and distribution capacity.

The new ACC adopted in 2020 is closely aligned with the grid planning efforts of the Integrated Resource Planning (R. 16-02-007) and Distributed Resource Plan (R. 14-08-013) proceedings. The avoided costs are based on data and analysis from Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) modeling, except for the avoided costs of transmission and distribution, which will be based on data and guidance from the Distributed Resources Plan (DRP) proceeding. The 2020 ACC was also updated to fully support evaluation of electrification measures that increase load, but affect total GHG. This includes adopting a new avoided cost of high global warming potential (GWP) gases, which value the GHG impacts of distributed energy resources (DERs) on methane and refrigerant leakage.<sup>1</sup> The ACC now also provides ancillary service prices, which are not an avoided cost, but a potential benefit for dispatchable DER that can provide reserves in CAISO markets. Table 1 summarizes the differences between the new methods adopted in the 2020 ACC and the prior 2019 ACC.

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<sup>1</sup> For electrification measures, the cost categories for delivering electricity for added load are not a benefit or 'avoided' cost, but an added cost. Reduced use of natural gas and GWP gases are avoided costs for electrification measures.

Table 1. Changes from 2019 to 2020 ACC Update

Avoided Cost	2019 ACC	2020 ACC	Data Source
Generation Capacity	Combustion Turbine Cost of New Entry	Battery Storage Cost of New Entry	RESOLVE input assumptions
Energy	Energy futures and gas turbine modeling	RESOLVE and SERVM modeling	SERVM outputs
Ancillary Services	percentage of energy	RESOLVE and SERVM modeling	SERVM outputs
GHG Value	Based on RESOLVE GHG shadow price and cap & trade price	Based on RESOLVE GHG shadow price and cap & trade	RESOLVE outputs, cap & trade prices
GHG Emissions	Implied market-heat rate short-run marginal emissions	SERVM short-run marginal emissions and RESOLVE long-run grid emissions intensity	RESOLVE and SERVM outputs, cap & trade prices, annual GHG electric sector goals
Transmission	GRC marginal cost filings	From DRP guidance	GRC filings and historical utility cost and financial data
Distribution	GRC marginal cost filings	From DRP guidance	GNA data
High GWP gases	NA	Methane & refrigerant leakage modeling	CARB data

## 1.1 Summary of Updates for 2021 ACC

The changes implemented for the 2021 minor update cycle are listed below in Table 2. A summary comparison of avoided costs from the 2020 and 2021 ACC models are shown for PG&E, Climate Zone 12 (Sacramento) in the year 2030 in Figure 1 through Figure 4 (in nominal dollars in 2030). As explained further in the documentation below, the 2021 Avoided Costs are broadly lower than in 2020 for several reasons:

- + Lower GHG value from IRP RESOLVE modeling, due primarily to lower costs for utility scale solar and energystorage
- + Lower energy prices due to Astrapé updates to the SERVM model and IRP benchmarking of SERVM production simulation to historical CAISO market prices.
- + Lower marginal heat rates in updated SERVM production simulation modeling
- + Lower generation capacity value due to lower energy storage costs, higher energy storage ELCC and increased market revenues in Net CONE modeling with 2021 SERVM modeled energy prices that have greater day to evening price differentials.


Table 2. Summary of 2021 ACC Update

Input	2021 Update	Data Source
No New DER Portfolio	Load and DER Forecasts	Final 2019 CEC IEPR Load Forecasts
	No New DER Portfolio	CPUC IRP RESOLVE Capacity Expansion Modeling
IRP Proceeding Inputs	Natural Gas Prices	CEC Power Plant Burner Tip Price Model, June 2020 Model
	Cost of Energy Storage	CPUC IRP RESOLVE Resource Costs and Build Inputs
	Weighted Average Cost of Capital	CPUC Authorized Rate of Return for 2020
SERVM Production Simulation	Updated SERVM Model from Astrapé	Run with No New DER Portfolio from CPUC IRP
DRP Proceeding Inputs	No update	
Natural Gas Avoided Cost	CEC IEPR Natural Gas Prices	CEC Power Plant Burner Tip Price Model, June 2020 Model
	Natural Gas Futures and Historical Prices	SNL Gas Prices from April 2021
	Transportation Rates Forecasts	CEC Power Plant Burner Tip Price Model, June 2020 Model
	GHG Adder	CPUC IRP RESOLVE Capacity Expansion Modeling
Energy	Implied Marginal Heat Rate	Recalculated From SERVM Production Simulation based on CEC IEPR and CPUC ACC Natural Gas Prices
	Updated Scarcity Pricing Methodology	
	Day Ahead Hourly Energy Prices	SERVM Production Simulation with Scarcity Pricing Adjustment
Ancillary Services	Real Time Energy and AS Prices	SERVM Production Simulation
	Avoided AS Procurement	Recalculated with SERVM Production Simulation Results
GHG Value	GHG Value	CPUC IRP RESOLVE Capacity Expansion Modeling
	Cap and Trade Value	Final 2019 CEC IEPR
GHG Emissions	Updated Heat Rates from SERVM Modeling	Implied Market Heat Rates from CPUC SERVM Production Modeling

	Average Annual Grid GHG Emissions Intensity	CPUC IRP RESOLVE Capacity Expansion Modeling
Distribution	Removed PG&E secondary distribution costs (~\$1/kW-Yr.)	PG&E General Rate Case
Transmission	No Update	
High GWP gases	Updated GHG Value	CPUC IRP RESOLVE Capacity Expansion Modeling

Figure 1. Average Monthly Avoided Costs (PG&E Climate Zone 12 in 2030)

2021





**2020**

Figure 2. Average Hourly Avoided Costs (PG&E Climate Zone 12 in 2030)

**2021**

## 2020






Figure 3. Hourly Avoided Costs for Three Days Beginning September 23rd (PG&E Climate Zone 12 in 2030)\*

## 2021





**2021**

\* Vertical axis is capped at \$1,000/MWh. Hourly allocation of Generation and Distribution Capacity is shifted due to updated weather/calendar year alignment in 2021.

Annual average avoided costs from the 2021 and 2020 ACC are shown for the single year of 2030 for selected end use electric load shapes are shown Figure 4. The load shapes are end use (not measure specific impacts) for selected loads or generation (for PV) types.

Figure 4. Average Annual Avoided Cost for Illustrative Normalized Load Shapes (PG&E Climate Zone 12 in 2030)

**2021**

**2020**

## 1.2 Flow Charts of Information Used in ACC

Figure 5 details the flow of data from IRP, DRP, and data sources such as the California Energy Commission (CEC) Integrate Energy Policy Report (IEPR), various California Air Resource Board (CARB) databases, and data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). Figure 6 shows the flow of inputs and calculations in the ACC.



Figure 5. Avoided Cost Process Overview





Figure 6. Avoided Cost Calculator Structure



## 2 Integrated Resource Planning Proceeding Inputs

As described in the Staff Proposal, the 2020 ACC leverages inputs from California’s IRP proceeding.<sup>2</sup> By coordinating with the state’s IRP, the ACC will better align with supply-side planning and projected future energy prices. This approach ensures greater consistency between demand-side resources evaluated using the ACC and supply-side resources in IRP.

California’s IRP proceeding uses E3’s RESOLVE resource planning model, which is a publicly available and vetted tool.<sup>3</sup> RESOLVE is a linear optimization model that co-optimizes investment and dispatch for a select number of days over a multi-year horizon to identify least-cost portfolios for meeting carbon emission reduction targets, renewables portfolio standard goals, reliability during peak demand events, and other system requirements. RESOLVE is used to create the final Reference System Plan (RSP), which identifies supply-side resource build requirements and costs, for the CPUC’s IRP proceeding.

The 2020 ACC relied upon the 2019 RSP Portfolio developed in the IRP Proceeding. Over the last year, the IRP proceeding performed analysis with updated inputs and assumptions, including updated resource cost and build inputs and results from the Final 2019 CEC IEPR issued after the 2019 RSP was finalized. The 2021 ACC uses the most recent available inputs and outputs from RESOLVE scenarios developed in 2019-2020 IRP Proceeding with these updates.

### 2.1 No New DER Scenario

The IRP RSP includes assumed levels of future DER adoption. The forecast DER levels are built-in as modifiers to overall system demand, and therefore impact the amount of supply-side resources selected by RESOLVE. In order to better estimate the value that DERs can play in meeting demand, the IRP developed a sensitivity where DER adoption was projected to remain at 2019 levels. This “No New DER” scenario assumes that no additional DERs are adopted post-2019 and demand response is discontinued, thus demonstrating a hypothetical counterfactual in which incremental DER adoption does not occur. The No New DER scenario allows the IRP and ACC to explore the difference in supply-side costs in a situation where additional DERs are not adopted, and as a result, more supply-side resources are necessary to meet overall demand. All other inputs are consistent with the latest resource portfolios modeled in the IRP Proceeding. Table 3 shows the changes in DER adoption to create the No New DER case, based on the DER adoption projected in the Final 2019 CEC IEPR.

The “No New DER” scenario keeps the BTM PV installation associated with building codes. The final 2019 CEC IEPR forecast groups previously separated baseline PV and Additional Achievable (AAPV) forecast into one category but uses the same assumptions as the 2018 CEC IEPR AAPV forecasts<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, the 2018

<sup>2</sup> See 2019-2020 IRP Events and Materials for source documents:

<https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=6442459770>

<sup>3</sup> RESOLVE models, inputs and results are available at: <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=6442464143>

<sup>4</sup> Behind-the-meter PV forecast, CEC, 2019: [https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/02a%20Kona%20BTM%20PV%20Presentation%2011.21.19\\_0\\_0\\_ada.pdf](https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/02a%20Kona%20BTM%20PV%20Presentation%2011.21.19_0_0_ada.pdf)

CEC IEPR AAPV forecast is used to account for the codes and standards driven PV installation required in new homes.

Table 3. DERs Removed in the “No New DER” Case

Energy Efficiency (GWh)	2020	2030	2040	2050
CEC 2019 IEPR - Mid Mid AAEE	1,092	10,229	22,115	34,829
No New DER	1,092	1,092	1,092	1,092
Behind-the-Meter PV (GWh)				
CEC 2019 IEPR - Mid PV Baseline + Mid-Mid AAPV	17,497	37,136	53,251	69,366
CEC 2018 IEPR - Mid-Mid AAPV	134	2,657	6,044	8,960
No New DER	15,068	17,591	20,978	23,894
Behind-the-Meter CHP (GWh)				
CEC 2019 IEPR - Mid Demand	12,331	12,293	-	-
No New DER	12,331	12,293	-	-
Non-PV Non-CHP Self Generation (Includes Storage Losses)				
CEC 2019 IEPR - Mid Demand	297	355	405	455
No New DER	287	287	287	287
BTM PV Capacity (MW)				
CEC 2019 IEPR - Mid PV Baseline + Mid-Mid AAPV	10,238	21,148	30,017	39,699
CEC 2018 IEPR - Mid-Mid AAPV	134	1,511	3,437	5,095
No New DER	8,795	10,172	12,098	13,756
BTM Storage (MW)				
CEC 2019 IEPR - BTM Storage installed capacity	446	1,819	1,819	1,819
No New DER	334	334	334	334
Load Modifying Demand Response (MW)				
Load-Modifying Demand Response: Mid Mid AAEE	(71)	(74)		
No New DER	-	-		
Shed DR (MW)				
Mid	1,617	1,617	1,617	1,617
No New DER	-	-	-	-

## 2.2 “IRP Inputs” Tab

The IRP Inputs tab of the ACC contains all relevant inputs drawn from the IRP except for detailed battery cost and technology specifications that are shown separately on the “Battery Costs” tab. The IRP Inputs tab includes basic planning inputs, such as utility Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and discount rate used in the IRP proceeding. It also includes the natural gas price forecast, which is used in the IRP and originally comes from the state’s Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR). The inputs are shown for the No New DER scenario, which is the same as the RSP except for the levels of DER adoption.

The IRP Inputs tab also shows the financial assumptions for new battery storage (utility-scale lithium-ion battery) installations. This includes the installed capacity and energy costs, levelized capacity and energy costs, and total levelized costs. These costs come from the Pro Forma model used in IRP modeling of generation resource costs. The IRP Inputs tab also includes the storage additions built in the No New DER scenario of RESOLVE. As discussed later in this documentation, the capacity avoided cost component is based on the Net CONE of battery storage, using the IRP cost assumptions and RESOLVE storage build.

## 2.3 SERVM Production Simulation

In this cycle of the ACC, a production simulation model is used to generate values for the energy, ancillary services, and emissions avoided cost components. In versions of the ACC before 2020, this was approached by projecting historical prices forward. As California's electricity grid is rapidly evolving with the integration of renewable energy generation and energy storage, wholesale electricity market price shapes may depart from historical trends. To better reflect these grid changes, 2020 cycle of the Avoided Cost Calculator incorporated production simulation modeling for forecasted years. The CPUC already performs extensive production simulation modeling as a part of the IRP modeling, providing a logical source of consistency between the IRP proceeding and the ACC. For the 2020 ACC, CPUC staff performed SERVM modeling using the No New DER case. SERVM is an 8760 hourly production simulation model provided by Astrapé Consulting that generates wholesale electricity prices based on the input system load and dispatch of the modeled generation portfolio.

Since the 2020 ACC update, Astrapé has updated algorithms used in SERVM and the CPUC staff and Astrapé performed benchmarking of SERVM model results to actual CAISO prices. CPUC staff performed new SERVM modeling with the No New DER portfolio provided by IRP RESOLVE modeling with the updated SERVM model for the 2021 ACC update. A comparison of 2020 and 2021 SERVM model results is presented in Appendix B.

Model runs are performed for years 2021-2031, reflecting forecasted changes in system load and generation portfolio. Each year assumes the CEC's new California Thermal Zone 2022 (CTZ22) typical meteorological year (TMY), shown in the table below.<sup>5</sup> As part of the IRP process, CPUC staff developed predictive models for system load shape and renewable generation profiles based on hourly weather conditions. To accurately model the effects of real weather data, CTZ22 selects specific full historical months, and references those historical months consistently across the state. For example, for the month of June, each climate zone will use local weather data from June 2013. Climate zone effects are then aggregated up to balancing authority and statewide levels.

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<sup>5</sup> See presentations from Oct 17, 2019 CEC Workshop and methodology reports (forthcoming) under Dockets #19-BSTD-03 and #19-BSTD-04: <https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/title24/2022standards/prerulemaking/documents/>

Table 4. CTZ22 Historical Weather Months

CTZ Weather Year	
Month	Year
1	2004
2	2008
3	2014
4	2011
5	2017
6	2013
7	2011
8	2008
9	2006
10	2012
11	2005
12	2004

To accurately model grid conditions, SERVM has representations of each balancing area in WECC. Since the ACC is focused on evaluating programs within IOU territories, SERVM outputs are taken from IOU balancing areas – PG&E Bay, PG&E Valley, SCE, and SDG&E. These results are aggregated up to NP-15 (PG&E Bay and Valley) and SP-15 (SCE and SDG&E) by taking load-weighted averages of hourly market price forecasts.

The SERVM modeling results are used as the basis for energy, ancillary services, and emissions avoided cost components, as discussed in more detail later in this documentation.

### 3 Distribution Resource Planning Proceeding Inputs

In June 2019, the ALJs in the DRP and IDER proceedings jointly issued an Amended Ruling “to determine how to estimate the value that results from using DER to defer transmission and distribution (T&D) infrastructure”.<sup>6</sup> The Ruling includes an Energy Division White Paper entitled *Staff Proposal on Avoided Cost and Locational Granularity of Transmission and Distribution Deferral Values* (T&D Staff White Paper) to estimate avoided T&D costs based on the forecast data provided in the IOU Grids Needs Assessment (GNA) and Distribution Deferral Opportunities Reports (DDOR).

The inputs and analysis from the DRP remain unchanged in the 2021 ACC update. More detailed GNA and DDOR reporting will be provided by the IOUs in the Fall of 2021 and be included in the 2022 ACC update.

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<sup>6</sup> ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S AMENDED RULING REQUESTING COMMENTS ON THE ENERGY DIVISION WHITE PAPER ON AVOIDED COSTS AND LOCATIONAL GRANULARITY OF TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION DEFERRAL VALUES, June 13, 2019.

For the 2020 ACC update, we applied the T&D Staff White Paper methodology for calculating transmission and distribution values in this update. This methodology calculates specified and unspecified costs for both transmission and distribution.

The 2020 ACC update entailed extensive effort to calculate distribution avoided costs based on the Staff White Paper methodology. The IOU's are filing more detailed GNA and DDOR documents in 2021, including needs evaluated at the line section level. The 2021 ACC relies on the prior analysis performed for the 2020 update and we plan to perform a major update with more detailed GNA and DDOR data in 2022.

Specified distribution deferral values are already estimated through the DRP's Distribution Investment Deferral Framework and therefore do not require further modeling to estimate or incorporate their values into the ACC.

Unspecified distribution deferral values are costs that reflect the increased need for distribution capacity projects that are likely to occur in the future, but are not specifically identified in current utility distribution planning. Unspecified distribution deferral values are calculated using a system-average approach and a counterfactual forecast to determine the impact of DERs on load. Transmission avoided costs are developed from general rate case (GRC) data and data provided by the IOUs (Section 9). Distribution avoided costs are developed using information from the Distribution Deferral Opportunity Report and the Grid Needs Assessment, as filed in the DRP proceeding, supplemented with information acquired through data requests (Section 10)

## 4 Natural Gas Avoided Costs

Natural gas avoided costs are developed in a separate ACC for natural gas, which is used to determine the benefits of programs which reduce direct natural gas consumption. The Natural Gas ACC uses natural gas forward prices and CEC IEPR forecasts to develop avoided costs both for retail natural gas consumption and for electric generation (EG). The EG natural gas avoided costs are then used as an input for the Electricity ACC.

In the 2021 ACC, the Cap and Trade Cost Exemption Credit is subtracted from the transportation rate for electric generators in the CEC Model and the ACC model is updated with the latest natural gas futures and historical prices from SNL published in April 2021.

### 4.1 Continental Natural Gas Market

Natural gas delivered to California consumers is traded in an aggregate wholesale market that spans most of North America. Interstate natural gas pipelines transport the gas from the wellhead to wholesale market centers or "pricing hubs," where buyers include marketers, large retail customers, electric generators, and local distribution companies (LDCs) that purchase gas on behalf of small retail customers.

Spot gas is traded in monthly and daily packages. Monthly deals are made during the last week of each month ("bid week") for delivery the following month. Daily trading is generally for delivery the following day. Spot gas trading is overwhelmingly bilateral, with buyers and sellers trading standard contracts by telephone or on electronic bulletin boards. The two pricing hubs most relevant for California are "PG&E Citygate" and "SoCal Border."

### 4.1.1 Futures Contracts

The CME Group offers trading in natural gas futures contracts. A natural gas futures contract is for 10,000 MMBtu delivered uniformly across a calendar month to Henry Hub. Prices are quoted in dollars per MMBtu. At any given time, 72 consecutive monthly contracts are open for trading, beginning with the next calendar month.

Natural gas futures trading is extremely liquid, especially in the early months, and the gas futures contract has become a closely watched barometer of market expectations for future price movements. Natural gas futures prices help discover the spot gas prices in a future delivery period via trading activities of futures buyers and sellers.

### 4.1.2 Basis Trading

The central and most liquid trading hub for natural gas is Henry Hub. Natural gas futures contracts typically trade out for 10 years at Henry Hub. Trading at other points is less active. Traders typically link prices at different locations through “basis differentials.” A basis differential is the difference in the market value of natural gas at a given location and Henry Hub for the same month. Basis differentials respond to temporary events such as localized shortages or surpluses of natural gas supply or reductions in pipeline capacity. They can also vary over time with the introduction of new pipeline or storage capacity, changes in production costs at various locations, or permanent demand shifts.

Forward basis differentials are traded as financial derivatives known as “basis swaps.” The holder of one side of a basis swap agrees to pay the counterparty the difference between the spot prices at the two specified locations at the designated time. The CME Group offers clearing services and calculates settlement prices for forward natural gas basis swaps contracts between Henry Hub and a number of pricing points, including the two California locations mentioned above: PG&E Citygate and SoCal Border. Forward basis swaps contracts are for 2,500 MMBtu, and are settled as the monthly bid week spot price (as defined by a particular price index such as *Natural Gas Intelligence*) minus the final settlement price of a Henry Hub futures contract for the corresponding month. Trading for basis swaps do not trade as far out into the future as Henry Hub futures, typically only five years or less. Settlement prices are only calculated for those months in which traders hold open positions.

Forward prices for Henry Hub, PG&E Citygate and SoCal Border are obtained from the S&P Global Market Intelligence Platform.

## 4.2 Natural Gas Commodity Cost

In order to project natural gas commodity costs, the ACC divides the forecast time frame into three periods, defined by the availability of market data. This hybrid approach combines a market-based forecast for the near-term, when futures contracts are traded, and a model-based forecast for the long-term when there is no futures trading.

- + **Market Period (2021-2025).** During this period, the average future contract prices from the S&P Global Market Intelligence are used for the Henry Hub along with forward prices for the



SoCal Border and PG&E Citygate.<sup>7</sup> The average is over the year and is based on the 22 most recent trading day prices available at the time of update. For the months January through March in 2020, actual closing prices are used.<sup>8</sup>


- + **Transition (2026-2028).** Three-year transition period that is the linear interpolation between the 2025 and 2029 price forecasts.
- + **Model Period (2029 and beyond).** No futures contracts are traded for this period. Therefore, the ACC relies on forecasts of long-term natural gas prices. The CEC IEPR natural gas price forecast is used instead in order to be consistent with the natural gas prices used in the IRP proceeding. The IEPR provides forecasts for the SoCal Border and PG&E Citygate.

The ACC translates the annual forecast values into monthly values using multipliers derived from the IEPR forecast.

#### 4.2.1 Avoidable Marginal Distribution Costs for Core Customers

Avoided distribution costs reflect avoided or deferred upgrades to the distribution systems of each of the three major LDCs in California. Unlike with electricity, hourly allocations are not necessary because of the ability of utilities to “pack the pipe,” making use of the natural storage capacity of gas pipe lines. Costs are allocated to winter peak months, however, to reflect the winter-peak driven capacity costs (especially for distribution pipe serving core customers). The avoided costs are from the Original 2005 Avoided Cost Report, and have only been updated for inflation.

Figure 7. Natural Gas T&D Avoided Costs by Utility



<sup>7</sup> S&P Global, Market Intelligence: Natural Gas Markets Forwards & Futures. West- West Coast Monthly Full Value Future/Forward as of 3/21/2021-04/12/2021

<sup>8</sup> S&P Global, Market Intelligence: Historical Commodity View Spot Natural Gas Index Monthly Average Price. Accessed 4/12/2021

### 4.2.2 Transportation Charges for Electric Generators

Avoided natural gas costs for electric generators serve as inputs to electricity avoided costs. Electric generators in California purchase natural gas directly from the wholesale market, paying only transportation charges to LDCs. Because generators are not core customers, the appropriate measure of avoidable transportation charges is the applicable LDC tariff rate. The CEC IEPR Power Plant Burner Tip Price Model is the source used for natural gas price forecast and transportation rates used in the ACC. The rates from the latest model are shown in Table 5 below.<sup>9</sup>

Table 5. Gas Transportation Charges for Electric Generators (\$/MMBtu)

SoCalGas Backbone	SoCalGas TLS	PG&E Backbone (Redwood to On-System)	PG&E Backbone EG
\$0.3598	\$0.1084	\$0.1717	-\$0.0004

The CEC Model used for the 2020 ACC update included Cap and Trade Costs in the transportation rates. This resulted in a slight double counting of cap and trade costs in the 2020 ACC. Electric generators are eligible for a Cap and Trade Cost Exemption Credit in their natural gas transportation rate because allowances are required for the electricity they produce. In the 2020 version of the CEC model, the Cap and Trade Cost Exemption Credit is subtracted, avoiding the double counting that occurred in the 2020 ACC. With the credit subtracted, the PG&E Backbone rate provided in the CEC model for Electric Generation is very slightly negative. This is due to annual balancing account adjustments with an unusually large credit.<sup>10</sup>

## 5 Avoided Cost of Energy

The ACC has moved to using production simulation to develop energy values for the ACC. As explained earlier in this documentation, the CPUC IRP uses SERVM as a production simulation model and the ACC uses results from SERVM production simulation for energy avoided costs. Market prices reported directly from SERVM include the effects of carbon pricing from the cap and trade market. In post-processing the SERVM prices, the cap and trade value is backed out to provide an hourly energy only value for use in the ACC. The remaining energy value includes only fuel costs and power plant operating costs.

Day-ahead (DA) hourly energy prices from SERVM are used for energy component in the ACC to evaluate all types of DER.<sup>11</sup> SERVM results are also used to develop real-time (RT) energy prices and prices for the ancillary services (AS) frequency regulation and spinning reserves. The RT energy and AS prices are not avoided costs, but are used in two ways. The first is to calculate market revenues earned by battery storage for calculation of generation capacity value (Section 8). The second is to estimate market revenues that could be earned by dispatchable DER participating in wholesale CAISO markets. The RT energy and AS prices are not included in the standard ACC components for DER cost-effectiveness but are made available for use

<sup>9</sup> CEC Power Plant Burner Tip Price Model, June 2020 Model, available at: <https://www.energy.ca.gov/programs-and-topics/topics/energy-assessment/natural-gas-burner-tip-prices-california-and-western>

<sup>10</sup> PG&E Advice Letter 4200-G, December 23, 2019. Available at: [https://www.pge.com/tariffs/assets/pdf/adviceletter/GAS\\_4200-G.pdf](https://www.pge.com/tariffs/assets/pdf/adviceletter/GAS_4200-G.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Note that for electrification measures that increase electric load, this value is a cost, not an 'avoided' cost.

in other CPUC proceedings evaluating dispatchable DER (e.g., for energy storage in the Self-generation Incentive Program).

## 5.1 Post-processing of SERVVM Prices

SERVVM is a production simulation model that represents a theorized and optimized view of the day-ahead market. There are market dynamics that are present in the historical prices but not in the SERVVM simulation. ACC also require additional price streams based on the SERVVM simulation to capture a full spectrum of costs. Therefore, several post-processing steps are applied to SERVVM prices to better reflect historical market prices.

### 5.1.1 Extrapolating SERVVM Energy Prices Beyond 2030

While SERVVM model runs are only produced through 2031, the scope of the ACC extends beyond this timeframe to 2050. To extrapolate energy price beyond 2031, a similar approach to previous ACC cycles is applied. Hourly implied marginal heat rates (IMHR) as defined below remains constant from 2031 onwards.

$$IMHR = \frac{P_e - VOM_{CT}}{P_g + P_c I_c}$$


In which,  $P_e$  is the energy price in \$/MWh,  $VOM_{CT}$  is the variable O&M of a CT generator in \$/MWh,  $P_g$  is the gas price in \$/MMBtu,  $P_c$  is the carbon price in \$/tons and  $I_c$  is the carbon intensity in tons-CO<sub>2</sub>/MMBTU. IMHR is a simple but useful indicator of the marginal resource that is setting the hourly price. It is independent of the impact of evolving gas and carbon prices, which makes it a suitable anchor for extrapolating future energy price. Final hourly electricity market prices are calculated based on these heat rates, coupled with projections of fuel costs, power plant O&M costs and carbon prices. Fuel costs for final calculation of electricity generation prices are consistent with natural gas commodity prices discussed in Section 4.

### 5.1.2 Price Cap and Floor

First, a price floor of \$0/MWh is set. Historical locational marginal prices in CASIO do fall below zero during hours of curtailment; this approach assumes that those negative prices are largely driven by Renewable Energy Credits from potentially curtailed renewable generation. In this cycle of the ACC, these negative prices are represented in the GHG Adder component – increasing load in those hours will reduce the costs of meeting electricity sector emissions targets. This reduction of costs is analogous to consuming more energy in negatively priced hours that are driven by curtailed renewables.

Secondly, a price cap of \$250/MWh is also set on the energy price. SERVVM prices could jump beyond \$500/MWh in some most extreme hours, which lacks precedent in modern day CAISO market as shown in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8. Comparing Historical and SERVM Simulated Energy Prices, Showing Price Cap




### 5.1.3 Scarcity Function

A scarcity scaling function is also applied to SERVM results to better capture the non-ideal market conditions prominent in the highest hours, when the system is operating near full capacity. Production simulation models are typically over optimized or simplified, and unable to capture probabilistic real-world variables, such as contingency events, forecast errors, and market irrationality. Prices during these periods of scarcity when the system is strained are generally higher than predicted from fundamentals-based projections.

E3's internal benchmarks to typical historical years have shown a markedly higher DA prices in approximately the top 5% on the market relative to production-simulation results. Given these observations, we apply a multiplier that scales up the top 5% of hours in a year. The scaling is applied to the implied heat rates rather than directly to exclude impacts of changing gas price, carbon price, and other such variables across the time horizon. The full scaling coefficient is applied to the top hour, but is exponentially scaled down progressively across the block of hours, such that the scalar value of the 168<sup>th</sup> hour is 1. The scaling coefficient was set to 1.3 and obtained by scaling the scarcity scalar used in E3's internal market price forecasts based on the top price in the 2020, the benchmark year.

Figure 9. Raw SERVM prices vs. Scarcity adjusted SERVM prices for Year 2020



Last year's update applied a piecemeal approach, which sliced the IMHR duration curve of a benchmark year into multiple strands and attempted to calculate coefficients for a set of implied heat rate bins. These coefficients are used to scale each piece of the curve to approximate historical data. This approach tended to push up an unrealistically large number of hours in each year. As seen in Figure 10, SERVM prices modified with the 2020 approach overshoots historical 2019 data across most of the year. Moreover, this method tends to suffer from problems related to overfitting. The coefficients are tuned against the price patterns in the benchmark year, then applied to prices across the entire study horizon. Should price patterns due to the evolving CA system portfolio, these relationships may no longer hold and could result in unintuitive results. This year, a less heavy-handed approach was favored to overcome the weaknesses identified last year. Figure 11 demonstrates how the current scarcity procedure affects only the highest 168 hours annually.

Figure 10. Impact of previous year's scarcity adjustment on raw SERVM prices relative to historical data






Figure 11. Impact of current year's scarcity adjustment on raw SERVVM prices relative to historical data



#### 5.1.4 Real-time Prices

Real-time market (15-minute) prices are also developed based on the scarcity adjusted hourly prices, to serve as input to the energy price revenue stream. The ACC uses the day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) price divergence in 2019 and superimposed this hourly divergence on top of future simulated future day-ahead price to obtain synthetic real time prices. An overall diagram of the synthetic RT series can be seen in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Overall Methodology of Generating Future Real-time Prices



It is indeed unlikely that historical DA/RT divergence would repeat itself hour by hour in the future. However, ACC is not concerned with accurately calculating revenue for an individual hour, but rather representing cost mitigation over an extended and aggregated period. In this aspect, this methodology can capture aggregated annual DA/RT divergence. Inherent in this methodology is also the assumption that the annual DA/RT divergence would persist into the future. The current divergence is largely driven by stochastic events such as renewable/load forecast errors and unscheduled unit outage. This methodology essentially assumes that future storage installation would cancel out increase in net-load forecast error due

to increasing renewable installation, and the total amount of uncertainty remains at the current manageable level.

## 5.2 Energy Price Calendar Alignment

Users of the ACC generally calculate the impacts of a DER by multiplying the hourly avoided costs from the ACC by the hourly impact shape of their DER measure. Many DER impact shapes can vary significantly between weekdays and weekends/holidays because of different usage levels on non-workdays. It is therefore important that the weekends/holidays line up correctly in the impact shape and avoided cost data. The standard approach is to estimate impact shapes using a single defined calendar, regardless of what year's avoided costs are being used. To accommodate this, the avoided costs need to reflect the same chronology for all years. For example, in the 2019 ACC, all years reflected a 2018 calendar year.

In this ACC, all years reflect a 2020 calendar year (excluding the leap year day). SERVM modeling, however, matches the calendar to the year being modeled. For example, 2020 starts on a Wednesday, while 2021 starts on a Friday. To accommodate the varying calendars in SERVM, the energy prices for years that do match the 2020 calendar (excluding the leap day), are shifted to align weekdays and weekends/holidays as if the year started on a Wednesday. The total annual energy prices of the original and shifted energy prices remain the same.

## 5.3 Energy Component Results

Following these steps, prices follow a trend of increased renewable generation and curtailment in the spring. In near-term years, peak prices occur in the summer evenings. In later years, peak prices continue to occur in summer system peak hours, but also move to the evenings and mornings of months that have limited renewable generation availability. The example results of the scarcity adjusted DA energy prices from SERVM for NP-15 are shown below in Figure 13 to Figure 14.

Figure 13. 2021 NP-15 Day Ahead Market Prices from SERVM

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	28	28	27	26	28	30	33	40	33	46	28	24	24	25	24	29	33	47	66	68	59	41	28	26	35
Feb	70	55	58	54	65	68	81	79	73	60	54	49	52	47	53	61	77	123	161	151	142	115	83	63	79
Mar	28	18	16	18	17	24	31	33	29	24	21	17	13	17	22	31	21	42	70	76	72	45	20	16	30
Apr	6	16	18	13	12	22	34	19	14	12	7	5	5	6	8	15	19	26	58	81	65	41	9	11	22
May	19	7	12	11	9	20	36	31	22	16	14	12	14	13	14	25	34	38	46	75	52	23	12	19	24
Jun	18	20	19	19	19	25	31	29	24	29	37	35	45	46	50	49	47	48	63	76	52	30	20	17	35
Jul	16	25	16	15	19	17	30	37	38	38	40	37	43	45	62	70	58	66	80	76	49	27	19	17	39
Aug	33	37	36	30	37	31	31	26	25	27	32	34	39	56	41	42	54	60	81	76	45	36	33	31	41
Sep	33	33	32	32	49	35	42	30	30	28	27	30	31	42	40	42	50	64	84	66	45	36	31	31	40
Oct	52	36	29	44	46	52	44	32	32	26	22	22	24	31	32	43	99	54	62	49	45	41	32	32	41
Nov	34	37	36	26	44	65	55	39	33	28	26	23	24	26	26	39	99	66	66	61	55	55	34	33	43
Dec	30	31	29	28	29	40	36	37	39	32	31	28	35	26	33	30	90	58	69	65	64	51	37	32	41
Avg	30	28	27	26	31	35	40	36	32	30	28	26	29	32	34	40	57	57	75	76	62	45	29	27	39

Figure 14. 2030 NP-15 Day Ahead Market Prices from SERVM

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	62	53	44	44	44	53	69	65	47	41	37	35	34	35	35	51	90	151	67	66	65	91	80	62	59
Feb	61	56	46	45	50	49	71	50	41	26	28	19	18	25	22	26	58	140	74	80	76	94	67	55	53
Mar	53	35	40	39	42	50	67	47	17	8	7	6	3	4	11	11	40	91	101	105	96	77	46	45	43
Apr	28	34	31	18	51	45	39	15	1	0	0	0	11	0	1	13	12	44	99	116	101	57	26	29	32
May	39	28	24	27	23	37	47	6	1	1	0	1	3	3	2	8	23	52	60	122	102	87	53	33	33
Jun	42	29	34	29	35	38	56	19	15	9	5	6	7	10	15	24	54	67	103	129	100	74	52	37	41
Jul	39	30	35	17	33	27	39	15	3	4	2	3	4	14	16	34	77	115	105	170	89	80	51	35	43
Aug	43	39	47	40	44	44	40	30	22	20	18	21	29	37	48	78	52	82	192	186	63	49	50	43	55
Sep	45	43	55	47	55	57	45	29	19	20	11	13	16	22	33	37	57	108	176	94	52	56	50	42	49
Oct	51	47	43	42	44	63	62	35	28	23	17	16	17	20	33	56	71	125	92	78	79	55	48	53	50
Nov	63	44	52	53	43	46	63	44	26	21	15	14	15	20	22	43	87	81	78	86	122	77	45	51	51
Dec	44	44	43	43	44	59	80	71	53	40	38	34	32	31	33	50	115	77	75	67	85	61	53	47	55
Avg	47	40	41	37	42	47	56	36	23	18	15	14	16	19	23	36	61	94	102	109	86	71	52	44	47

Figure 15. 2045 NP-15 Day Ahead Market Prices from SERVM

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	116	98	82	82	82	99	129	121	87	77	70	65	64	65	65	90	148	268	123	124	121	166	139	111	108
Feb	114	104	86	83	93	91	133	93	77	48	51	35	33	47	40	49	109	256	139	144	136	161	125	103	98
Mar	99	67	76	73	80	94	127	90	31	15	13	11	6	8	21	21	71	166	191	199	181	145	86	85	81
Apr	47	58	59	34	92	85	73	29	1	1	1	0	15	1	2	19	23	77	177	220	192	107	49	54	59
May	73	52	45	50	43	70	88	11	1	2	1	2	6	5	3	14	43	97	113	222	192	163	100	62	61
Jun	77	54	64	55	66	72	105	35	24	16	10	12	13	19	28	45	102	127	184	241	189	140	99	70	77
Jul	73	56	66	32	61	51	73	28	5	8	3	5	8	27	30	63	145	205	197	303	168	150	96	67	80
Aug	81	73	87	76	84	82	75	57	42	38	34	39	55	70	91	148	98	149	313	309	119	92	94	81	99
Sep	86	81	100	89	104	109	86	56	36	38	22	25	31	43	63	71	103	201	289	174	100	106	96	80	91
Oct	97	89	81	80	84	120	117	67	53	45	33	31	32	38	57	96	130	225	176	149	146	104	91	101	93
Nov	115	85	100	95	82	88	120	84	49	40	29	27	28	39	42	77	166	155	149	165	220	142	86	98	95
Dec	83	82	81	81	83	107	144	134	100	76	72	65	60	58	62	89	185	140	137	124	151	112	100	88	101
Avg	88	75	77	69	79	89	106	67	42	34	28	27	29	35	42	66	110	172	183	198	159	132	97	83	87

Figure 16. 2050 NP-15 Day Ahead Market Prices from SERVM

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	146	122	103	103	103	125	163	152	110	97	88	82	80	82	82	112	178	327	153	156	150	201	171	137	134
Feb	143	130	108	104	117	115	167	117	97	60	64	44	42	59	51	62	137	315	174	179	168	195	157	129	122
Mar	126	85	96	93	101	119	161	113	39	19	16	14	7	10	24	26	87	206	242	252	229	184	109	107	103
Apr	57	71	74	43	114	107	93	36	2	1	1	1	17	1	3	22	29	95	219	275	241	133	63	69	74
May	92	66	57	63	55	88	111	14	1	3	1	3	7	6	4	18	54	122	143	274	242	206	126	79	76
Jun	95	68	80	70	84	92	133	45	28	21	12	15	17	24	35	57	129	160	229	296	239	178	125	89	97
Jul	92	70	84	40	75	64	92	35	7	9	4	7	10	34	38	79	183	252	247	367	212	189	121	84	100
Aug	102	92	108	96	106	104	95	72	53	48	43	49	69	89	115	187	124	186	364	367	150	116	119	102	123
Sep	109	103	124	114	132	139	109	71	45	48	27	32	39	54	80	91	129	249	339	217	127	135	121	102	114
Oct	123	113	103	102	107	152	149	85	67	57	42	39	40	49	70	118	160	278	223	189	183	133	115	128	118
Nov	144	107	125	118	104	111	153	107	62	51	37	34	36	49	53	95	209	197	190	208	271	175	109	124	120
Dec	105	104	102	102	106	133	178	168	126	96	91	82	76	73	78	110	221	175	171	152	187	140	127	111	126
Avg	111	94	97	87	100	112	134	85	53	43	36	33	37	44	53	82	137	213	225	245	200	165	122	105	109

## 6 Ancillary Services

### 6.1 Avoided Ancillary Service Procurement

Ancillary services (AS) are procured in the day-ahead CAISO market largely on the basis of total load forecast for the following day. Reducing load generally reduces the amount of spin and non-spin AS that must be procured to operate the CAISO system. This load dependent AS procurement is approximately 0.9% of total wholesale energy costs, based on the latest CAISO Annual Report on Market Issues and Performance,



currently for 2018.<sup>12</sup> Regulation services are excluded from this amount because their procurement is generally independent of load.

SERVM production simulation is providing forecasted values for energy and for ancillary services for the 2021 ACC update. The 2021 ACC takes advantage of this information to adjust the avoided AS procurement costs going forward. The ACC calculates the ratio of spinning reserve to energy prices from 2020-2030 SERVM results and adjusts the 0.9% value from the 2018 CAISO report accordingly. The 0.9% is adjusted proportionally each year to reflect the AS as a percent of energy prices calculated from SERVM from 2021 to 2030 and then held constant through 2050.

## 6.2 Ancillary Service Market Revenues

New for the 2020 ACC, SERVM production simulation also provides prices to calculate potential market revenues from dispatchable DERs participating in wholesale markets or providing AS type services for the electric grid. These results are also used to calculate market revenues from energy storage for generation capacity value (Section 8). Real-time energy, frequency regulation and spinning reserve prices are produced from SERVM results. These follow a similar trend to energy prices, with low-cost hours corresponding with high solar generation and high cost hours corresponding with high system net load.

Ancillary Service market prices from SERVM are also only produced for each balancing authority (BA) in WECC, for years 2020-2031. Similar to NP-15 and SP-15 energy prices, ancillary service prices for NP-15 and SP-15 are calculated as load-weighted averages of PG&E Bay and PG&E Valley (NP-15), and SCE and SDG&E (SP-15). AS prices are assumed to stay constant in real dollars after 2031.

SERVM produces a single price for frequency regulation, whereas the CAISO has separate markets for regulation up and regulation down. The single price from SERVM is divided in half to separately represent regulation up and regulation down prices for CAISO. The resulting NP-15 frequency regulation and spinning reserve prices from SERVM for 2020 and 2030 are shown in Figure 17 through Figure 23.

## 6.3 Splitting into Reg Up and Down

The regulation price forecast provided from SERVM production simulation lumps the reg up and down pricing into a singular reg price. However, to account for the AS value streams in the ACC, we need the granularity to differentiate between downward and upward regulation price.

To achieve this, a simple linear spline function is used to capture the relationship between historical regulation up fraction and historical IMHR. IMHR is once again used as the predictor here as in the scarcity pricing adjustment of the previous chapter since it indicates the marginal generator and, consequently, whether the market is in surplus or shortage of resource.

Fitting a spline function over a full year of hourly 2019 data yielded a reasonable trend for the reg up fraction, which increases as IMHR goes up. This is expected, as an increasing IMHR indicates a shortage of resource

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<sup>12</sup> CAISO, 2018 Report on Market Issues and Performance, p. 141-142 and Figure 6.2. May 15, 2019. Available at: <http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/MarketMonitoring/AnnualQuarterlyReports/Default.aspx>. Total cost of AS as a percentage of wholesale energy costs is 1.7%, and 53% of that is estimated to be spin and non-spin, resulting in 0.9%.

and therefore an increase in price for upward regulation. Applying this fitted spline function to simulated reg prices of future years also yielded a reasonable diurnal trend for regulation prices, with most of it being reg down during solar surplus noon hours, and most of it being reg up during the afternoon ramp.

Figure 17 A. Linear spline functions to describe the historical relationship between reg up fraction and IMHR. B. Average hourly reg up and reg down price for 2020-2050. Highlighting diurnal trend.




Figure 18. 2021 NP-15 Regulation Up Market Prices from SERVIM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
Feb	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.9	2.1	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.4
Mar	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.4	1.7	1.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.1	0.8	1.3
Apr	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.3	1.3	1.7	2.3	2.6	3.0	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.2	2.1	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.4	1.6
May	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.1	1.6	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.0	2.7	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.4	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.5	1.3
Jun	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.8	1.5	1.7	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.2	1.7	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.8	0.4	1.4
Jul	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.8	1.5	2.1	2.6	6.2	5.3	5.5	3.7	3.0	0.4	0.2	1.5
Aug	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.9	3.7	6.8	5.2	4.8	3.0	5.3	1.0	1.1	2.1
Sep	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.9	4.5	4.5	8.2	9.7	5.5	3.2	6.1	4.3	1.6	2.8
Oct	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.8	2.3	1.8	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.4	0.9	1.2
Nov	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.3	0.9	1.0	1.0
Dec	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7
Avg	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.9	2.8	2.3	1.7	2.0	1.2	0.9	1.4

Figure 19. 2030 NP-15 Regulation Up Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.7	4.2	4.9	4.7	3.8	3.1	2.8	1.9	1.5	1.8	3.7	5.8	4.6	4.4	3.9	5.3	6.0	1.2	2.9
Feb	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.2	2.5	3.6	2.2	1.6	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.2	1.2	5.8	6.3	6.6	5.0	4.5	2.0	1.0	2.4
Mar	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.5	1.6	1.7	3.7	4.9	5.2	5.8	5.8	5.9	5.4	3.7	1.4	3.4	8.0	9.4	8.9	4.1	2.0	1.7	3.7
Apr	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	2.6	6.7	6.3	6.4	7.2	7.3	6.4	5.5	3.8	4.5	4.7	1.5	3.8	4.5	2.8	1.3	0.4	0.2	3.2
May	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.8	1.7	4.6	6.4	9.0	10.0	10.9	11.0	9.5	8.3	8.5	9.5	4.0	2.1	3.3	3.9	3.3	1.8	0.6	0.6	4.7
Jun	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.8	2.9	4.7	4.6	5.8	5.8	6.4	6.5	6.1	7.7	4.8	1.8	3.1	6.7	7.6	5.7	3.4	1.4	1.5	3.8
Jul	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.5	2.1	2.7	3.3	3.6	4.3	4.4	4.6	5.0	2.9	1.7	4.9	7.1	7.8	6.2	4.4	1.2	0.9	2.9
Aug	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.5	3.2	3.4	4.0	2.5	2.6	5.8	6.8	6.3	5.1	4.8	5.1	3.8	3.1
Sep	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	3.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.1	2.5	6.4	7.8	6.3	6.2	6.1	4.6	3.7	3.1
Oct	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.9	1.9	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	8.6	8.4	7.7	7.1	4.5	2.9	1.6	2.7
Nov	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.3	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.8	2.9	8.3	8.5	9.9	10.2	7.6	4.0	1.6	3.0
Dec	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.6	2.4	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.2	1.8	1.6	2.3	2.2	4.4	5.4	5.2	8.5	7.2	6.7	2.1	2.9
Avg	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.4	2.1	3.1	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.3	2.6	5.0	6.4	6.6	6.1	4.6	3.1	1.6	3.2

Figure 20. 2045 NP-15 Regulation Up Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.8	3.0	4.7	12.7	12.2	13.0	11.1	8.9	7.7	5.2	4.5	4.8	10.0	16.1	12.3	11.3	11.5	14.7	16.3	3.9	8.1
Feb	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.6	4.2	7.0	11.2	7.9	6.0	7.5	6.2	6.3	6.1	5.9	4.2	4.0	18.8	18.2	18.8	17.7	13.2	6.8	2.9	7.6
Mar	3.0	2.4	2.7	2.9	2.8	4.5	4.8	4.6	11.0	15.2	16.2	17.8	16.9	17.9	16.4	11.5	4.9	10.6	25.3	28.1	24.8	14.1	6.7	5.0	11.3
Apr	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.8	2.3	9.1	21.8	19.2	19.8	22.1	22.4	19.6	16.9	11.8	14.5	14.8	5.1	10.8	14.6	8.9	4.6	1.1	0.6	10.1
May	1.9	1.4	1.0	1.1	2.5	6.5	14.4	18.9	27.7	30.0	33.4	33.7	29.1	25.6	26.3	28.6	12.2	6.5	10.0	12.8	10.1	5.2	1.9	1.6	14.3
Jun	3.6	1.1	1.5	1.5	3.6	2.1	9.1	14.7	14.4	17.3	17.2	18.9	19.2	19.5	22.9	14.5	5.3	9.2	21.4	23.1	17.3	10.1	4.4	4.0	11.5
Jul	2.1	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.2	4.6	6.7	8.3	10.2	11.1	13.4	13.8	14.7	14.8	9.1	5.3	16.5	21.2	25.0	19.0	14.3	4.4	2.8	9.3
Aug	5.4	3.7	3.7	3.6	4.1	5.3	3.0	4.2	4.2	6.4	6.2	7.8	9.8	8.7	12.4	7.0	6.0	17.4	21.6	19.0	16.7	14.8	15.0	9.9	9.0
Sep	5.5	4.2	3.9	4.3	4.3	8.8	4.1	4.3	3.7	4.8	4.7	6.9	6.5	7.5	8.7	5.7	6.9	18.7	22.3	17.4	18.5	16.5	13.7	9.8	8.8
Oct	4.2	3.5	2.8	2.9	3.4	6.9	6.1	4.0	4.3	4.2	3.8	4.8	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.4	27.2	26.9	23.8	22.2	15.6	10.4	5.2	8.7
Nov	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.2	2.2	3.7	6.0	4.6	3.0	3.6	2.7	3.0	2.9	3.2	3.7	4.7	9.0	23.5	24.3	27.2	30.1	19.2	12.5	4.0	8.5
Dec	1.9	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.6	2.7	3.9	6.3	7.2	7.9	6.7	5.3	5.6	4.6	4.5	5.9	6.9	12.1	15.9	15.0	23.4	20.7	14.6	4.1	7.6
Avg	2.9	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.5	4.3	6.4	9.5	10.3	11.6	11.9	12.5	12.0	11.3	11.5	9.7	7.6	15.1	19.2	19.7	18.4	13.6	9.0	4.5	9.6

Figure 21. 2050 NP-15 Regulation Up Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	4.2	6.5	19.0	17.4	18.5	15.7	12.4	10.0	7.7	5.7	6.9	14.4	23.2	19.2	17.1	14.6	20.3	24.5	5.5	11.5
Feb	3.0	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.2	5.2	10.5	15.0	10.6	7.9	9.9	9.1	8.5	8.9	8.9	5.4	5.5	26.9	28.1	26.6	21.5	19.2	8.9	5.0	10.7
Mar	5.0	3.1	3.9	3.5	3.9	5.9	8.0	7.9	17.5	22.3	23.3	25.2	25.1	26.5	23.4	17.4	7.9	14.4	40.6	40.2	36.4	20.1	10.1	7.6	16.6
Apr	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.5	1.1	2.6	11.7	29.0	28.2	28.7	32.1	32.6	28.5	24.6	17.1	20.2	20.8	6.2	16.0	21.4	13.2	5.2	1.6	0.7	14.3
May	2.5	2.4	1.4	1.5	3.4	9.2	21.2	28.5	40.3	44.6	48.5	47.8	42.4	37.2	38.4	40.2	17.4	9.4	14.7	18.3	14.6	7.8	3.0	2.3	20.7
Jun	4.9	1.4	1.6	1.6	4.1	2.6	10.5	18.1	20.7	25.5	24.0	25.9	26.6	26.3	31.7	21.1	7.2	12.7	29.3	32.1	24.8	13.5	6.5	5.8	15.8
Jul	3.2	1.5	1.5	0.9	1.3	1.8	6.2	9.8	12.0	14.8	16.2	19.5	20.2	21.1	21.6	12.1	7.2	24.2	30.0	37.2	28.3	19.4	7.1	3.9	13.4
Aug	7.2	4.7	4.9	4.6	5.1	5.8	3.9	6.0	6.2	9.1	8.4	9.9	12.8	14.4	16.2	9.3	8.9	27.4	30.9	27.0	22.2	21.6	18.2	14.2	12.4
Sep	8.3	7.1	6.4	6.4	7.2	14.5	6.9	6.2	5.8	7.3	6.9	10.0	10.0	12.0	13.3	9.7	10.9	28.2	34.8	29.9	29.4	26.6	22.8	15.2	14.0
Oct	6.0	5.3	4.0	4.3	4.5	8.0	8.6	6.0	5.8	5.3	5.8	7.1	7.7	8.1	7.5	7.7	8.3	39.3	37.8	33.3	31.8	21.6	14.4	7.6	12.3
Nov	3.1	3.2	4.5	3.0	3.4	5.1	8.5	5.5	4.8	5.7	5.0	4.1	4.4	4.9	5.7	7.5	11.9	34.4	32.9	38.4	40.7	30.8	15.5	5.5	12.0
Dec	3.4	3.4	2.5	2.4	2.3	4.5	6.4	10.5	12.9	10.9	9.3	9.5	9.9	7.4	7.2	10.2	10.1	17.6	22.3	24.1	35.6	30.0	28.5	8.0	12.0
Avg	4.2	3.2	3.1	2.9	3.5	5.8	9.0	13.4	15.2	16.8	17.2	17.8	17.2	16.6	16.5	14.0	10.9	22.0	28.1	28.8	26.1	19.7	13.5	6.8	13.8

Figure 22. 2021 NP-15 Regulation down Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.6	1.3	1.1
Feb	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	1.2	1.5	0.8
Mar	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.4	2.1	2.7	2.0	1.6	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.4	2.3	2.0	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6
Apr	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.5	3.3	3.4	5.0	4.9	5.1	4.8	4.5	4.8	5.6	3.9	2.1	1.6	0.7	0.5	0.6	1.3	1.3	1.8	2.9
May	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.9	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.5	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.1	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	2.0
Jun	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.6	2.3	2.4	1.9	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.1	0.7	1.5
Jul	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.8	2.1	5.3	2.9	2.2	4.0	4.1	0.9	0.3	1.3	1.3
Aug	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	2.1	3.0	3.0	5.6	2.4	2.5	3.0	5.9	1.4	1.3	2.0
Sep	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	1.5	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.6	2.8	4.3	3.5	4.4	3.8	3.4	3.3	6.9	6.3	2.4	2.4
Oct	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.9	1.3	1.3
Nov	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.1
Dec	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.9	1.3	0.9
Avg	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.1	1.8	2.2	1.4	1.3	1.5	2.3	1.7	1.3	1.6

Figure 23. 2030 NP-15 Regulation down Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.8	5.1	5.1	6.0	5.0	4.4	3.6	2.7	2.1	1.9	2.6	2.6	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.6	5.5	1.8	3.1
Feb	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.8	2.8	4.7	3.7	3.8	3.2	3.3	2.8	2.2	2.6	1.9	1.5	3.7	5.6	5.8	5.6	3.6	2.0	1.4	2.8
Mar	1.2	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.6	2.3	8.0	8.4	8.5	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.0	5.0	2.1	3.0	4.4	3.4	3.7	4.3	3.1	2.0	4.1	4.1
Apr	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3	5.5	12.6	11.4	11.3	9.7	9.2	7.7	6.9	4.8	4.4	6.0	2.5	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.4	0.5	4.4
May	0.7	0.9	0.7	1.4	3.2	3.2	7.9	12.3	13.3	12.5	14.3	13.8	12.5	10.5	10.7	11.5	4.7	2.3	2.9	2.1	2.0	1.5	1.0	0.7	6.1
Jun	1.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.1	0.6	3.3	8.1	9.1	8.1	8.7	9.0	9.5	9.1	8.0	5.5	1.5	2.2	3.6	2.9	2.4	2.3	1.6	1.7	4.2
Jul	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	2.6	4.4	5.5	5.1	5.4	6.0	7.0	6.9	6.3	4.4	2.0	4.4	3.1	2.5	3.2	3.9	2.1	1.6	3.4
Aug	1.9	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.1	3.8	3.9	4.3	3.9	2.6	2.3	5.1	1.7	2.2	5.3	5.8	5.3	4.4	3.0
Sep	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	4.1	1.9	2.1	3.1	3.1	3.9	3.6	4.2	4.4	4.3	2.9	2.0	2.8	2.9	4.9	6.1	4.7	5.7	4.4	3.3
Oct	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.8	2.2	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.8	3.2	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.3	1.7	4.6	4.8	6.2	6.4	6.2	4.5	2.4	3.0
Nov	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.5	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.1	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.6	6.4	5.2	1.7	2.6
Dec	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.2	2.2	3.0	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	2.2	1.4	3.7	3.3	5.0	5.8	7.3	6.2	1.6	2.6
Avg	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.7	2.8	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.6	5.2	4.8	3.9	2.5	3.5	3.6	3.9	4.4	4.4	3.6	2.0	3.6

Figure 24. 2045 NP-15 Regulation down Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.5	5.9	15.9	18.4	19.9	15.8	14.1	11.8	9.2	6.5	6.5	9.6	9.6	16.1	15.5	13.4	15.8	19.0	5.5	10.2
Feb	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.9	3.1	5.0	9.0	14.3	10.1	10.8	9.0	10.3	8.7	7.1	8.5	5.4	4.2	10.2	18.3	19.3	14.8	11.5	5.5	4.5	8.4
Mar	3.8	2.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	4.0	5.2	7.6	24.7	25.9	26.0	25.3	26.3	25.3	24.5	15.1	5.8	9.0	12.8	11.1	13.8	11.5	8.8	6.2	12.7
Apr	1.4	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	3.5	15.8	37.4	35.0	34.8	29.9	28.2	23.7	21.3	14.8	13.0	18.1	7.3	6.9	5.7	6.1	5.0	4.3	1.5	13.2
May	2.2	3.0	2.5	4.1	9.7	8.6	24.0	38.5	40.9	38.9	44.0	42.3	38.6	32.2	32.4	35.8	14.7	7.3	9.2	5.5	6.1	5.1	2.8	2.4	18.8
Jun	3.8	1.1	1.4	1.5	3.7	2.2	9.8	24.5	27.8	25.6	27.3	28.2	29.8	27.2	25.1	17.2	4.7	7.0	10.1	9.1	7.7	7.5	4.8	5.8	13.0
Jul	2.5	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.2	8.0	13.3	16.7	15.9	16.5	18.3	21.1	20.7	19.9	13.4	5.9	12.3	10.2	6.4	9.9	11.4	5.5	4.7	10.1
Aug	6.3	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.7	5.4	4.3	8.6	9.4	9.0	10.5	11.7	11.8	14.8	12.0	8.7	9.0	16.1	4.4	6.8	15.2	17.6	17.1	15.1	9.6
Sep	7.1	6.3	5.9	5.7	5.6	14.2	6.3	6.5	9.7	9.7	12.2	11.3	13.5	13.9	12.6	9.7	7.0	9.4	10.7	16.9	19.4	16.6	18.0	15.0	11.0
Oct	4.3	4.0	3.3	3.5	3.6	7.5	6.3	5.0	6.7	6.6	8.5	9.3	8.7	9.3	8.5	6.9	5.8	13.5	13.7	18.8	19.3	17.2	12.1	6.8	8.7
Nov	2.9	3.2	3.7	3.1	3.9	4.2	4.5	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.9	5.8	5.6	5.7	6.8	8.1	6.2	17.3	17.2	19.6	18.2	23.9	15.8	6.1	8.7
Dec	3.1	2.9	2.2	2.2	2.0	3.1	4.6	7.6	11.9	10.7	10.1	9.9	8.7	8.0	6.4	7.9	4.0	12.8	10.9	16.3	20.4	23.8	24.9	7.4	9.2
Avg	3.6	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.8	5.3	8.6	15.4	18.2	17.9	18.1	18.0	17.4	16.3	14.9	12.4	7.9	11.0	11.7	12.5	13.7	13.9	11.6	6.8	11.2

Figure 25. 2050 NP-15 Regulation down Market Prices from SERVM and Heat Rate Predicted Splitting

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	4.3	3.8	4.2	3.9	4.4	5.2	8.8	22.6	27.1	29.3	23.5	21.1	18.3	13.2	10.3	9.6	14.1	14.2	22.0	21.8	21.7	23.9	26.9	8.1	15.1
Feb	4.2 <td>3.9</td> <td>3.9</td> <td>4.3</td> <td>5.0</td> <td>8.2</td> <td>12.8</td> <td>22.1</td> <td>15.6</td> <td>16.5</td> <td>14.2</td> <td>14.9</td> <td>13.3</td> <td>10.3</td> <td>12.0</td> <td>8.5</td> <td>6.4</td> <td>15.3</td> <td>24.9</td> <td>28.8</td> <td>25.7</td> <td>16.7</td> <td>9.1</td> <td>5.8</td> <td>12.6</td>	3.9	3.9	4.3	5.0	8.2	12.8	22.1	15.6	16.5	14.2	14.9	13.3	10.3	12.0	8.5	6.4	15.3	24.9	28.8	25.7	16.7	9.1	5.8	12.6
Mar	4.8	4.0	5.2	5.7	5.2	6.5	6.5	9.7	34.5	37.3	38.0	37.8	37.7	36.2	36.1	21.3	7.6	14.0	14.8	16.8	19.6	17.1	12.5	8.7	18.2
Apr	2.2	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.4	5.8	24.4	57.2	50.7	50.5	43.5	41.0	34.4	31.0	21.6	19.7	27.0	11.7	9.7	8.0	8.6	8.7	6.3	2.3	19.6
May	3.4	3.9	3.6	6.1	14.3	12.6	34.5	54.9	59.4	55.6	63.9	62.6	56.1	46.8	46.9	53.4	21.6	10.6	13.2	8.3	9.0	7.1	3.9	3.5	27.3
Jun	5.7	1.8	2.5	2.8	6.4	3.6	17.0	38.9	40.6	36.8	40.7	42.6	44.6	41.6	38.1	25.0	7.4	10.9	16.4	14.7	11.7	12.1	6.9	8.4	19.9
Jul	3.4	2.8	2.3	2.8	3.0	3.1	12.2	19.3	24.3	23.0	24.0	26.5	30.6	30.2	29.0	20.6	9.2	17.6	15.6	8.5	13.6	18.0	7.3	7.1	14.7
Aug	9.9	6.7	6.1	6.4	7.6	9.8	6.8	12.6	13.7	13.3	15.9	18.4	18.7	19.7	19.3	13.4	12.9	21.3	6.9	10.5	24.2	25.6	28.5	22.2	14.6
Sep	10.0	8.2	7.9	8.1	7.3	19.1	8.1	9.5	13.7	13.8	17.7	16.3	19.1	19.2	17.7	12.6	9.3	12.6	13.1	19.8	25.6	21.5	23.2	20.8	14.8
Oct	6.4	5.6	4.9	5.0	5.6	12.9	9.5	7.1	10.1	10.3	12.0	13.5	12.8	12.7	12.2	10.2	8.0	19.8	21.2	28.7	28.6	26.0	18.2	9.9	13.0
Nov	4.7	5.5	5.2	4.7	5.4	6.3	6.8	10.3	8.8	8.8	9.0	8.8	7.9	8.1	9.5	11.1	10.2	24.7	27.3	29.6	29.4	31.8	25.5	9.3	12.9
Dec	3.8	3.8	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.9	6.0	9.7	14.8	16.1	15.2	12.6	10.9	10.8	8.6	9.8	5.7	18.5	16.6	21.5	28.0	34.8	29.0	8.9	12.4
Avg	5.2	4.3	4.2	4.5	5.7	8.1	12.8	22.8	26.2	26.0	26.5	26.4	25.5	23.4	21.8	18.0	11.6	16.0	16.7	18.0	20.4	20.3	16.5	9.6	16.6

## 7 Avoided Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

To determine the avoided costs of GHG emissions, it is necessary to determine both the *amount* and the *value* of GHG emissions from the electric grid.

### 7.1 GHG Value

The 2020 ACC updated the valuation of GHG emissions to better align with the IRP and California's GHG reduction goals. The value of GHG emissions is represented by the sum of two values: 1) the monetized carbon cap and trade allowance cost embedded in energy prices, and 2) the non-monetized carbon price beyond the cost of cap and trade allowances (represented by the "GHG Adder," as adopted by the CPUC).<sup>13</sup> The GHG Adder reflects the cost of further reducing carbon emissions from electricity supply, rather than the compliance cost represented by the cap and trade allowance price. The combination of adding the cap and trade price and the GHG Adder is the total GHG avoided cost component included in the 2019 ACC.

For the 2020 ACC update, CPUC Energy Division staff (CPUC staff) and its consultants at E3 considered several different options for the GHG value. Because the ACC is updated to be more consistent with the IRP, CPUC staff decided to base the GHG values on IRP RESOLVE outputs from the No New DER scenario.

The key GHG cost value produced in the IRP is the shadow price of GHG emission reductions from RESOLVE. The GHG shadow prices represent the cost of reducing an additional unit of GHGs in each year. In the near-term, the GHG shadow price is fairly low, matching the cap and trade allowance prices. This is for a variety of reasons, but in part because renewable generation is procured prior to 2022 for reliability and to take advantage of the Federal Investment Tax Credit (ITC) before it steps down from 30% to 10%, rather than procuring renewables to support GHG goals. This results in a generation portfolio that exceeds the GHG targets for 2022 and 2026, resulting in a low GHG shadow price because emissions reductions are not the binding constraint in RESOLVE. However, after 2030 the RESOLVE GHG shadow price increases rapidly because the model must reduce GHGs in order to meet annual emissions targets for the electric sector. In other words, RESOLVE must procure additional clean energy resources in order to meet emissions targets, and this results in significant supply-side costs beyond the cap and trade allowance price. This means that emissions are more expensive in later years of the IRP as GHGs must be reduced significantly to meet the more stringent annual targets.

Figure 26 summarizes the GHG value that is based on the 2030 GHG shadow price from RESOLVE and discounted for 2020-2029 based on the utility weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This method is the same as what was used in the 2020 ACC, discounting the RESOLVE GHG shadow price in 2030 for 2020-2029 using the utility WACC, and scaling up at the same rate for 2031 and beyond. This approach balances the

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
<sup>13</sup> D.18-02-018, Table 6. Note that in Table 6 of this IRP Decision, the term "GHG Adder" is used, inconsistent with the usage in IDER, to represent the combined value of the monetized cap and trade allowance price and the non-monetized residual value (rather than only the residual, non-monetized value).

goal of generating consistency with the IRP and RESOLVE with the objective of not deviating too drastically with the 2019 ACC values in the short-medium term.

This method using the RESOLVE 2030 GHG shadow price provides the total GHG avoided cost component for the calculator. The total GHG cost can still be split out as the cap and trade price and a “GHG Adder,” recalculated as the total avoided cost based on the new 2020 ACC method minus the IEPR mid-case cap and trade value. As discussed in the next section, both amounts that make up the total GHG avoided cost component are used to evaluate GHG emissions.

For the 2021 update, GHG value drops significantly compared to 2020 ACC (See Appendix B) due to declining costs of the utility-scale solar and storage, which are key drivers of the GHG shadow price in RESOLVE.

Figure 26: CO<sub>2</sub> Cap & Trade and GHG Adder Price Series used in 2021 Avoided Cost Calculator



## 7.2 GHG Emissions

GHG emissions levels and costs have been estimated in the ACC for years. Emissions levels and costs were based on changes in CO<sub>2</sub> output of the marginal generating unit in each hour of each year. As described in the previous section, in previous ACCs the total GHG avoided costs were considered to be the sum of the cap and trade compliance cost and the IDER GHG Adder, where the cap and trade portion represented the short-term cost to utilities of purchasing carbon allowances, and the GHG Adder portion represented the cost of procuring generation resources to meet California’s GHG goals. While this is a valid and appropriate estimation of the immediate or short-term impact of DER resources, the method used prior to 2020 did not account for how the DER would affect future emissions as the electricity system resources are rebalanced to reflect new overall levels of consumption. In other words, that method could over-estimate the cost of procuring future resources if the electricity sector emission targets were to change as electricity demand

changed. This issue of rebalancing was not as much of a concern when the ACC's primary applications were for DERs that reduced grid electricity production. However, with the increased focus on electrification, the incremental resources to serve that new load will also have a larger impact on utility procurement costs, and those cost should be recognized in the GHG emission methodology. The approach is similar in concept to the approach used for the fuel substitution test (D. 19-08-009), described in the Fuel Substitution Technical Guidance Version 1.1.<sup>14</sup> The CEC also uses a similar approach for the 2022 Title 24 TDV.<sup>15</sup>

The 2020 ACC uses a two-step approach to estimate GHG emissions impacts from DER measures:

- + **Step 1. Marginal Emissions:** Hourly marginal GHG emissions from DER will be estimated with hourly marginal emissions rates derived from SERVVM production simulation. This is the same as was done in the 2019 ACC.
- + **Step 2. Portfolio Rebalancing:** The rebalancing of emissions to meet annual electric grid GHG intensity targets from IRP. This step accounts for how the utility resource plan will adjust for added DER and be rebalanced to achieve the annual emissions intensity target. The average annual GHG emissions intensity target for the electricity sector will be estimated from RESOLVE capacity expansion modeling of the RSP.


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<sup>14</sup> Fuel Substitution Technical Guidance for Energy Efficiency, V.1.1, October 31, 2019, Appendix A at Figure 1.

<sup>15</sup> Documentation is in development and will be published in the 2022 Energy Code Pre-Rulemaking Docket Log: <https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/Lists/DocketLog.aspx?docketnumber=19-BSTD-03>



Figure 27. GHG Emission Impact Estimation for DERs



### 7.2.1 Hourly Marginal GHG Emission Impact

In the 2019 ACC, GHG impacts are based on hourly marginal emissions, calculated using an implied heat rate methodology that incorporates market price forecasts for electricity and natural gas, as well as gas generator operational characteristics.<sup>16</sup> For the 2021 ACC, SERVIM production simulation of the No New DER case is used to calculate hourly marginal emissions. The hourly load shapes from DER will be multiplied by the hourly marginal emissions rates for each year to calculate hourly marginal emission impacts.

### 7.2.2 Average Annual Electric Grid GHG Emissions Intensity

A major methodological change for 2020 is to implement an estimate of long-run GHG emission impacts. Given that California plans to meet the SB100 goal of 100% decarbonized electricity (as measured by retail sales) by 2045, average annual electric grid GHG emissions intensity can be calculated based on an assumed GHG reduction target aligned with the SB100 goal.<sup>17</sup> The annual emissions intensity values derived from IRP

<sup>16</sup> See 2019 Avoided Cost Update Documentation available at: <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=5267>

<sup>17</sup> A joint agency report process to assess and interpret SB 100 requirements is underway. Among the issues is an interpretation of how to define SB 100-eligible zero carbon resources. CPUC IRP inputs in the 2019 RSP modeling analysis were developed, of necessity, based on one possible interpretation of the SB100 goals. However, assumptions used for IRP modeling purposes by CPUC staff do not represent the Commission's dispositive view on SB 100 interpretation.



are used to reflect the emissions attributed to load-modifying demand-side actions.<sup>18</sup> RESOLVE capacity expansion modeling in the IRP determines the least-cost resource portfolio for meeting electricity sector GHG emission targets. The RSP will achieve increasingly lower GHG emissions intensity over time.

Table 6 and

Figure 28 below depict the annual emissions intensity trajectory derived from the IRP RESOLVE modeling. Emissions intensity is calculated as tonnes of GHG per MWh of retail sales to be consistent with SB100 language that zero-carbon resources supply 100% of retail sales of electricity to end-use customers in 2030. The formula for calculating average intensity factors is shown here, for year  $t$ :


$$\text{Emissions Intensity}_t \left( \frac{tCO_2}{MWh} \right) = \frac{\text{Total CAISO Emissions}_t (tCO_2)}{\text{Total Retail Sales}_t (MWh)}$$

Table 6. 2021 IRP Preliminary Results 46 MMT Case Load and Emissions

		2020	2022	2024	2025	2026	2028	2030	2045
Load	GWh	241,526	247,426	254,907	258,327	261,477	267,600	273,758	392,804
Retail sales	GWh	208,613	213,600	220,037	222,974	225,648	230,857	236,109	341,712
CAISO Emissions	MMtCO <sub>2</sub> /Yr	46	46	43	38	39	41	38	12
Grid Emissions Intensity	tCO <sub>2</sub> /MWh	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.04

<sup>18</sup> The 2017-18 Reference System Plan adopted an electric sector goal of 42 MMt CO<sub>2</sub>e by 2030, reflective of specific scenario assumptions. Energy Division's consultant E3 recommends using the implied annual emissions intensity – rather than the 42 MMt emissions goal itself or the updated 46 MMt goal in the proposed 2019-20 Reference System Plan – to reflect the electric sector target for that year.

Figure 28. CAISO Projected Emissions Intensity, 2021 IRP Preliminary Results 46 MMT Case



As the RSP provides retail sales and GHG emissions through 2030, a linear progression was assumed between these 2030 values and the 2045 SB100 goals to estimate emissions intensity at that end-year.<sup>19</sup>


### 7.2.3 Portfolio Rebalancing GHG Emission Impacts

The 2021 ACC approach accounts for this supply-side response through a methodological shift based on declining average annual grid emissions intensity over time. The 2021 ACC assumes that the supply-side portfolio will be rebalanced to achieve the emissions intensity target set in the IRP after accounting for changes in the DER portfolio. With this approach, the GHG emissions impact will reflect the energy sector emissions cost of achieving the required annual intensity target.

Figure 29 below provides an illustrative example of how portfolio rebalancing based on annual emissions intensity targets will be implemented.

<sup>19</sup> To estimate the emissions intensity in 2045 it is assumed that SB100 goals will be met, requiring a minimum level of decarbonized generation equal to 100% of retail sales. With this assumption, up to approximately 7.25% of electric generation could be from natural gas generation (based on loss factor assumptions from the 2019 ACC v1b). Sector emissions in 2045 can be calculated using an assumption of the emissions intensity of a combined cycle gas turbine (with a heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh) and an assumed volume of fossil energy that could be used while still allowing the state to meet the SB100 target. The remaining energy on the system is assumed to have zero emissions.

Figure 29. Illustrative Long Run Emissions Calculation



This approach is most intuitively explained using electrification measures that increase load. The two steps described above are used:

- 1) the hourly marginal GHG emissions increases and
- 2) portfolio rebalancing to reach the long-run GHG emissions intensity target.

The first category of hourly marginal emissions will be valued at the total GHG avoided cost component—the sum of the cap and trade price and the GHG Adder, which reflects the annual economy wide cost of GHG emissions. The second category, the portfolio rebalancing, is valued at the GHG Adder only, which reflects the incremental costs associated with attaining GHG emission intensity targets.

The following equations illustrate the difference between the existing GHG calculation in the 2019 ACC and the GHG calculation used for the 2021 ACC. These equations reflect the value of the emissions attributable to a given measure or program in a year. Note that the first part of the 2021 ACC formula is the same as the 2019 ACC formula. The new rebalancing component is indicated by the bold font in the second equation. The total GHG avoided cost component, using the methodology based on RESOLVE outputs described earlier in this documentation, is represented by the cap and trade value plus the GHG Adder.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{GHG Calculation}_{2019 \text{ ACC}} &= \text{Load Shape (kWh)}_h * \text{Marginal Emissions (tCO}_2\text{e/kWh)}_h \\
 &\quad * (\text{Cap\&Trade} + \text{GHG Adder})(\$/\text{tCO}_2\text{e})_y
 \end{aligned}$$


$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{GHG Calculation}_{2021 \text{ ACC}} &= \text{Load Shape (kWh)}_h * \text{Marginal Emissions (tCO}_2\text{e/kWh)}_h \\
 &\quad * (\text{Cap\&Trade} + \text{GHG Adder})(\$/\text{tCO}_2\text{e})_y \\
 &\quad - \text{Annual kWh} * \text{Emissions Intensity}_y * \text{GHG Adder}(\$/\text{tCO}_2\text{e})_y
 \end{aligned}$$

Note, in the above equations  $h$  represents an hourly dimension, while  $y$  represents a yearly dimension.

Figure 30 provides an illustrative example of the 2019 ACC emissions valuation and the updated approach first used in 2020 based on the portfolio rebalancing calculation. This example illustrates increased

emissions due to a load-building measure, but the inverse relationship would hold true for a measure which instead reduces load.

Figure 30. Current ACC GHG Valuation and Proposed Update (Illustrative Load Increase Example)



The figure shows that the rebalancing to meet the emission intensity target reduces the GHG-related costs for the load increase (e.g., building electrification). More details on the sample values used in the figure are presented below.

### 7.2.3.1 Example GHG Rebalancing Calculations

This section presents example calculations for the GHG emissions impact and associated avoided costs. Using the methods described above, the examples add load to the electric grid and calculate the resulting increase in GHG emissions costs. To illustrate the combination of hourly marginal emissions and portfolio rebalancing impacts, we consider two electrification measures: 1) a commercial heat pump that adds air conditioning load in the middle of the day and 2) unmanaged residential EV charging that adds load in the evening. Each measure adds 3,000 MWh of electric load, but at different times of the day.

**Emissions Intensity:** Starting with a simple example, we begin with a supply portfolio of three resources: 1) a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) with an emissions rate of 0.40 tons/MWh, 2) Stand-alone utility scale PV and 3) PV integrated with long-duration energy storage that is able to avoid curtailment and deliver carbon free electricity in the evening. The IRP targets procurement of 10,000 MWh with 4,000 MWh of CCGT, 3,000 MWh of PV and 3,000 MWh of PV integrated storage. The resulting energy sector emissions are 1,600 tons with an average grid intensity of 0.16 tons/MWh.

**GHG Cost per Ton:** The cap and trade value is \$80/ton and the IRP GHG value is \$110/ton, making the GHG Adder \$30/ton (\$110-\$80). In the two examples presented below, 3,000 MWh of load are added. To meet an intensity target of 0.16 tons/MWh with an addition of 3,000 MWh, only 480 tons of GHG may be added.

**Unmanaged EV Charging Example:** In this first example, 3,000 MWh of unmanaged residential EV charging load is added in the evening. No PV generation is available, and the new demand is met with an increase of 3,000 MWh of CCGT generation. However, this results in an hourly marginal emissions increase of **1,200 tons** of GHG that increases the grid emissions intensity to 0.22 tons/MWh. The resource portfolio must be rebalanced to reduce emissions by 720 in order to limit additional GHG emissions to only **480 tons** and achieve the annual target of 0.16 tons/MWh.

In the first step, the 1,200 tons of additional marginal GHG emissions are valued at the cap and trade value of \$80/ton and the GHG Adder cost of \$30/ton for a total cost of \$132,000. This reflects the economy wide cost placed on GHG emissions. In the second step, we reflect the cost savings of rebalancing the supply portfolio to allow 480 tons of emissions in order to meet the electric sector intensity target of 0.16 tons/MWh. The rebalanced portfolio allowed emission increase of 480 tons is valued at the GHG adder value of \$30/ton for a total cost reduction of \$14,400. In total, of the allowable GHG emissions in step 1 (\$132,000) and the portfolio rebalancing in step 2 (-\$14,400) nets to \$117,600. This equates to a cost of \$98/ton for the 1,200 Tons of added marginal emissions and \$39/MWh for the added 3,000 MWh of load.

Table 7. GHG Cost: Unmanaged EV Charging Example

	A	B	C	
	GHG Cost (\$/ton)	Emissions (tons CO2)	Cost (\$) (A*B)	
1 Tons added		1,200		
2 Tons allowed by intensity target		480		0.16t/MWh * L8
Marginal emissions impacts				
3 Cap and Trade	\$80.00	1,200	\$96,000	
4 GHG Adder	\$30.00	1,200	\$36,000	
5 Total marginal emission cost			\$132,000	L3 + L4
Rebalancing Impacts				
6 GHG Adder	\$30.00	(480)	-\$14,400	
7 Net GHG cost			\$117,600	L5 + L6
8 Usage added (MWh)		3000		
9 Net GHG cost per MWh			\$39.20	L7/L8
10 Net GHG Cost per ton of added marginal emissions			\$98.00	L7/L1

**Space Heating Electrification Example:** For the second measure, 3,000 MWh of commercial space heating load is added during the day, using 2,500 MWh of carbon free PV and 500 MWh of CCGT generation. Only **200 tons** of hourly marginal GHG emissions are added, reducing the average grid intensity to 0.14 tons/MWh. This is below the annual target of 0.16 tons/MWh. To meet the 0.16 tons/MWh target emission intensity level, **480 tons** of increased emission would be allowed based on electrification load of 3000 MWh.

In step 1, the 200 tons of hourly marginal emissions are valued at the cap and trade price of \$80/ton and the GHG Adder cost of \$30/ton for a total cost of \$22,000. In step 2, the portfolio is rebalanced to allow for an increase of 480 tons which are valued at the GHG Adder cost of \$30/ton for a cost reduction of \$14,400. In total the cooling load increases GHG costs by only \$7,600. Dividing the \$7,600 in GHG costs by the 200 tons of marginal GHG impacts results in a savings of \$38/Ton. The reduced GHG costs divided by the 3,000 MWh of added load results in a GHG cost of \$2.5/MWh.

Table 8. GHG Cost: Commercial Space Heating Electrification Example

	A	B	C	
	GHG Cost (\$/ton)	Emissions (tons CO2)	Cost (\$ (A*B)	
1 Tons added		200		
2 Tons allowed by intensity target		480		0.16t/MWH * L8
Marginal emissions impacts				
3 Cap and Trade	\$80.00	200	\$16,000	
4 GHG Adder	\$30.00	200	\$6,000	
5 Total marginal emission cost			\$22,000	L3 + L4
Rebalancing Impacts				
6 GHG Adder	\$30.00	(480)	-\$14,400	
7 <b>Net GHG cost</b>			<b>\$7,600</b>	L5 + L6
8 Usage added (MWh)	3000			
9 Net GHG cost per MWh			\$2.53 L7/L8	
10 Net GHG Cost per ton of added marginal emissions			\$38.00 L7/L1	

### 7.2.3.2 Implementation of the GHG Portfolio Rebalancing in the ACC

The rebalancing is based on annual average emission intensity levels described in section 7.2.2 *Average Annual Electric Grid GHG Emissions Intensity*. It is calculated as:

$$\text{Rebalancing Cost}_y (\$/\text{MWh}) = - \text{Emissions Intensity}_y (\text{tonnes}/\text{MWh}) * \text{GHG Adder Cost}_y (\$/\text{tonne})$$

Within a year the rebalancing costs (\$/MWh) are the same for all hours. Note that the rebalancing cost is presented as a negative value consistent with the presentation of avoided costs as positive benefits associated with load reductions. In the case of the rebalancing costs, a program that reduces load would incur a rebalancing disbenefit, that is, rebalancing would reduce the avoided cost benefits of the program. Conversely for a program that increases load, the rebalancing costs would reduce the net cost increases associated with the program.

## 8 Avoided Cost of Generation Capacity

### 8.1 Battery Storage Resource Net Cost of New Entry

The 2020 ACC adopted the approach recommended by the Joint Utilities in their prepared testimony<sup>20</sup> for calculating the Net Cost of New Entry (CONE) of a new battery storage resource. This approach is similar in concept to the approach used in prior ACC iterations, except that the proxy for new capacity is a battery storage resource instead of a gas combustion turbine. The cost and configuration of the battery storage resource is taken from the IRP. The RESOLVE capacity expansion modeling in the IRP uses a battery storage resource with a 4-hour duration and 20-year useful life (with augmentation costs) for a capacity resource. With increasing penetrations of solar, the Effective Load Carrying Capacity (ELCC) of a 4-hour battery to

<sup>20</sup> PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY (JOINT INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES) PROPOSED UPDATES TO THE AVOIDED COST CALCULATOR PREPARED TESTIMONY, submitted October 7, 2019 in R.14-10-003, p. 3-7.

provide generation capacity is diminished. This is reflected in the ACC by taking the ELCC from the IRP RESOLVE modeling and de-rating the capacity value of the 4-hour battery. The cost and performance assumptions as well as the financial pro-forma model from the IRP are used to calculate the levelized fixed costs of a battery over its expected useful life of 20 years. The revenues that batteries earn in the energy and ancillary markets are calculated with optimal dispatch using the CEC Solar + Storage Model and subtracted from the levelized fixed costs to calculate a Net CONE. The prices for energy and ancillary services are derived from SERVIM production simulation using resource portfolios from the No New DER case. These prices are used to calculate net market revenues for a new battery storage resource.

Compared to the 2020 ACC, the net CONE of storage drops, largely driven by decreased capital costs and increased forecast value of ELCC for storage as well as increased market revenues with more dynamic energy prices from 2021 SERVIM modeling. The most recent RESOLVE IRP case allows to build offshore wind, which leads to less storage build in the portfolio and smaller decline of storage ELCC value in future years. The 2021 SERVIM modeling produced spinning reserve prices higher than historically observed in the CAISO market, which led to unrealistically high revenues for energy storage. Therefore, for the 2021 update, we have omitted spinning reserves and dispatched storage to maximize revenue in the energy and frequency regulation markets only. Net CONE results for energy storage for two additional cases are provided with the ACC models: 1) including spinning reserves and 2) day ahead energy market only.<sup>21</sup>

*Table 9. Subset of Battery Storage Resource Cost Assumptions from IRP*

Resource			Utility-scale Battery - Li [Capacity] - No ITC	Utility-scale Battery - Li [Energy] - No ITC
Category for Cost Reductions	Resource Category		Battery Storage-Standalone	Battery Storage-Standalone
	Technology Type		Lithium ion (Grid) - Capacity	Lithium ion (Grid) - Energy
	Techno-Resource Group			
	Active Cost Trajectory Scenario		Mid	Mid
Performance Inputs			Units	
Plant Output	Installed Capacity	MW-ac	1	4
	Capacity Factor	%	15.0%	
	Degradation	%/yr	0.0%	
Plant Cost Inputs				
Capital Costs	Installed Cost, 2018	\$/kW-ac	\$208	\$244
	Progress Multiplier	%	94%	94%
	Installed Cost, 2020	\$/kW-ac	\$196	\$230

<sup>21</sup> See: 2021 ACC Net Cone v1a Appendix.xlsx

Table 10. Select Battery Storage Resource Net CONE Calculations from ACC

Fixed Costs (\$2018)	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040
Capacity	\$24	\$17	\$15	\$14	\$13
Energy x 4	\$154	\$109	\$96	\$89	\$84
Total Levelized Fixed Costs (\$2018)	\$178	\$126	\$111	\$103	\$96
Total Levelized Fixed Costs Nominal	\$186	\$147	\$144	\$149	\$155
ELCC Adjustment	100%	90%	90%	84%	82%
ELCC Adjusted Nominal Fixed Costs	\$186	\$163	\$160	\$176	\$190
<b>Revenues</b>					
Net Energy Revenue (\$)	29,158	86,461	126,037	152,154	186,786
Regulation Down Revenues (\$)	9,836	15,562	29,190	34,773	37,666
Regulation Up Revenues (\$)	52,188	10,807	19,378	23,070	24,540
Spin Revenues (\$)	-	-	-	-	-
Total Revenues (\$)	91,182	112,830	174,606	209,997	248,991
<b>Net Revenue (\$/kW-Yr)</b>					
Net Revenue	\$91	\$113	\$175	\$210	\$249
After Tax Net Revenue	\$66	\$81	\$126	\$151	\$179
Net CONE	\$120	\$82	\$34	\$25	\$11
Annual Charge (kWh)	1,433,441	1,433,001	1,432,127	1,431,926	1,431,635
Parasitic Losses (kWh)	233,441	233,001	232,127	231,926	231,635
Annual Discharge (kWh)	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000
Round Trip Efficiency	84%	84%	84%	84%	84%
Energy Revenue/Annual Discharge (\$/MWh)	\$24	\$72	\$105	\$127	\$156

## 8.2 Hourly Allocation of Generation Capacity Value

The generation capacity values (\$/kW-yr), after adjusting for temperature, losses, and planning reserve margin, are allocated to the hours of the year with highest system capacity need using the E3 RECAP model. Using 63 years of historical load and generation data, the RECAP model determines the expected unserved energy (EUE) for each month/hour/day-type time period in the year based on the most recent IRP RESOLVE case.

Note that while a No New DER paradigm was used to develop the hourly energy price shape, it was not necessary to use that same case for the RECAP analysis. The RSP has a large amount of forecasted new distributed generation PV, and the No New DER scenario basically replaces that distributed generation with grid-sited PV. Since we use the RECAP analysis to determine the timing of the relative need for additional capacity, and that timing is basically unaffected by whether a generation resource is located at the customer site or on the grid, we can utilize the RECAP results based on the RSP for the ACC.

A snapshot of these hourly EUE values in 2020 and 2030 are shown below in Figure 31



Figure 31. Hourly Expected Unserved Energy from RECAP

base case, 2020												
	jan	feb	mar	apr	may	jun	jul	aug	sep	oct	nov	dec
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.24	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	76.76	-	-	-
19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.42	121.49	-	-	-
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.33	60.83	-	-	-
21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.82	-	-	-
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.31	-	-	-
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

base case, 2030												
	jan	feb	mar	apr	may	jun	jul	aug	sep	oct	nov	dec
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.82	-	-	-
19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	115.04	0.00	-	-
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56.79	-	-	-
21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	109.39	-	-	-
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.47	431.04	-	-	-
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.55	143.07	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.68	-	-	-

These month/hour/day-type EUE values are then allocated to days of the year using the CTZ22 temperature data and the 2020 calendar year for consistency with energy prices. A load-weighted daily maximum statewide temperature is calculated and all hours in days where this value exceeds 90 degrees F receive the corresponding month/hour/day-type EUE value from RECAP.<sup>22</sup> The resulting 8760 hourly capacity allocators are shown below.

<sup>22</sup> In the 2019 update, the temperature threshold for the month of September was set to 85 degrees F (rather than 90), to account for the fact that only one non-workday in September 2018 – from which the underlying weather data is

Figure 32. Generation Capacity Hourly Allocation Factors (2020)




Figure 33 shows LOLP heatmaps corresponding to Figure 32 after the original EUE values are remapped to the CTZ 22 weather data.

Figure 33- Loss of Load Probability Heatmaps post-remapping

base case, 2020												
	jan	feb	mar	apr	may	jun	jul	aug	sep	oct	nov	dec
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00040	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01365	-	-	-
19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00025	0.02160	-	-	-
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00006	0.01081	-	-	-
21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00299	-	-	-
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00023	-	-	-
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

used – had an average temperature above 90 F (which is inconsistent with the September weather characterized in the RECAP assumptions).

base case, 2030

	jan	feb	mar	apr	may	jun	jul	aug	sep	oct	nov	dec
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00067	-	-	-
19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00653	0.00000	-	-
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00322	-	-	-
21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00621	-	-	-
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00020	0.02446	-	-	-
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00009	0.00812	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00049	-	-	-

## 9 Transmission Avoided Capacity Costs

### 9.1 Background

The 2021 ACC update uses the same inputs and methods used for the 2020 ACC to calculate transmission avoided costs.

Transmission avoided capacity costs represent the potential cost impacts on utility transmission investments from changes in peak loadings on the utility systems. The paradigm is that reductions in peak loadings via customer demand reductions, distributed generation, or storage could reduce the need for some transmission projects and allow for deferral or avoidance of those projects. The ability to defer or avoid transmission projects would depend on multiple factors, such as the ability to obtain sufficient dependable aggregate peak reductions in time to allow prudent deferral or avoidance of the project, as well as the location of those peak reductions in the correct areas within the system to provide the necessary reductions in network flows.

This avoided cost update does not look to evaluate whether any particular technology, measure, or installation could provide transmission avoided cost savings. Those determinations should be made in the proceedings in which these avoided costs are applied. The values developed herein represent the value provided IF the peak loading reductions can be obtained in the right amount, right location, and with the right dependability.

It should also be noted that the locations of the needs for demand reductions or distributed generation or storage will move over time as loadings on the utility systems evolve differently in different areas within the utility service territories. Thus, over the next ten years there could be a value to load reductions in area A, but not area B; but in years 10-20 the situation may flip, and area B could become the area with a need for load reductions, while area A no longer has a need. Given this locational and temporal uncertainty, the

transmission avoided capacity costs are presented as a simple system average value for each utility. While this may underestimate the value of net load reductions in some areas and overestimate in other areas, we believe that this approach is superior to trying to forecast locational needs far into the future.

*Table 11. Long-Term Transmission Marginal Costs (\$2020)*

	PG&E	SCE	SDG&E
Transmission Capacity (\$/kW-yr)	\$11.75	\$28.52	\$14.44

*Note that the PG&E cost is derived for \$2021. It has been converted to \$2020 for consistency with the other values shown in the table.*

### 9.1.1 PG&E

Recent ACCs have used transmission marginal capacity costs from PG&E's GRC proceedings. PG&E has estimated those values for ratemaking purposes using the Discounted Total Investment Method (DTIM). The DTIM calculates the unit cost of transmission capacity as the present value of peak demand driven transmission investments divided by the present value of the peak demand growth. This unit cost is then annualized using a Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC) with adjustments for other ratepayer-borne costs, such as administrative and general costs (A&G) and operations and maintenance costs (O&M). The DTIM has a long history of use for marginal cost estimation in California, and we continue its application for PG&E's avoided transmission capacity costs.

In response to a data request by the CPUC Energy Division in this proceeding, PG&E provided its forecast of peak demand driven transmission projects and its peak demand growth, along with its RECC and other financial factors that affect avoided costs (such as A&G and O&M). That data was originally developed by PG&E as part of their 2020 GRC Phase II Application.

PG&E is forecasting \$229.8M in capacity-related transmission from 2020 through 2025. The forecasted load growth over that period is 2007 MW. Discounting at PG&E's real discount rate of 4.6%, these correspond to a discounted cumulative investment cost of \$201.1M and discounted cumulative growth of 1793 MW.<sup>23</sup> As shown in the table below, the investment costs and load growth result in an average unit cost of transmission investment of \$115/kW. This is then multiplied the "Annual MC Factor" to derive the marginal transmission capacity cost of \$12.02/kW-yr (in \$2021).

<sup>23</sup> The casual reader may be troubled by the discounting of the load growth values for the DTIM approach. This discounting of both numerator (costs) and denominator (loads) is a counterintuitive but correct way to estimate average unit costs, and is well established for estimating marginal costs.

*Table 12. Derivation of PG&E Marginal Transmission Avoided Costs  
(From PG&E 2020 GRC Ph II MTCC Model. Table Title retained from the PG&E model)*

**Table 3: Marginal Transmission Capacity Cost (2021 \$) at 5-Year Time Horizon**

[A]	[B]
PV of Investment (\$)	[1] \$206,142,713
PV of Load Growth (MW)	[2] 1,793
PV of Load Growth (kW)	[3] 1,793,203
Marginal Investment (\$/MW)	[4] \$114,958
Marginal Investment (\$/kW)	[5] \$115
Annual MC Factor	[6] 10.46%
Marginal Transmission Capacity Cost (\$/MW-Yr)	[7] \$12,022
Marginal Transmission Capacity Cost (\$/kW-Yr)	[8] \$12.02

**Notes:**

[1] = The Cumulative Discounted Project Cost for the selected time horizon, multiplied by 10<sup>6</sup> from the CALC\_DTIM PV Investments & Load tab.

[2] = The Cumulative Discounted Load Growth for the selected time horizon from the CALC\_DTIM PV Investments & Load tab.

[3] = [2] x 1,000.

[4] = [1] / [2].

[5] = [1] / [3].

[6]: See CALC\_Annual MC as % tab.

[7] = [4] x [6].

[8] = [5] x [6].

The PG&E Annual MC Factor annualizes the unit cost of transmission investment using a Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC) and adds adjustments for O&M, A&G, General Plant, Working Capital, and Franchise Fees and Uncollectables. This is a well-established process for developing marginal capacity costs. The detailed derivation is shown below.

Table 13. Derivation of PG&amp;E Annual MC Factor (From PG&amp;E 2020 GRC Ph II MTCC Model)

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	6.56%	
Electric Transmission O&M Loading Factor (Capital Basis)	[2]	2.77%	
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Transmission (Transmission O&M + A&G Basis)	[3]	15.30%	
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission (Transmission O&M + A&G Basis)	[4]	15.16%	
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]	0.83%	
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Dist. O&M + A&G Based - Annualized)	[6]	2.44%	
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]	1.0109	
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$100.00	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$6.56	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense	[10]	\$2.77	[10] = [8] x [2].
A&G Expense	[11]	\$0.42	[11] = [10] x [3].
General Plant	[12]	\$0.48	[12] = ([10] + [11]) x [4]
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$3.68	[13] = [10] + [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]	\$0.03	[14] = ([10] + [11]) x [5].
Cash Working Capital	[15]	\$0.08	[15] = ([10] + [11]) x [6].
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]	\$0.10	[16] = [14] + [15].
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]	\$0.11	[17] = ([9] + [13] + [16]) x ([7] - 1).
<b>Marginal Cost</b>	[18]	\$10.46	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
<b>Annual Marginal Cost Factor</b>	[19]	10.46%	[19] = [18] / [8].
<b>Notes:</b>			
[1] to [8]: Inputs from Dashboard and IN_RECC and IN_Loaders tabs.			

### 9.1.2 SCE

SCE does not include estimates of transmission capacity costs in its GRC proceedings. We therefore calculate marginal transmission costs for SCE using information provided by SCE in response to Energy Division data requests.

SCE indicates over \$230M in transmission investments for capacity needs through 2025. \$215M of the costs are for a single project that serves less than 5% of SCE's load and is driven by 7MW per year of local load growth. The remaining \$15M is for smaller projects that are driven by SCE system wide load growth. Given the different drivers of the projects (system load vs local load), we apply the DTIM to the system-wide projects the LNBA method to the large \$215M project.

#### 9.1.2.1 SCE DTIM Calculation for System Projects

The DTIM was applied to the SCE system-wide Big Creek and Sylmar projects. These projects are referred to as system-wide projects because SCE indicated that their need is driven by SCE system peaks, rather than local peaks. The general PG&E process was applied to the SCE data, with some minor modifications for loading factors, and a large modification for the peak load forecast used. Unlike the PG&E forecast, the forecast that SCE provided with its data response showed declining peak loads. Using those declining loads in the DTIM would result in negative values. We therefore replaced the SCE peak load forecast with the IEPR forecast net of incremental DER. To address the problem of some negative load growth years even

with the IEPR forecast, we used the median peak load growth for SCE over the period 2020 through 2028 to represent the general system growth for SCE without DER.

The two SCE system-wide projects have a cumulative discounted investment cost of \$17.68M, and the median growth forecast has a cumulative discounted growth of 382MW over the five-year analysis period. Combined with SCE's Annual MC factor, the resulting DTIM transmission marginal cost (without O&M) is \$5.07/kW-yr for these systemwide projects.

*Table 14. Derivation of SCE Marginal Transmission Avoided Costs for System Wide Projects (Without O&M)*

PV of Investment (\$M)	[1]	\$17.68
PV of Load Growth (MW)	[2]	382
PV of Load Growth (kW)	[3]	382,337
Marginal Investment (\$/MW)	[4]	\$46,243
Marginal Investment (\$/kW)	[5]	\$46.24
Annual MC Factor	[6]	10.96%
O&M (\$/kW-yr) (to be added later)	[7]	\$0.0
Marginal Transmission Capacity Cost (\$/kW-Yr)	[8]	\$5.07

**Notes:**

[1] = The Cumulative Discounted Project Cost Big Creek and Pardee Sylmar projects

[2] = The Cumulative Discounted Load Growth based on Median IEPR forecast without incremental DER

[3] = [2] x 1,000.

[4] = [1] \* 10<sup>6</sup> / [2].

[5] = [1] \* 10<sup>6</sup> / [3].

[6]: See Derivation of SCE Transmission Annual MC Factor

[7] = from ED-SCE-001

[8] = [5] x [6] + [7].

Table 15. SCE Systemwide Transmission Project Costs and Load Forecasts

Year	Project Cost (\$M)			SCE Forecast		IEPR without DER based forecast		
	Big Creek	Pardee Sylmar	Total	Peak Demand (MW)	Peak Demand Growth (MW)	IEPR without DER Peak Load (MW)	Annual Peak Demand Growth (MW)	Median Growth (2020-2028)
2020	5	0	5	23825		25,137		
2021	0	0	0	23744	-81	24,970	(166)	91
2022	0	6	6	23806	62	24,919	(51)	91
2023	0	10	10	23795	-11	24,871	(48)	91
2024	0	0	0	23805	10	25,017	145	91
2025	0	0	0	23743	-62	25,093	76	91
2026	0	0	0	23671	-72	25,184	91	91
2027	0	0	0	23544	-127	25,295	112	91
2028	0	0	0	23460	-84	25,462	167	91
2029	0	0	0	23311	-149	25,650	188	91
NPV (2020 - 2024)			\$17.68	(68.90)		382.34		

Note:

IEPR Source: <https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/Lists/DocketLog.aspx?docketnumber=19-IEPR-03>

Real Discount Rate Used: 5.99%



Table 16. Derivation of SCE Transmission Annual MC Factor

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	9.11%	ED-SCE-001
Electric Transmission O&M (\$/kW-yr)	[2]	\$6.70	ED-SCE-001
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Transmission ( Capital basis)	[3]	1.10%	ED-SCE-001
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission ( Annual Capital basis)	[4]	6.90%	ED-SCE-001
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]		
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Dist. O&M + A&G Based - Annualized)	[6]		
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]	1.12%	
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$100.00	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$9.110	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense (to be added directly, rather than included as a factor)	[10]		
A&G Expense	[11]	\$1.10	[11] = [8] x [3].
General Plant	[12]	\$0.63	[12] = [9] x [4]
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$1.729	[13] = [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]		
Cash Working Capital	[15]		
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]		[16] = [14] + [15].
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]	\$0.12	[17] = ([9] + [13] + [16]) x [7].
Marginal Cost	[18]	\$10.96	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
Annual Marginal Cost Factor	[19]	10.96%	[19] = [18] / [8].

### 9.1.1.2.2 SCE Large Project Transmission Marginal Cost

The LNBA method was specifically developed in the DRP to estimate avoided capacity costs for individual projects.<sup>24</sup> The LNBA method calculates the value of deferring the original project and divides that value by the peak net load reduction needed to obtain that deferral. This deferral value per kW is then annualized over the planning period and adjusted for the additional cost factors such as taxes (in the present value revenue requirement factor) and A&G. O&M is added to the marginal costs after the system wide and Alberhill marginal costs are combined in order to avoid double counting

For the SCE Aberhill project, we applied the LNBA method assuming a one-year deferral due to a 7MW reduction in area peak net loads. The deferral by one year of all investments in the multi-year capital plan results in a present value savings of \$12.15M in direct costs, which translates to a value of \$1735.93 per kW of reduction (\$12.15M deferral value / 7MW load growth).

Since the transmission capacity cost will apply to the entire SCE service territory, the next step is the calculate the equivalent avoided capacity cost for all of SCE. The paradigm we assume is that projects with this cost per kW of load growth would be required in the future in SCE's service territory. We cannot

<sup>24</sup> Details on the LNBA method can be found here: <https://drpwwg.org/sample-page/drp/> under Joint IOU Demo B LNBA Tool.

forecast where the projects would be needed, so we convert the project value into a uniform capacity value across the entire service territory. In this case, the project area represents 4.45% of SCE's peak loading, so the equivalent avoided cost is \$16.75/kW-yr (\$376.36 \* 4.45%).

*Table 17. SCE Derivation of Transmission Capacity Costs for Alberhill Project using the LNBA Method*

1	Discount Rate	8.46%
2	Inflation Rate	2.33%
3	Real Discount Rate	5.99% $(1+[1])/(1+[2]) - 1$
4	Planning Horizon (yrs)	10
5	RECC	12.81% $((1-[2])/(1+[1]))*((1+[1])^3/((1+[1])^3-(1+[2])^3))$

	Year	Project Cost (\$M)	Peak Demand Growth (MW)	1 Yr Deferral Value (\$M)	Deferral Value (\$/kW)	
6	2020	50	7	2.83	403.70	
7	2021	1	7	0.06	8.07	
8	2022	1	7	0.06	8.07	
9	2023	9	7	0.51	72.67	
10	2024	69	7	3.90	557.11	
11	2025	85	7	4.80	686.30	
12	2026		7	0.00	0.00	
13	2027		7	0.00	0.00	
14	2028		7	0.00	0.00	
15	NPV using Real Discount Rate			12.15	1735.93	
16	RECC (From Above) [5]				0.13	
17	Present Value Revenue Requirement Factor (ED-SCE-001)				1.549	
18	LNBA Value (\$/kW-yr) [15] * [16] * [17]				\$344.63	
19						
20	A&G (1.1%)				1.10%	\$3.79
21	General Plant (6.9%)				6.90%	\$23.78
22	Franchise Fees (1.1% of all items above)				1.12%	\$4.17
23	Plus O&M (\$/kW-yr from ED-SCE-001)					\$6.70
24	Total Project Marginal Cost (\$/kW-yr)					\$383.06
25	Percent of system load					4.45%
26	Project Marginal Cost spread across the system					\$17.05

Note that the RECC factor used herein is different from the RECC factor used in the DTIM method above. The DTIM RECC annualizes the full unit cost of the projects over the life of the project (50-60 years) and reflects the revenue requirement effects such as taxes that increase the cost of the project to ratepayers. This is equivalent to value of deferring the revenue requirement cost of the project and all of the project's future replacements by one year. This paradigm of the one-year replacement value is how the RECC was originally developed in the Electric Utility Rate Design Study Task Force 4 by NERA for EPRI (NP-22555). The LNBA method follows this same deferral concept, but directly calculates the value of deferring projects over each year over the planning horizon. Because the LNBA method sums the deferral value of projects over multiple years, a RECC is used to convert that multi-year value back to a \$/kW-yr value needed for marginal costing. The RECC used for the LNBA method annualizes the total deferral value over the planning horizon (10 years) and does not include the Present Value Revenue Requirement Factor effects. For the LNBA, the RECC is utilized as a capital recovery factor that is constant in real dollars.

Table 18. Total SCE Transmission Marginal Cost (\$/kW-yr \$2020)

	Marginal Cost (\$/kW-yr)
System-wide projects	\$5.07 / kW-yr
Alberhill project averaged over SCE system	\$16.75 / kW-yr
Transmission O&M	\$ 6.70 / kW-yr
Total	<b>\$28.52 / kW-yr</b>

Transmission O&M is from ED-SCE-001, and reflects SCE's 2018 GRC.

### 9.1.3 SDG&E

SDG&E's response to the Energy Division data request indicated a preference for a regression-based estimation of marginal costs. Unfortunately, the provide system peak load data reflected a negative load growth trend. With that negative growth trend, the regression method resulted in a nonsensical negative marginal capacity cost for transmission.

To address the negative load growth problem, we again turn to the IEPR forecast. Combining the SDG&E Mid Low IEPR load forecast with SDG&E's forecasted capacity-driven projects allow us to derive transmission marginal costs via the DTIM approach. Using the IEPR forecast, we see increased peak load for all years except 2020.

Table 19. SDG&amp;E Transmission capital forecast and IEPR forecast without DER (\$M and MW)

Discount rate	7.14% Dec 2020 after-tax WACC
Inflation	2.35%
Real Discount Rate	4.68%

Year	SDG&E Capital Expenditures (\$M)	IEPR without DER based forecast	
		IEPR without DER Peak Load (MW)	Annual Peak Demand Growth (MW)
2020	46.28	4,571	(31)
2021	9.78	4,540	38
2022	5.82	4,579	58
2023	4.96	4,636	58
2024	3.44	4,695	54
2025	0	4,749	50
2026	0	4,800	45
2027	0	4,845	47
2028	0	4,892	46
NPV(2021-2024)	\$21.85		185.63

Excludes projects deemed too large to be deferred (Sunrise Powerlink and South Orange County Reliability Enhancement)

In applying the DTIM method, we use the period 2021 through 2024. Excluding 2020 avoids the problem introduced by the large negative load growth in that year of the IEPR forecast. In addition, \$40.5M of the \$46M 2020 investment cost is due to the last phase of a project that was commenced in 2012. Including

that large project in the analysis without the ability to recognize the load growth that caused the need for the project would greatly skew the marginal cost results.

*Table 20. Derivation of SDG&E Marginal Transmission Avoided Costs*

PV of Investment (\$M)	[1]	\$21.85
PV of Load Growth (MW)	[2]	186
PV of Load Growth (kW)	[3]	185,629
Marginal Investment (\$/MW)	[4]	\$117,706
Marginal Investment (\$/kW)	[5]	\$117.71
Annual MC Factor	[6]	12.27%
Marginal Transmission Capacity Cost (\$/kW-Yr)	[8]	\$14.44

Notes:

[1] = The Cumulative Discounted Project Cost, excluding Sunrise and SOCRE

[2] = The Cumulative Discounted Load Growth based on Median IEPR forecast

[3] = [2] x 1,000.

[4] = [1] \*  $10^6$  / [2].

[5] = [1] \*  $10^6$  / [3].

[6]: See Derivation of SDG&E Transmission Annual MC Factor

[8] = [5] x [6]

Table 21. Derivation of SDG&amp;E Transmission Annual MC Factor

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	7.07%	
Electric Transmission O&M (Capital basis)	[2]	\$0.02	
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Transmission (Capital basis)	[3]	0.88%	
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission (Capital basis)	[4]	2.77%	
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]		
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Capital Based)	[6]	1.50%	
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]		
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$100.00	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$7.070	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense	[10]	\$1.55	[10] = [8] x [2].
A&G Expense	[11]	\$0.88	[11] = [8] x [3].
General Plant	[12]	\$2.77	[12] = [8] x [4].
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$5.200	[13] = [10] + [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]		
Cash Working Capital	[15]	\$1.50	[15] = [8] x [6]
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]	\$1.500	[16] = [14] + [15].
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]		
Marginal Cost	[18]	\$12.27	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
Annual Marginal Cost Factor	[19]	12.27%	[19] = [18] / [8].

## 9.2 Annual Transmission Marginal Capacity Costs

The transmission capacity marginal costs are escalated to nominal dollars using the annual inflation rates shown below. The inflation rates were provided by the utilities in their response to the Energy Division data request. SDG&E provided an annual transmission inflation rates for 2010 through 2024. The value used herein is the simple average of the 2020 through 2024 values.

Table 22. Transmission Inflation Rates

PG&E	SCE	SDG&E
2.34%	2.33%	2.06%

The annual capacity costs by climate zone and utility are shown below.

*Table 23. Annual Transmission Marginal Capacity Costs (\$ Nominal)*

Year	PG&E	SCE	SDG&E
2020	11.75	28.52	14.44
2021	12.02	29.18	14.74
2022	12.30	29.86	15.04
2023	12.59	30.56	15.35
2024	12.89	31.27	15.67
2025	13.19	32.00	15.99
2026	13.50	32.74	16.32
2027	13.81	33.51	16.66
2028	14.13	34.29	17.00
2029	14.47	35.09	17.35
2030	14.80	35.90	17.71
2031	15.15	36.74	18.07
2032	15.51	37.60	18.45
2033	15.87	38.47	18.83
2034	16.24	39.37	19.21
2035	16.62	40.28	19.61
2036	17.01	41.22	20.01
2037	17.41	42.18	20.43
2038	17.81	43.17	20.85
2039	18.23	44.17	21.28
2040	18.66	45.20	21.71
2041	19.09	46.25	22.16
2042	19.54	47.33	22.62
2043	20.00	48.44	23.08
2044	20.47	49.56	23.56
2045	20.94	50.72	24.05
2046	21.43	51.90	24.54
2047	21.94	53.11	25.05
2048	22.45	54.35	25.56
2049	22.97	55.61	26.09
2050	23.51	56.91	26.63

### 9.3 Hourly Allocation of Transmission Avoided Capacity Costs

The annual capacity costs shown above are allocated to hours of the year to allow the ACC to reflect the time varying need for transmission capacity. The prior ACC used the distribution hourly allocation factors for transmission capacity costs. In this update, the peak capacity allocation (PCAF) method used to estimate distribution allocation factors in the prior ACC has been applied to the IOU system level hourly loads to estimate the transmission hourly allocation factors. 2019 Historical system loads were taken from the CAISO Energy Management System dataset<sup>25</sup>. CAISO averaging methods during daylight savings hours were removed to generate a true 8760 hourly load profile, aligned with the CTZ22 weather year.

The PCAF method allocates capacity costs to the hours where each utility system is most likely to be constrained and require upgrades—the hours of highest load, with the additional constraint that the peak period contain between 20 and 250 hours for the year.

<sup>25</sup> CAISO Historical EMS Load Data can be found here:

<http://www.caiso.com/planning/Pages/ReliabilityRequirements/Default.aspx#Historical>

$$\text{PCAF}[a,h] = (\text{Load}[a,h] - \text{Threshold}[a]) / \text{Sum of all positive } (\text{Load}[a,h] - \text{Threshold}[a])$$

Where


a is the utility,

h is hour of the year,

Load is the net utility load on the grid, and

Threshold is the utility maximum demand less one standard deviation, or the closest value that satisfies the constraint of between 20 and 250 hours with loads above the threshold.

Figure 34- Transmission PCAF Allocators by IOU



## 10 Distribution Avoided Capacity Costs

The 2021 ACC update retains the avoided distribution capacity costs from the 2020 ACC update with only one small revision. The distribution avoided cost calculations will be revisited in 2022 using more detailed GNA and DDOR information that will be provided by the IOU's later in 2021. The one change is to remove secondary distribution costs from the calculation of PG&E's long-term avoided distribution costs. This is a very small change as secondary distribution values are on the order of \$1/kW-Yr.

Distribution avoided costs represent the value of deferring or avoiding investments in distribution infrastructure through reductions in distribution peak capacity needs. The DRP proceeding has developed

considerable insight and data related to the impact of DERs on the distribution system. Specifically, the Energy Division T&D White Paper attached to the DRP’s June 13, 2019 ALJ Ruling<sup>26</sup> defines two types of avoided costs, specified and unspecified, and proposes to leverage information from utility Distribution Deferral Opportunity Report (DDOR) and Grid Needs Assessment (GNA) filings that contain detailed information about utility needs and investment plans. The avoided costs developed herein leverage information from those reports to estimate near term distribution marginal costs (for years 1 through 5 of the forecast) based on the recommendations in the T&D White Paper.

The distribution marginal costs then transition to GRC distribution marginal costs for the long-term values. Such GRC-sourced marginal costs have been a staple in the ACC in the past.

## 10.1 Near-term Distribution Marginal Costs from the DRP

The utilities calculate distribution avoided costs as part of the annual DDOR process. These avoided costs are specific to a small number of utility capacity projects that could potentially be deferred via DER adoptions in the project areas. The DDOR avoided costs represent the value of deferring distribution investment projects through the addition of DER or other load reducing measures that are above and beyond the DER growth the utility expects to be adopted in the project area because of current DER policies, incentives, and programs. The T&D White Paper defines these DDOR costs as “**specified deferrals.**”

The challenge is that these specified deferrals are not theoretically well-suited to determining the avoided distribution costs that could be provided by the DER that the utilities have embedded in their planning forecasts. The need for a capacity-driven distribution project is determined by the intersection of the capacity limit with the load growth forecast. In some cases, the load growth forecast may not intersect the capacity limit because of the expected peak load reductions from new embedded DER. However, if that new embedded DER were removed from the forecast, there could have been a need for a capacity project.


This is illustrated in Figure 35, where the chart on the left represents the GNA analysis for a circuit that shows no need for a capacity project within the five-year planning horizon. The chart on the right shows the effect of the removal of the new DER growth from the load forecast. The removal of the new embedded DER increases the loading on the equipment and results in higher deficiencies as well as the need for incremental projects over the five-year planning horizon (compared to the utility planning forecasts). The No New DER local load forecasts are referred to as the “counterfactual” forecasts in the T&D White Paper.

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<sup>26</sup> ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S AMENDED RULING REQUESTING COMMENTS ON THE ENERGY DIVISION WHITE PAPER ON AVOIDED COSTS AND LOCATIONAL GRANULARITY OF TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION DEFERRAL VALUES, June 13, 2019



Figure 35. Project need from counterfactual forecast



The concern with how to estimate marginal costs under the No New DER paradigm, prompted the effort to quantify “**unspecified deferrals**” and the associated marginal distribution cost. For the ACC, the near-term marginal distribution capacity costs are the system average marginal costs under the counterfactual forecast for each utility. The marginal costs of the specified deferrals are not included in the ACC as the ACC modeling is done at the system and climate zone level, and the ACC would not currently accommodate the geographic specificity that would be necessary for the specified deferral cases. Instead, the marginal costs of specified deferrals should be applied with the already established DDIF process.

To calculate the marginal cost under the counterfactual forecast, we have implemented the method put forth in the T&D White Paper.<sup>27</sup>

1. **Calculate the counterfactual forecast from the GNA:** For each listed circuit, the counterfactual load can be derived by removing the circuit level DER forecast from the circuit level load.
2. **Identify potential new capacity projects under the counterfactual forecast:** All circuits that exceed the facility rating in any year of the counterfactual forecast. Note that in the T&D White Paper, this step also identified projects that would have occurred in the planning forecast, and separated those projects out from the calculations. We determined that this separation step was not needed in performing the final marginal cost calculations. The reason is that near-term distribution marginal costs derived herein will be applicable to all DER system wide. Therefore, the marginal costs should reflect a system-wide value. To be sure, DDIF can be used to target areas and recognize higher values in those project areas, but system-wide programs may also provide DER load reductions in those same areas independent of the DDIF.
3. **Estimate the percentage of distribution capacity overloads that lead to a deferred distribution upgrade:** Calculate a system level quantity for deferred distribution capacity by using a ratio between capacity overloads identified in the GNA to capacity overloads deferrable in the DDOR. The resulting percentage is a proxy for the percentage of distribution capacity upgrades that can be deferred by DER. Multiplying this percentage with the number of deferrable projects from Step 2 determines the subset of counterfactual capacity projects that could potentially be deferred via DER.

<sup>27</sup> ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S AMENDED RULING REQUESTING COMMENTS ON THE ENERGY DIVISION WHITE PAPER ON AVOIDED COSTS AND LOCATIONAL GRANULARITY OF TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION DEFERRAL VALUES, June 2019, Attachment A, p. 11

4. **Calculate the average marginal cost of the deferred distribution upgrades:** The average DDOR marginal cost is the sum of the DDOR avoided distribution cost (\$/kW-yr) for each project from the DDOR filing, multiplied by its total deficiency need over the planning horizon, and the sum then divided by the total deficiency need for all DDOR projects.
5. **Calculate system level avoided costs:** Multiply the average DDOR marginal cost found in step 4 by the total quantity of deferred capacity by DERs for each circuit. This product is then divided by the sum of forecasted level of DERs for all areas (not just DDOR areas) to obtain a single, system level distribution deferral value in \$/kW-yr.

The method basically uses the utilities' GNA planned case to indicate the unit cost to add distribution capacity. A counterfactual forecast that adds back the load reductions of DER embedded in the utility planning cases is then used to calculate a counterfactual distribution capital plan. The counterfactual plan has the same system average distribution unit cost<sup>28</sup> as each IOU's plan, and is reduced if needed to reflect that not all forecasted overloads lead to a distribution project. In some cases, low or no cost solutions are available that would allow a circuit or area deficiency to be addressed without a meaningful capital project. The proportion of deficiencies that could be addressed in such a manner are removed from the counterfactual distribution plan.

This counterfactual plan is then converted into a system average marginal cost using standard GRC methods of applying a RECC annualization factor along with loaders or adders, such as A&G and O&M. Note that while only a fraction of the circuits and areas have need of a capital project even under the counterfactual forecast, the entire forecast amount of DER load reductions is used to calculate the system average marginal cost. This allows the near-term distribution marginal cost to reflect that only a fraction of DER installed in the next five years could contribute to deferring a distribution project over that same time period. However, as discussed later in this section, the distribution marginal capacity costs do increase toward long term marginal cost levels after year five, reflecting the potential value that could be provided by DER whose load reductions persist past year five.

*Table 24. Near-Term Distribution Marginal Costs*

	PG&E	SCE	SDG&E
Circuits only		\$12.24	
B-Bank Substations		\$12.30	
A-Bank Substations		\$3.07	
Subtransmission		\$0.86	
Total Distribution Capacity (\$/kW-yr)	\$14.49 (\$2019)	\$28.47 (\$2018)	\$3.66 (\$2019)

<sup>28</sup> Unit cost used here is the distribution capital cost per kW of circuit or area deficiency over the five year planning horizon.

## 10.1.1 Derivation of Near-Term Distribution Marginal Capacity Costs

### 10.1.1.1 Unspecified Distribution Marginal Costs

Table 25 shows the calculation of the unspecified distribution marginal cost that is used for the near-term distribution marginal capacity costs. PG&E and SDG&E are shown as a single column, while SCE's costs are divided into circuits and substations separately. In addition, there are subtransmission components to SCE's distribution marginal capacity costs, which are developed in the next section.

Table 25. Unspecified Distribution Deferral Costs by IOU

Line	Number of Overloads	PG&E	SCE-Substations (B-Bank)	SCE-Circuits	SDG&E	Notes:
1	Actual Overloads	224	35	226	11	[1]
2	Counterfactual Overloads	271	50	349	25	[2]
3	Number of Proposed Projects	180	N/A	N/A	10	[3]
4	Percentage of Overloads addressed by Load Transfers	20%	20%	20%	9%	[4] = 100% - ([3]/[1])
<b>Overload Capacity</b>						
5	Actual Overloads (kW)	289,880	269,140	634,702	10,039	[5]
6	Counterfactual Overloads (kW)	349,018	286,660	643,360	25,320	[6]
7	Deferrable Counterfactual Overloads (kW)	280,461	229,328	514,688	23,018	[7] = [6] x (100% - [4])
<b>Project &amp; Planned Investment Costs</b>						
8	Total Cost of Planned Investments in DDOR Filing (\$)	\$390,416,858	\$350,016,877	\$288,412,287	\$17,800,000	[8]
9	Capacity Deficiency that Planned Investments Mitigate (kW)	323,844	269,140	634,702	17,178	[9]
10	Unit Cost of Deferred Distribution Upgrades (\$/kW)	\$1,205.57	\$1,300.50	\$454.41	\$1,036.21	[10]* = [8] / [9]
<b>System Level Avoided Distribution Costs</b>						
11	Deferrable Capital Investment	\$338,114,662	\$298,241,326	\$233,877,317	\$23,851,370	[11] = [10] x [7]
12	5 Year Total forecasted DER (kW)	2,285,003	2,911,430	3,113,110	625,460	[12]
13	Distribution Deferral Value (\$/kW)	\$147.97	\$102.44	\$75.13	\$38.13	[13] = [11] / [12]
14	IOU Specific RECC	9.79%	11.49%	11.45%	7.65%	[14]
15	Capacity Deferral Value (\$/kW of DER installed-yr)	\$14.49	\$11.77	\$8.60	\$2.92	[15] = [13] * [14]
<b>O&amp;M Distribution Costs</b>						
16	O&M Deferral Value (\$/kW-yr)	\$0.00	\$6.74	\$21.98	\$20.26	[16]
17	O&M Deferral Value (\$/kW of DER installed-yr)	\$0.00	\$0.53	\$3.63	\$0.75	[17] = [16] * [7] / [12]
18	Unspecified Marginal Cost (\$/kW of DER installed-yr)	\$14.49	\$12.30	\$12.24	\$3.66	[18] = [15] + [17]

Table 25 Notes:

- [1] Number of circuits or areas in the utility Grid Needs Assessment (GNA) that have a deficiency or overload over the planning horizon (2019-2023) based on the utility planning forecast that includes peak load reductions due to DER. Note that while all utilities use a five year planning horizon, SDG&E only forecast projects for the first three years of the horizon (See [8] below).
- [2] See discussion below.
- [3] See discussion below.
- [5], [6] Sum of the maximum deficiency (kW) from 2019-2023 for each of the overloads identified in [1] and [2]
- [8-10] See discussion below.
- [12] Total forecasted DER was calculated by using the GNA and summing all DER adoption from 2019-2023 across all areas, including areas that were not overloaded. SDG&E's DER forecasts include estimates of coincident DER kW, rather than nameplate. This information was provided by SDG&E as a supplement to the information in the GNA and DDOR.
- [15] See Table 26 through Table 29.
- [16] O&M information is from data requests to the IOUs,

#### Number of Overloads [Line 2]

As a part of the Grid Needs Assessment (GNA) each IOU submitted a list of distribution areas with three key elements: a) Projected Load Forecasts (2019-2023) b) Projected DER adoption (2019-2023) and c) Facility Loading Limits. The counterfactual forecast takes the planning forecast and adds back, or removes the load

reduction from the DER. This results in higher cumulative loads. A circuit or area is considered overloaded (Table 25, Line [2]) if the projected load forecast in any year (2019-2023) exceeds the facility loading limit.

#### *Percentage of Overloads Addressed by Load Transfers [Line 4]*

This is the percent of overloaded circuits or areas that can be addressed via low cost / no cost options. (Table 25, Line [3]) For PG&E, this is the total number of capacity-related "Candidate Deferral" projects provided in the PG&E DDOR divided by the overloaded circuits identified in Line 1 of the Table. For SDG&E, this is the number of demand-growth (capacity) related projects provided in the "Decision - GNA Contents" tab of the SDG&E DDOR divided by the overloaded circuits identified in Line 1. For SCE, see section 10.1.1.2 *Estimation of SCE Low Cost/ No Cost Project Percentage*

#### *Deferrable Counterfactual Overloads [Line 7]*

Multiplying the number of counterfactual overloads by one minus the low cost / no cost percentage, results in the number of counterfactual projects that could potentially be deferred by DER. Similarly, multiplying the amount of counterfactual overload kW (Line [6]) by one minus the low cost / no cost percentage, results in the amount of deferrable overload kW (Line [7]). This is the amount of load reduction that would be needed to defer the deferrable counterfactual projects.

#### *Derivation of Unit Cost of Deferred Distribution Upgrades [Lines 8-10]*

The average project cost per kW of deficiency in the planning case is used to estimate the cost of project upgrades under the counterfactual case. Project costs were only included if the project was proposed specifically to address a capacity overload. The sources for the project costs and associated grid needs are:

- PG&E:** The unit cost for each capacity-driven project in the "Planned Investments" of the DDOR was provided in a PG&E response to an E3 data request. Capacity needs are calculated by summing the "Grid Needs" which were provided for each project. PG&E provided a list of planned investments in the DDOR including a description of the type of distribution service required. The projects with a distribution service of "Capacity" were included in the total project cost and grid need calculation, while projects with a listed distribution service of "Reliability / Other" and "Voltage" were ignored.
- SCE:** Total project costs for sub-transmission, substation (A-Bank), substation (B-Bank) and circuits were provided by SCE in a March 2020 response to an E3 data request. Due to SCE's methodology, and the fact that the projects listed in the GNA were post-load transfer optimization, the total capacity needs are the same as those provided in [5].
- SDGE:** Total project costs and associated capacity needs from 2019-2021 were provided in the "Independent Professional Engineer SDG&E 2019 GNA-DDOR Report." Project costs are shown in Table 6-13, while Grid Needs are shown in Appendix A. Response 1 of Appendix A in the IPE Report states that SDG&E's 2019 distribution planning cycle did not identify any grid needs in 2022 or 2023. Thus, the listed project costs and associated grid needs are only applicable for a three-year time horizon.


#### **10.1.1.2 Estimation of SCE Low Cost/ No Cost Project Percentage**

A capital project is not always needed to address a capacity deficiency. In some cases, the utility can address the deficiency through low cost or no cost options such as reconfiguring the local distribution system through changes in switch settings. The percentage of overloads that can be addressed via low cost/ no cost options can be determined from the PG&E and SDG&E GNA and DDOR reports by comparing the deficiencies to the planned projects. This fraction of low cost / no cost solutions is then used to reduce the estimated deferrable capital investments under the counterfactual case.

For SCE, the low cost / no cost percentage cannot be calculated from their GNA or DDOR data because the SCE GNA reports reflect system conditions after their system has been reconfigured to remove the deficiencies addressed by low cost / no cost solutions. We expect that many deficiencies identified under the counterfactual case for SCE would have been addressable via low cost / no cost solutions, so we derived a low cost / no cost percentage for SCE based on the distribution of deficiencies for the projects identified by SCE in their GNA.


The assumption is that circuits or substations with small deficiency amounts would have a higher likelihood of being addressable via the low cost / no cost solutions. This is supported by Figure 36 that shows a far higher percentage of very low counterfactual deficiencies than the actual GNA deficiencies.

*Figure 36. Distribution of Actual and Counterfactual Deficiencies for SCE*




To correct for this overabundance of small deficiency projects, we remove the smallest deficiency counterfactual “projects” so that the distributions of actual and remaining counterfactual projects are similar. Figure 37 shows that removing the lowest 20th percentile of counterfactual deficiencies results in a deficiency distribution that is closer to the GNA actual data. The 20% value is also comparable to the low cost / no cost percentage of projects shown in the PG&E data.

Figure 37. Distribution of SCE Circuit Adjusted Counterfactual Deficiencies (20% Removed)



The same analysis process was used for SCE substations, and the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile was found to be a reasonable adjustment factor. The substation distributions are shown below.

Figure 38. Distribution of SCE Substation Adjusted Counterfactual Deficiencies (20% Removed)



### 10.1.1.3 Derivation of Distribution Annual MC Factors

As with Transmission, Annual MC Factors annualize the unit cost of capital investment using a RECC and adds adjustments for A&G, General Plant, Working Capital, and Franchise Fees and Uncollectables. PG&E also includes the cost of O&M in its RECC, whereas SCE and SDG&E provided O&M costs as a \$/kW-yr cost separate from the RECC. The detailed derivations of the Annual MC Factors are shown below.

Table 26. PG&E Distribution Annual MC Factor

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	6.36%	
Electric Distribution O&M Loading Factor (Capital Basis)	[2]	2.46%	
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Distribution (Distribution O&M + A&G Basis)	[3]	24.17%	
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission (Transmission O&M + A&G Basis)	[4]	5.53%	
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]	0.83%	
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Dist. O&M + A&G Based - Annualized)	[6]	2.44%	
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]	1.0109	
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$100.00	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$6.36	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense	[10]	\$2.46	[10] = [8] x [2].
A&G Expense	[11]	\$0.59	[11] = [10] x [3].
General Plant	[12]	\$0.17	[12] = ([10] + [11]) x [4]
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$3.22	[13] = [10] + [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]	\$0.03	[14] = ([10] + [11]) x [5].
Cash Working Capital	[15]	\$0.07	[15] = ([10] + [11]) x [6].
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]	\$0.10	[16] = [14] + [15].
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]	\$0.11	[17] = ([9] + [13] + [16]) x ([7] - 1).
<b>Marginal Cost</b>	[18]	\$9.79	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
<b>Annual Marginal Cost Factor</b>	[19]	9.79%	[19] = [18] / [8].

**Notes:**

- [1] E-Dist Primary Composite from Table 1: Financial Factors from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch02.xlsm
- [2] Overhead Secondary Line from Table 1: All Loaders Summary from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch03.xlsm
- [3] Distribution A&G from Table 1: All Loaders Summary from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch03.xlsm
- [4] Distribution GPLF from Table 1: All Loaders Summary from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch03.xlsm
- [5] M&S from Table 1: All Loaders Summary from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch03.xlsm
- [6] CWC from Table 1: All Loaders Summary from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch03.xlsm
- [7] FF&U Factor from Table 1: All Loaders Summary from IntegeratedDistributedResourcesOIR\_DR\_ED\_001-Q01Atch03.xlsm

Table 27. SCE Distribution Annual MC Factor for Circuits

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	9.25%	ED-SCE-003 follow up
Electric Transmission O&M (\$/kW-yr)	[2]	\$21.98	ED-SCE-003 follow up
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Transmission ( Capital basis)	[3]	1.44%	ED-SCE-003 follow up
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission ( Annual Capital basis)	[4]	7.30%	ED-SCE-003 follow up
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]		
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Dist. O&M + A&G Based - Annualized)	[6]		
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]	1.12%	
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$100.00	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$9.250	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense (to be added directly, rather than included as a factor)	[10]		[10] = not included in factors
A&G Expense	[11]	\$1.44	[11] = [8] x [3].
General Plant	[12]	\$0.68	[12] = [10] x [4].
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$2.115	[13] = [10] + [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]		
Cash Working Capital	[15]		
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]		
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]	\$0.13	[17] = ([9] + [13] + [16]) x [7].
<b>Marginal Cost</b>	[18]	\$11.49	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
<b>Annual Marginal Cost Factor</b>	[19]	11.49%	[19] = [18] / [8].



Table 28. SCE Distribution Annual MC Factor for Substations

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	9.21%	ED-SCE-003 follow up
Electric Transmission O&M (\$/kW-yr)	[2]	\$6.74	ED-SCE-003 follow up
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Transmission ( Capital basis)	[3]	1.44%	ED-SCE-003 follow up
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission ( Annual Capital basis)	[4]	7.30%	ED-SCE-003 follow up
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]		
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Dist. O&M + A&G Based - Annualized)	[6]		
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]	1.12%	
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$100.00	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$9.210	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense (to be added directly, rather than included as a factor)	[10]		[10] not included in the factors.
A&G Expense	[11]	\$1.44	[11] = [8] x [3].
General Plant	[12]	\$0.67	[12] = [10] x [4].
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$2.112	[13] = [10] + [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]		
Cash Working Capital	[15]		
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]		
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]	\$0.13	[17] = ([9] + [13] + [16]) x [7].
<b>Marginal Cost</b>	[18]	\$11.45	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
<b>Annual Marginal Cost Factor</b>	[19]	11.45%	[19] = [18] / [8].

Table 29. SDG&amp;E Distribution Annual MC Factor

<b>Loaders &amp; Financial Factors Inputs:</b>			
Real Economic Carrying Charge (RECC)	[1]	7.18%	
Electric Transmission O&M (\$/kW-yr added later)	[2]	\$20.26	
A&G Payroll Loading Factor Transmission ( Annual Capital basis + GPL + CWC)	[3]	2.10%	
General Plant Loading Factor Transmission ( Annual Capital basis)	[4]	2.77%	
Materials and Supplies Carrying Charge (Plant Based)	[5]		
Cash Working Capital Carrying Charge (Capital Based)	[6]	1.50%	
Franchise Fees & Uncollectibles Loading Factor RRQ Basis	[7]		
<b>MARGINAL INVESTMENT</b>			
Marginal Investment	[8]	\$429.17	
<b>Annualized Marginal Investment</b>	[9]	\$30.83	[9] = [8] x [1].
<b>MARGINAL EXPENSES</b>			
O&M Expense	[10]		[10] = [8] x [2].
A&G Expense	[11]	\$0.68	[11] = [3] x ( [9] + [12] + [15] )
General Plant	[12]	\$0.85	[12] = [4] x [9]
<b>Sub-total Marginal Expenses</b>	[13]	\$1.530	[13] = [10] + [11] + [12].
<b>WORKING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE</b>			
Materials and Supplies On-hand	[14]		
Cash Working Capital	[15]	\$0.46	[15] = [9] x [6]
<b>Sub-total Carrying Costs</b>	[16]	\$0.462	[16] = [14] + [15].
<b>Franchise Fees and Uncollectibles</b>	[17]	\$0.00	
<b>Marginal Cost</b>	[18]	\$32.82	[18] = [9] + [13] + [16] + [17].
<b>Annual Marginal Cost Factor</b>	[19]	7.65%	[19] = [18] / [8].

#### 10.1.1.4 SCE Subtransmission and A-Banks Marginal Costs

The near-term distribution marginal costs for SCE are derived in three parts, Circuits, Substations, and Subtransmission. The marginal capacity costs for circuits and substations are derived using the T&D White Paper counterfactual process. Subtransmission, however, does not fit well with that paradigm because of the networked nature of system for addressing N-1 contingency events. In other words, the need for subtransmission projects cannot be determined simply by looking at the loadings on downstream circuits in the normal configuration. To address this gap, we include a fraction of SCE's long-term GRC-based subtransmission marginal capacity costs in the near-term costs. The fraction is the ratio of SCE Substation B-Bank counterfactual overloads to total DER reduction forecast over the five-year planning horizon (2019-2023). In this way, the subtransmission and A-bank marginal costs reflect an average expected avoided cost from systemwide DER deployment. This is the same treatment of the total DER reduction forecast used for the unspecified distribution marginal costs derived above.


Figure 39. SCE Subtransmission and A-Bank Distribution Deferral Value

Line		SCE-Substations (A-Bank)	SCE Subtransmission	Notes
[1]	Distribution Deferral Value (\$/kW-yr)	\$ 31.17	\$ 8.77	From SCE GRC
[2]	Deferrable Counterfactual Overloads (kW)*	286,660	286,660	* Using SCE Substation B-Bank Value:
[3]	5 Year Total forecasted DER (kW)	2,911,430	2,911,430	* Using SCE Substation B-Bank Value:
[4]	Distribution Deferral Value (\$/kW of DER - yr)	\$ 3.07	\$ 0.86	[4] = [1] * [2] / [3]

## 10.2 Use of Short-term and Long-term Avoided Distribution Costs

As stated in the T&D White Paper, “the impact of DERs to defer distribution upgrades accrue over the long term, while the GNA is limited to the forecast horizon that is necessary for distribution planning.” The avoided costs estimates discussed above are based on DDOR and GNA filings that use a five-year planning horizon. To extrapolate these estimates into long-term forecasts, the avoided costs in years 1-5 would be the unspecified deferral values held constant on a real dollar basis. Years 8 and beyond would be the GRC level held constant on a real dollar basis. Years 6 and 7 would linearly transition between the two end points of years 5 and 8. This method is depicted in the figure below.

Figure 40. Illustrative Distribution Avoided Cost Transition



## 10.3 Long-term GRC-based Marginal Costs

The California IOUs have used a wide variety of methods for estimating distribution marginal costs in their GRC filings.<sup>29</sup> The long-standing purpose of the marginal costs in a GRC filing is to guide the allocation of the utility revenue requirement to customer classes and the design of marginal-cost based rates. The GRC filing therefore provides a useful source for marginal costs that are estimated on regular three-year cycle. However, the GRC marginal costs might not be completely appropriate for use in DER cost effectiveness

<sup>29</sup> Methodology and Forecast of Long Term Avoided Costs for the Evaluation of California Energy Efficiency Programs, Prepared for the CPUC, October 2004, p. 102

evaluations. They are not location-specific, and they are not necessarily avoidable costs. Therefore, Staff recommends that the GRC values be the source for long-run marginal costs, with the recognition that they may need to be modified for DER cost effectiveness and the ACC.

Specifically, the long-term avoided costs use GRC total distribution capacity costs for all utilities and does not make a distinction between peak and grid distribution capacity. Energy Division's consultant E3 has examined SCE's proposed separation of peak and grid-related distribution marginal costs, and has concluded that it was not supported by sufficient estimation rigor. Use of the total distribution capacity cost as estimated by SCE's regression analysis of cumulative distribution capacity-related investments and cumulative peak loads is consistent with avoided distribution capacity costs that have been used for SCE in prior avoided cost updates.

Should SCE adequately revise its methods in a subsequent GRC proceeding, those revisions should be evaluated on their merits and not rejected based on the current findings herein.

### 10.3.1 GRC Data Hierarchy

In selecting data to use for the long term avoided costs, Staff used the following hierarchy of GRC Phase II data sources, presented in descending order of preference.

1. Values adopted for revenue allocation from most recently completed proceeding.
2. Values adopted for rate design purposes from most recently completed proceeding.
3. Values agreed to by majority of parties for revenue allocation in settlement agreement from most recently completed proceeding.
4. Values agreed to by majority of parties for rate design purposes in settlement agreement from most recently completed proceeding.
5. Utility-proposed values for revenue allocation from most recently completed proceeding.

### 10.3.2 Distribution Marginal Costs from Most Recently Completed Proceedings

#### 10.3.2.1 PG&E

PG&E marginal distribution capacity costs are from its settlement agreement in the utility's 2017 Phase II General Rate Case (GRC) proceeding. The attachment 1 of the settlement agreement<sup>30</sup> shows distribution marginal capacity costs by Operating Division and Planning Area.

For conversion of the capacity costs to Climate Zones, we use the Operating Division data shown in Settlement Table 4, and contained in the electronic workpaper file MCREv\_GRC.xlsx. That marginal cost data is expressed in \$/PCAF-kW-yr and \$/FLT-kW-yr. PCAF (Peak Capacity Allocations Factors) are hourly allocation factors used by PG&E to calculate the relative need for distribution capacity across the year. The PCAF-KW are the PCAF-weighted coincident peak demands on primary capacity equipment. The FLT-kW are the peaks on the final line transformers, and represent a more noncoincident measure of peak demand on the secondary equipment. To make the two marginal costs compatible, we convert the secondary costs from \$/FLT-kW-yr to \$/PCAF-kW-yr based on the ratio of FLT-kW to PCAF-kW in the division. The total

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<sup>30</sup> GRC-2017-PhII\_Plea\_PGE\_20171026\_427910.pdf

distribution capacity cost by PG&E Operating Division is shown in column I of Table 30. For 2021, the secondary costs (Column H) are excluded and only the primary costs (Column D) are included.

Table 30. Long-Term Distribution Capacity Costs for PG&E by Division (Base Year of 2017)

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Line No.	Division	Climate Zone	Primary Capacity \$/PCAF-kW-yr /1/	Secondary \$/FLT-kW-yr /1/	Total PCAF Loads (PCAF kW) /2/	Total FLT Loads (FLT kW) /2/	Secondary \$/PCAF-kW-yr (E*G/F)	Total Distribution Capacity \$/PCAF kW-yr (D+H)
1	Central Coast	4	\$69.09	\$1.04	823,510	1,759,256	2.22	\$71.31
2	De Anza	4	\$35.65	\$1.01	741,675	1,234,311	1.68	\$37.33
3	Diablo	12	\$17.78	\$1.56	1,265,169	1,524,487	1.88	\$19.66
4	East Bay	3A	\$19.99	\$0.88	627,862	1,338,170	1.88	\$21.87
5	Fresno	13	\$39.52	\$1.36	2,164,629	3,575,125	2.25	\$41.77
6	Humboldt	1	\$73.97	\$1.12	292,803	736,437	2.82	\$76.79
7	Kern	13	\$34.07	\$1.23	1,585,454	2,449,767	1.90	\$35.97
8	Los Padres	5	\$56.49	\$1.06	492,381	1,041,742	2.24	\$58.73
9	Mission	3B	\$13.63	\$0.97	1,233,354	2,022,915	1.59	\$15.22
10	North Bay	2	\$29.42	\$1.75	647,540	1,283,383	3.47	\$32.89
11	North Valley	16	\$53.40	\$1.26	742,213	1,324,624	2.25	\$55.65
12	Peninsula	3A	\$31.79	\$1.06	766,475	1,436,434	1.99	\$33.78
13	Sacramento	11	\$40.91	\$1.22	970,943	1,589,591	2.00	\$42.91
14	San Francisco	3A	\$40.41	\$1.52	829,544	1,435,075	2.63	\$43.04
15	San Jose	4	\$40.12	\$1.16	1,369,868	2,130,431	1.80	\$41.92
16	Sierra	11	\$30.65	\$1.25	1,187,910	1,833,534	1.93	\$32.58
17	Sonoma	2	\$121.98	\$1.28	544,454	1,147,401	2.70	\$124.68
18	Stockton	12	\$33.36	\$1.34	1,207,506	2,114,747	2.35	\$35.71
19	Yosemite	13	\$60.18	\$1.56	1,090,280	2,098,437	3.00	\$63.18


/1/ From PG&E 2017 GRC Phase II, MCRv\_GRC.xlsx. IN-Dist-Capacity MC tab

/2/ From PG&E 2017 GRC Phase II, MCRv\_GRC.xlsx.OUT)PCAF-FLT Factors tab

Finally, the division-level avoided costs are converted into climate zone values. If a climate zone encompasses more than one Operating Division, then the weighted average value is calculated using the PCAF kW in each Operating Division. The PG&E long-term distribution marginal capacity costs by climate zone are summarized below. Climate Zone 3A is the western portion of the zone, comprised of San Francisco and neighboring cities in the Bay Area.

Table 31. Long-Term Distribution Capacity Costs for PG&amp;E by Climate Zone (Base Year of 2017)

J	K
Climate Zone	Wtd Avg Capacity Cost \$/PCAF-kW-yr (Col I wtd by Col F)
1	\$76.79
2	\$74.81
3A	\$33.87
3B	\$15.22
4	\$49.01
5	\$58.73
11	\$37.22
12	\$27.50
13	\$44.69
16	\$55.65



Climate zone map from:

<https://www.pge.com/myhome/edusafety/workshopstraining/pec/toolbox/arch/climate/index.shtml>

### 10.3.2.2 SCE

SCE's long-term distribution marginal capacity costs are from is 2018 GRC Phase II proceeding.<sup>31</sup> SCE did not develop marginal costs on a geographically disaggregated basis, but used a regression analysis of cumulative distribution capacity-related investments and cumulative peak loads, consistent with avoided distribution capacity costs that have been used for SCE in prior avoided cost updates. SCE developed marginal costs for three categories of distribution capacity investment: subtransmission, substations, and local distribution.

<sup>31</sup> ERRATA, PHASE 2 OF 2018 GENERAL RATE CASE MARGINAL COST AND SALES FORECAST PROPOSALS, SCE-02A TABLE I-14 (SCE 2018 GRC PHASE II

Table 32. Long-term Distribution Marginal Capacity Costs for SCE (\$2018)

	SCE Distribution Marginal Capacity Costs (2018\$)
Subtransmission (\$/kW-yr)	\$40.00
Substation (\$/kW-yr)	\$25.00
Local Distribution (\$/kW-yr)	\$102.90
Total (\$/kW-yr)	\$167.90

In its 2018 GRC Phase II proceeding, SCE also proposes the functionalization of its distribution marginal capacity costs into a peak component and a grid component. SCE's rationale is that the peak refers to the capacity function to meet time-variant peak customer demand, whereas grid refers to the distribution system's function that enables the bi-directional transfer of energy to and from customers. (SCE-02A, p. 39).

With this functionalization, peak related costs are similar to how we previously viewed SCE distribution marginal costs, so they would continue to be included. There is a question, however, of whether grid-related capacity costs should be included in the forecast of SCE avoided distribution capacity costs.

The current avoided distribution capacity costs are consistent with the paradigm that power flows from generators connected to bulk transmission down to customers connected at lower voltages. With the reduction in demand at the customer meter, the need for distribution capacity expansion projects to deliver power from the grid to the customer meter are reduced, and future distribution costs decline. When power flows in the reverse direction (from the customer site onto the grid), however, reductions in demand at the meter could actually increase infrastructure costs as the reduction in customer gross usage results in higher net exports (reverse flow) and higher capacity needs to address those reserve flows.

That said, the method that SCE used to estimate distribution peak and grid capacity costs does not align with a bi-directional flow situation. SCE estimated the total distribution capacity costs using its long-standing NERA regression method. That method only looked at cumulative capacity investment and cumulative peak load. The approach is no different from how SCE estimated marginal distribution costs before its peak/grid distinction. There is no explicit reflection of reverse flow in the estimation of the marginal cost, which suggests that the entirety of the marginal cost should be included (peak plus grid), just as has been done in the past.

SCE makes an additional observation that the distribution system is evolving and that the grid-related equipment is serving more of a contingency and grid connectivity role. Again, while that may be true, the total distribution capacity costs (peak plus grid) that SCE derived do not present a functional relationship between contingency capacity or grid connectivity and distribution investment costs.

For these reasons, we are not making a distinction between peak and grid distribution capacity costs for SCE in this ACC update. We are including the total distribution capacity cost as estimated by SCE's regression analysis of cumulative distribution capacity-related investments and cumulative peak loads. This is consistent with avoided distribution capacity costs that have been used for SCE in prior ACCs.

### 10.3.2.3 SDG&E

SDG&E's 2016 GRC Phase II does not have marginal costs adopted in the Decision, nor in the applicable Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, we use the marginal distribution costs filed by SDG&E in the Amended Testimony of William Saxe. The marginal costs are for 2016 per SDG&E testimony, pg. WGS-6. SDG&E currently has its 2019 GRC Phase II Application before the Commission (A.19-03-002), but that case has not been resolved as of the time of this writing.

*Table 33. Long-term Distribution Capacity Costs for SDG&E<sup>32</sup>*

	SDG&E Marginal Capacity Cost (\$2016)
Substation (\$/kW-yr)	\$22.05
Local Distribution (\$/kW-yr)	\$77.97
Total	\$100.02

## 10.4 Annual Distribution Capacity Costs

As discussed in section 10.2 *Use of Short-term and Long-term Avoided Distribution Costs*, the annual distribution marginal cost stream is a combination of near-term and long-term costs. The nominal marginal costs are shown below based on the IOU specific escalation rates shown below.

*Table 34. Distribution Annual Escalation Rates*

	PG&E	SCE	SDG&E
Annual Distribution Escalation Rate (%/yr)	2.5%	2.33%	2.0%

*Escalation rates are from the IOU RECC factor derivations for distribution capital projects.*

<sup>32</sup> PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM G. SAXE ON BEHALF OF SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY IN SUPPORT OF SECOND AMENDED APPLICATION CHAPTER 6, P. WGS-6 (SDG&E 2016 GRC)



Table 35. Annual Distribution Marginal Capacity Costs (\$/kW-yr) (Nominal)

Year	Climate Zone:	PG&E										SCE	SDG&E
		CZ1	CZ2	CZ3A	CZ3B	CZ4	CZ5	CZ11	CZ12	CZ13	CZ16	All	All
2019	Historical	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$14.49	\$29.13	\$3.66
2020	Near Term	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$14.85	\$29.81	\$3.74
2021	Near Term	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$15.22	\$30.51	\$3.81
2022	Near Term	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$15.60	\$31.22	\$3.89
2023	Near Term	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$15.99	\$31.94	\$3.96
2024	Near Term	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$16.39	\$32.69	\$4.04
2025	Transition	\$42.49	\$41.52	\$24.44	\$16.74	\$31.03	\$35.03	\$25.97	\$21.76	\$29.01	\$33.71	\$90.65	\$44.15
2026	Transition	\$68.59	\$66.65	\$32.49	\$17.10	\$45.67	\$53.67	\$35.56	\$27.13	\$41.64	\$51.03	\$148.61	\$84.26
2027	Long Term	\$94.69	\$91.78	\$40.55	\$17.45	\$60.32	\$72.31	\$45.14	\$32.50	\$54.26	\$68.36	\$206.57	\$124.36
2028	Long Term	\$97.06	\$94.07	\$41.56	\$17.88	\$61.82	\$74.12	\$46.27	\$33.31	\$55.62	\$70.07	\$211.39	\$126.85
2029	Long Term	\$99.48	\$96.43	\$42.60	\$18.33	\$63.37	\$75.97	\$47.43	\$34.14	\$57.01	\$71.82	\$216.31	\$129.39
2030	Long Term	\$101.97	\$98.84	\$43.66	\$18.79	\$64.95	\$77.87	\$48.61	\$35.00	\$58.43	\$73.61	\$221.35	\$131.97
2031	Long Term	\$104.52	\$101.31	\$44.75	\$19.26	\$66.58	\$79.82	\$49.83	\$35.87	\$59.89	\$75.45	\$226.51	\$134.61
2032	Long Term	\$107.13	\$103.84	\$45.87	\$19.74	\$68.24	\$81.81	\$51.07	\$36.77	\$61.39	\$77.34	\$231.79	\$137.31
2033	Long Term	\$109.81	\$106.44	\$47.02	\$20.23	\$69.95	\$83.86	\$52.35	\$37.69	\$62.93	\$79.27	\$237.19	\$140.05
2034	Long Term	\$112.55	\$109.10	\$48.20	\$20.74	\$71.70	\$85.96	\$53.66	\$38.63	\$64.50	\$81.25	\$242.72	\$142.85
2035	Long Term	\$115.37	\$111.82	\$49.40	\$21.26	\$73.49	\$88.11	\$55.00	\$39.60	\$66.11	\$83.29	\$248.37	\$145.71
2036	Long Term	\$118.25	\$114.62	\$50.64	\$21.79	\$75.33	\$90.31	\$56.38	\$40.59	\$67.76	\$85.37	\$254.16	\$148.62
2037	Long Term	\$121.21	\$117.48	\$51.90	\$22.33	\$77.21	\$92.57	\$57.78	\$41.60	\$69.46	\$87.50	\$260.08	\$151.60
2038	Long Term	\$124.24	\$120.42	\$53.20	\$22.89	\$79.14	\$94.88	\$59.23	\$42.64	\$71.19	\$89.69	\$266.14	\$154.63
2039	Long Term	\$127.34	\$123.43	\$54.53	\$23.47	\$81.12	\$97.25	\$60.71	\$43.71	\$72.97	\$91.93	\$272.34	\$157.72
2040	Long Term	\$130.53	\$126.52	\$55.89	\$24.05	\$83.15	\$99.68	\$62.23	\$44.80	\$74.80	\$94.23	\$278.69	\$160.88
2041	Long Term	\$133.79	\$129.68	\$57.29	\$24.65	\$85.22	\$102.17	\$63.78	\$45.92	\$76.67	\$96.59	\$285.18	\$164.09
2042	Long Term	\$137.14	\$132.92	\$58.72	\$25.27	\$87.36	\$104.73	\$65.38	\$47.07	\$78.59	\$99.00	\$291.82	\$167.38
2043	Long Term	\$140.56	\$136.25	\$60.19	\$25.90	\$89.54	\$107.35	\$67.01	\$48.25	\$80.55	\$101.48	\$298.62	\$170.72
2044	Long Term	\$144.08	\$139.65	\$61.69	\$26.55	\$91.78	\$110.03	\$68.69	\$49.45	\$82.56	\$104.01	\$305.58	\$174.14
2045	Long Term	\$147.68	\$143.14	\$63.24	\$27.21	\$94.07	\$112.78	\$70.41	\$50.69	\$84.63	\$106.61	\$312.70	\$177.62
2046	Long Term	\$151.37	\$146.72	\$64.82	\$27.89	\$96.42	\$115.60	\$72.17	\$51.95	\$86.74	\$109.28	\$319.99	\$181.17
2047	Long Term	\$155.16	\$150.39	\$66.44	\$28.59	\$98.83	\$118.49	\$73.97	\$53.25	\$88.91	\$112.01	\$327.44	\$184.80
2048	Long Term	\$159.04	\$154.15	\$68.10	\$29.30	\$101.31	\$121.45	\$75.82	\$54.59	\$91.14	\$114.81	\$335.07	\$188.49
2049	Long Term	\$163.01	\$158.00	\$69.80	\$30.04	\$103.84	\$124.49	\$77.71	\$55.95	\$93.41	\$117.68	\$342.88	\$192.26
2050	Long Term	\$167.09	\$161.95	\$71.55	\$30.79	\$106.43	\$127.60	\$79.66	\$57.35	\$95.75	\$120.62	\$350.87	\$196.11

## 10.5 Allocation of Avoided Distribution Capacity Costs to Hours

The annual capacity costs shown above are allocated to hours of the year to allow the ACC to reflect the time varying need for distribution capacity. The prior ACC used the distribution hourly allocation factors based on regression estimates of distribution hourly loads.<sup>33</sup> Those estimates reflected forecasts of net loads (load net of local PV production) for the present and future (2030). In this way, the allocation factors estimated an evolution in the timing of the peak capacity needs on the distribution system due to DER. With the change to estimating distribution capacity costs under the paradigm of no new incremental DER, this estimation of the timing of peak capacity needs in a future with more DER is no longer needed.

<sup>33</sup> While the updated allocation factors are superior to the prior values, they are not substitutes or replacements for the work that utilities are currently undertaking as part of the DRP proceeding. These allocation factors are simulations based on a limited number of 2010 circuit and substation load patterns. Actual loading for a specific local distribution area within a climate zone could vary significantly from the loading assumed herein. Moreover, the IOUs may develop alternate methods for determining the peak contribution of distributed energy resources.


Therefore, the distribution hourly allocation factors estimated for 2020 are used for all years 2020 through 2050 in the ACC.

In addition to holding the allocation factors fixed over the analysis period, this ACC update also utilizes historical utility data and GRC analyses for the allocation factors. Details by IOU are provided below.

### 10.5.1 PG&E PCAFs


PG&E produces hourly peak capacity allocation factors (PCAFs) by distribution area for their GRC filing. In its 2020 GRC Phase II proceeding, PG&E presents a novel modification to its PCAF methodology wherein the need for capacity to accommodate exports is factored into the PCAF calculations. While this modification may have merit, it has not been incorporated into the ACC at this time because its impact is currently negligibly small. Figure 41 shows the PCAF associated with normal delivery of power from the grid to the customer, and the PCAF associated with exports. The export-related PCAFs are barely visible in the hours 15-18.

*Figure 41. PG&E PCAF Distribution for all Areas by Hour of the Day (PST)*



The PCAFs used in the ACC were provided by PG&E division. PG&E divisions were mapped to climate zones using the same methodology outlined in Table 30. If there was more than one division per climate zone, a weighted average of the PCAFs was taken. The appendix in section 0 contains figures for all IOU PCAFs by climate zone. Two climate zone results are shown below as examples.

Figure 42. Example PG&amp;E PCAF Distributions by Hour of Day (PST)




### 10.5.2 SCE Peak Load Risk Factors (PLRF)

For SCE, the ACC utilizes the PLRF analysis done by SCE in its 2018 GRC Phase II proceeding. According to SCE: “The PLRF methodology is a deterministic variant of the LOLE methodology used for generation capacity, and uses the same conceptual framework of identifying hours of the year when expected load may result in an expected capacity constraint on the system. Since the distribution system is geographically disparate, the PLRF methodology is applied to each individual substation and circuit to take into account load diversity on the system.”

The PLRF identifies the hours of peak capacity need for each substation and circuit. To translate that to allocation factors by climate zone, we aggregated the substations and circuits into climate zones, and calculated the probability of peak capacity need for each hour based on the relative number of times each hour was the peak hour for a substation or circuit in the climate zone.

Figure 43. Example SCE PLRF Distributions by Hour of the Day (PST)



### 10.5.3 SDG&E PCAFs


SDG&E does not produce PCAFs or PLRFs in its GRC proceedings. We therefore calculated PCAFs for the SDG&E climate zones using distribution-level power flow data provided by SDG&E and the PCAF methodology from the prior ACC. The allocation factors are derived with the formula below and the additional constraint that the peak period contain between 20 and 250 hours for the year.

$$\text{PCAF}[a,h] = (\text{Load}[a,h] - \text{Threshold}[a]) / \text{Sum of all positive } (\text{Load}[a,h] - \text{Threshold}[a])$$

Where:

- + a is the climate zone area,
- + h is hour of the year,
- + Load is the net distribution load, and
- + Threshold is the area maximum demand less one standard deviation, or the closest value that satisfies the constraint of between 20 and 250 hours with loads above the threshold.

Figure 44. Example SDG&E Climate Zone PCAFs by Hour of the Day (PST)



### 10.5.4 Distribution Day and Weather Mapping

The distribution capacity hourly allocation factors described above reflect the particular years from which the historical data was obtained. The peak loads are therefore driven by weather conditions in those years – and that weather will not match the CTZ22 weather files used for the generation avoided cost modeling. In order to better align the distribution and generation costs, the distribution allocation factors are reordered to align with the weather in the CTZ22 files. Moreover, the hourly allocation factors are realigned so that the occurrence of weekends and holidays matches a 2020 calendar year. This remapping of allocation factors for weekends is particularly important for the evaluation of energy efficiency measures that vary by occupation schedules such as office HVAC. Each IOU provided temperature data from weather stations within the service territory which were mapped to climate zones using the index provided by the *California Climate Zone Descriptions*<sup>34</sup> document published by the CEC. Data for climate zone 1, 5 and 16 were missing due to the size of the climate zones. Temperature Data for climate zone 2 was used to approximate climate zones 1 and 16, while data from climate zone 4 was used to approximate climate zone 5. These proxy climate zones were selected by choosing the climate zone with the most comparable amounts of heating and cooling degree days to the climate zone with missing data.

The CTZ22 weather data and calendar year 2020 are the master timeseries for the remapping.

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.pge.com/includes/docs/pdfs/about/rates/rebateprogrameval/advisorygroup/climatezones.pdf>

All timeseries data are assigned in 24-hour days to bins by workday/weekend-holiday, and season. Within each bin, the timeseries data is ranked by a temperature metric for each day. The temperature metric used by E3 for the PCAF is the mean temperature over the course of a day. The remapping then reorders the timeseries data by day within each bin by mapping temperature metric ranks for the master data and the weather data used in the utility analyses. For example, PCAFs for the summer weekday with the highest temperature metric (mean average temperature) will be remapped to the CTZ22 weekday with the highest ranked temperature metric. The second highest PCAF day would be mapped to the second highest base day, etc. If there are more source days in the bin than base year days, the lowest ranked source days would be discarded. If there are fewer source days in the bin than base year days, the lowest ranked source day would be replicated as needed. Given that PCAF and PLRF are concentrated in relatively few hours of the year, the effects of duplicating or discarding the lowest ranked days would likely have no impact.

The results of the remapping process is distribution hourly allocation factors that sum to the same total (basically 100%) for each climate zone, but better reflect the expected impact of CTZ22 weather and align all weekends and holidays with a 2020 calendar (each year starts on Wednesday).

## 11 Transmission and Distribution Loss Factors

### 11.1 T&D Capacity Loss Factors

The value of deferring transmission and distribution investments is adjusted for losses during the peak period using the factors shown in Table 36 and

Table 37. These factors are lower than the energy and generation capacity loss factors because they represent losses from secondary meter to only the distribution or transmission facilities.

*Table 36. Loss Factors for SCE and SDG&E Transmission and Distribution Capacity*

	SCE	SDG&E
Distribution	1.022	1.043
Transmission	1.054	1.071

Table 37: Loss Factors for PG&amp;E Transmission and Distribution Capacity

	Transmission	Distribution
Central Coast	1.053	1.019
De Anza	1.050	1.019
Diablo	1.045	1.020
East Bay	1.042	1.020
Fresno	1.076	1.020
Kern	1.065	1.023
Los Padres	1.060	1.019
Mission	1.047	1.019
North Bay	1.053	1.019
North Coast	1.060	1.019
North Valley	1.073	1.021
Peninsula	1.050	1.019
Sacramento	1.052	1.019
San Francisco	1.045	1.020
San Jose	1.052	1.018
Sierra	1.054	1.020
Stockton	1.066	1.019
Yosemite	1.067	1.019

## 12 High GWP Gases

### 12.1 Introduction

This new avoided cost component introduced in 2020 measures the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from refrigerants and methane, two types of high Global Warming Potential (GWP) gases. High GWP gases are defined as GHGs that have a greater impact on global warming than CO<sub>2</sub>. The GWP of a given gas is the ratio of its atmospheric effect on global warming to that of CO<sub>2</sub>, so that the larger the GWP the more that a given gas contributes to the atmospheric greenhouse effect over a given time period. The GWP of a given gas may differ depending on the time period over which it is measured. For example, methane has a GWP of 72 over 20 years and a GWP of 25 over 100 years.<sup>35</sup> The 100-year GWP is used by CARB for emission inventory calculations and is provided as the default value with the 20 year GWP is provided as a sensitivity.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> The 100-year GWP is used the CARB inventory, documented [here](#). The 20-year GWP is documented in IPCC materials, for example the [technical documentation for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report](#), p. 212.

<sup>36</sup> See CARB Global Warming Potentials Table, available at: <https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ghg-gwps>

The impetus for this new component is primarily the advent of DER programs designed to replace natural gas appliances with electric appliances, as a result of recent changes in state energy policy and new legislation.<sup>37</sup> These programs *decrease* GHG emissions due to their reduction in natural gas usage and associated methane leakage, but they simultaneously *increase* GHG emissions due to their increase in refrigerant use and electricity consumption. Therefore, these changes must be accounted for to accurately measure the GHG impact of these new programs. This new avoided cost will also be used to value changes in methane leakage for a wide range of DERs, since DER programs are generally designed to decrease electricity consumption (which then results in a decrease in natural gas usage at power plants) or to decrease direct natural gas consumption in buildings.

Methane leakage occurs within the natural gas system, so decreases in natural gas consumption can result in decreases in methane leakage, although the exact relationship between usage and leakage in different parts of the system is unclear. However, in the long run, large scale electrification will decrease methane leakage as large sections of the natural gas infrastructure are shut down. This new avoided cost component estimates this effect.

Most of the electric appliances that are expected to replace natural gas appliances due to the state's building decarbonization efforts use heat pumps, which contain refrigerants. This will result in an increase in refrigerant leakage. Since most refrigerants are potent GHGs – the most commonly used refrigerant has a 100-year GWP of more than 2000 – it is important to consider the impact of these devices on the state's GHG reduction goals. Hence, this new avoided cost will be used to measure the increase in GHG emissions from heat pump appliances. It will also be used for any future programs which focus on refrigerant replacement (i.e., replacing high GWP refrigerants with lower GWP refrigerants).

## 12.2 Methane

### 12.2.1 Introduction and summary

Natural gas is the primary fuel used in buildings both indirectly, for electricity generation, and directly, for space and water heating, cooking, and clothes drying. Natural gas consists mostly of methane. When methane is combusted, it produces CO<sub>2</sub>, whereas if it leaks before it can be combusted it is not only wasted as a fuel but also has a disproportionately high impact on global warming, as compared to burning that same methane. Uncombusted methane has a 100-year GWP of 25, meaning it is 25 times more potent than CO<sub>2</sub> as a greenhouse gas over a 100-year time horizon. Over a shorter time horizon, uncombusted methane is even more potent, which is why methane has a 20-year GWP of 72. The 100-year values are primarily what is discussed in this documentation, as this is what is used in the ARB GHG inventory, although the ACC includes the option to toggle between 100-year and 20-year GWPs. The 100-year value is the default value used in the ACC, with the 20-year value included for sensitivity analysis purposes.

Methane leakage occurs in all parts of the natural gas system – at production and storage facilities, in pipelines, at the meter, and behind the meter. The link between natural gas use (throughput) and methane leakage is not precisely known. Decreases in natural gas usage may result in decreased leakage at production facilities, since fewer new wells will be drilled over time in response to decreased demand (and

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<sup>37</sup> Such as SB1477 and AB3232, which implement statewide building decarbonization efforts.

old wells may be taken out of service), but may not result in decreased leakage within pipelines or at storage facilities, at least in the short run, because many of those systems are kept at a constant pressure. However, in the long run, as parts of the natural gas distribution system are shut down as the result of building decarbonization efforts, methane leakage in the entire system will decrease.<sup>38</sup> Likewise, building decarbonization will eliminate leakage at the meter, and behind the meter, particularly when all natural gas appliances are removed from a building and the building's gas connection is shut off.

The October 2019 IDER Staff Proposal presented two options for an avoided methane leakage rate: a national average estimate of 2.4% from a 2018 study and an in-state estimate of 0.7% implied by the CARB inventory.<sup>39</sup> Since California imports more than 90% of its natural gas, a national average, as opposed to a statewide estimate for methane leakage, is more appropriate for determining the lifecycle leakage of natural gas consumed in California. However, out-of-state methane leakage is not included in the CARB inventory, meaning that reducing this leakage does not count towards achieving California's GHG reduction goals. Thus, reduced out-of-state methane leakage is not strictly an avoided cost to California ratepayers, as defined by the current avoided cost framework. Hence, we now reject the proposal to use the national estimate. However, out-of-state methane leakage could, in theory, be incorporated as a societal cost, paired with a societal carbon price, in a future societal cost-effectiveness test.

The 0.7% estimate is a methane leakage *rate*, which is simply the percent of California natural gas consumption that is assumed to leak within the state. For incorporation into avoided costs, a leakage *rate* must be converted to a leakage *adder*—the % increase that methane leakage *adds* to the GHG intensity of natural gas. A 0.7% leakage rate is equivalent to a 6.4% leakage adder, due to the high GWP of methane. In this document, we primarily use leakage adders to quantify methane leakage as they are the most directly applicable to values. More information about leakage rates, leakage adders, and how they were derived can be found in the Appendix.

CPUC Energy Division staff and its consultant E3 coordinated with CARB to discuss the proposed 6.4% leakage adder (originally proposed as an equivalent 0.7% leakage rate) and determine if it is an appropriate value to use in the 2020 ACC. CARB informed us that the previous estimate of 6.4% included all sources of methane leakage in the state, including behind-the-meter leakage. We re-visited the inventory to develop separate estimates for upstream and behind-the-meter, so that methane leakage can be properly attributed to each category of natural gas use examined in the ACC. The resulting estimates are a leakage adder of 5.57% for upstream in-state methane leakage and a leakage adder of 3.78% for residential behind the meter leakage.

The leakage adder is the percent of CO<sub>2e</sub> emissions that will be added to gas emissions estimates in the ACC to account for methane leakage, which will be applied to all DERs. The residential behind-the-meter leakage

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<sup>38</sup> As identified in the 2018 CARB/CPUC [Joint Staff Report](#) analyzing the California natural gas utilities' leakage abatement reports, leakage in the natural gas distribution system and at the meter represents the majority (roughly 70%) of in-state T&D leakage. Therefore, the majority of methane leakage in the T&D system could be avoided through large-scale building electrification that would allow a coordinated retirement of the gas distribution system.

<sup>39</sup> Note that the in-state 0.7% estimate is a rate of leakage occurring within state borders, expressed as a percentage of total natural gas consumption in the state, most of which is imported. Thus, the leakage rate for CA-produced natural gas alone would be much higher.



adder will be applied only to DERs that reduce behind-the-meter natural gas combustion through removal of natural gas appliances.

The upstream leakage adder of 5.57% is most accurately described as an estimate of “long-run avoided methane leakage” for the natural gas system. With the exception of methane leakage at the individual appliance level, it is unclear if methane leakage in the natural gas system in California will change as a function of throughput,<sup>40</sup> unless portions of the gas distribution system are shut down due to coordinated electrification. However, in the long run, as the state transitions away from using natural gas in buildings, all or most of the leakage in the natural gas system in the state could be avoided. Thus, it makes the most sense to attribute avoided methane leakage proportionally to each natural gas reduction, and each removed natural gas appliance, rather than only to the last building to electrify that enables part of the gas system to shut down. In other words, reducing natural gas usage will lead, in the long run, to reduced methane leakage that is likely to occur in a step-wise fashion, where large cumulative reductions in natural gas usage result in reductions in leakage that occur in relatively large “steps.” By applying that large, long-run reduction to each BTU of natural gas reduction, we are “smoothing out” the step-wise function, and spreading the same total reduction in GHGs more evenly over time. This is similar to the way we currently treat avoided generation capacity in the ACC, where even a small change in peak energy usage is considered to have capacity value, even though only relatively large changes will actually avoid the construction of a new power plant.

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<sup>40</sup> While decreased natural gas usage is likely to result in decreased methane leakage at production facilities, since less natural gas will be pumped, most of that leakage is not considered here because California imports almost all of its natural gas.

### 12.2.2 Detailed Methodology for Methane Leakage Adders

The leakage adders in the 2021 ACC are calculated using CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions numbers from the 2017 GHG inventory published by the ARB.<sup>41</sup> The ARB inventory is a record of all GHG emissions occurring within the state borders of California, plus any out-of-state GHG emissions from electric generators supplying electricity to California.

As mentioned in the preceding section, the methane leakage rate originally proposed in the IDER Staff Proposal was 0.7%, which corresponds to a 6.4% leakage adder (further explanation of the difference between these two quantities is below). After coordination with ARB, this estimate was refined to break out the residential behind-the-meter component of methane leakage, and divide this by residential consumption only, to arrive at the residential behind the meter leakage adder.

There are three categories of methane leakage that are included in the ARB inventory: 1) Oil & Gas Production and Processing, 2) Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution, and 3) Residential Behind-the-Meter (BTM). The methane leakage in categories 1) and 2) reflects the “upstream” methane leakage occurring within state boundaries, and is thus assumed to apply to all natural gas consumed in California. The CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent methane leakage in these categories is divided by the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from all natural gas consumption in California, to arrive at the **upstream in-state methane leakage adder** of 5.57%. Note that the methane leakage emissions from production and processing of natural gas imported to California from out-of-state (representing about 90-95% of natural gas consumption in California) are not included in this estimate, so this 5.57% is significantly lower than it would otherwise be if these out-of-state emissions were included. These out-of-state emissions are not currently in the ARB inventory, which is why they are not currently included in this upstream emissions estimate. Also note that the CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent methane leakage included in the ARB inventory is calculated using the 100-year GWP for methane. (The ACC includes the ability to toggle between 100-year and 20-year GWP, but this appendix focuses on the values calculated with the 100-year GWP.)

Similarly, the **residential behind-the-meter leakage adder** of 3.78% is calculated by dividing the CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent methane leakage emissions in category 3) above by the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from residential natural gas consumption only. This second adder applies only to natural gas consumed in residential buildings, and is included as an avoided cost only for programs which remove a natural gas appliance from a building, since more efficient gas appliances such as tankless water heaters are not likely to reduce methane leakage.

These **methane leakage adders** are distinct from **methane leakage rates**, which were what was originally described in the Staff Proposal. Methane leakage **rates** reflect the percentage of unburned natural gas that is leaked across the lifecycle of natural gas consumption. Methane leakage **adders** reflect the impact of this leaked natural gas on the GHG intensity of natural gas, which is what is required for incorporating methane leakage into avoided cost calculations. A leakage **adder** is higher than its corresponding leakage **rate** due to the high GWP of methane. These two values are calculated in the following way:


$$+ \quad \text{Methane leakage rate} = \frac{\text{mass of natural gas leaked}}{\text{mass of natural gas consumed}}$$

<sup>41</sup> The 2017 ARB inventory (Economic Sector categorization) can be found here:

[https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/tables/ghg\\_inventory\\_by\\_sector\\_all\\_00-17.xlsx](https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/tables/ghg_inventory_by_sector_all_00-17.xlsx). This is the most recent version of the inventory.

- Answers the question: “What percent of my natural gas supply was leaked?”
- + Methane leakage **adder** =  $\frac{\text{CO}_2\text{-equivalent emissions from leaked natural gas}}{\text{CO}_2 \text{ emissions from burned natural gas}}$
- Answers the question: “How does this leaked methane increase the overall GHG emissions from natural gas consumption?”

At first glance, one might guess that the leakage **adder** is simply equal to the leakage **rate** times the GWP of methane, equal to 25 over a 100-year time horizon. However, this is not the case, because methane actually *gains mass when it is burned* due to being oxidized with oxygen-- each tonne of methane yields 2.74 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> when it is burned. Thus, the conversion from a methane leakage **rate** to a methane leakage **adder** is done in the following way:



And therefore, because  $25/2.74 = 9.1$ :

$$\text{methane leakage **rate**} \quad * \quad 9.1 \quad = \quad \text{methane leakage **adder**}$$

Thus, the conversion factor between a methane leakage **rate** and a methane leakage **adder** is actually 9.1, not 25.<sup>42</sup>

Another way of looking at this is that on a tonne by tonne basis, methane does have 25 times the impact of CO<sub>2</sub>. In other words, releasing a tonne of methane to the atmosphere has 25 times the global warming impact of releasing a tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> to the atmosphere (over 100 years). However, we are not comparing methane to CO<sub>2</sub> on a tonne by tonne basis. Rather, we are comparing methane leakage to CO<sub>2</sub> combustion. In other words, we are comparing tonnes of natural gas that we intended to combust but accidentally

<sup>42</sup> Note that this calculation assumes, for explanation purposes, that natural gas is 100% methane. In reality natural gas is about 95% methane, so the conversion factor of 9.1 would have to be modified slightly to account for this. However, since the ACC only relies on the leakage **adders**, which are calculated directly from the ARB inventory and do not require the conversion factor of 9.1, it is not necessary to account for this adjustment for the purposes of developing methane leakage estimates for the ACC. The explanation of the 9.1 conversion factor is included only to clarify the difference between leakage rates and leakage adders, since the Staff Proposal included a discussion of leakage rates only.

leaked instead with tonnes of natural gas that we are burning for fuel and thus producing CO<sub>2</sub> as a byproduct.

For example, we start out with a tonne of methane. If we leak it, then (obviously) a tonne of methane will enter the atmosphere, which will have 25 times the global warming impact of a tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>. But, if we burn it, because of the different molecular mass of CH<sub>4</sub> (methane) and CO<sub>2</sub>, more than 1 tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> will be produced. Burning a tonne of methane produces 2.74 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>. In order to determine the global warming impact of the leaked methane, we do not want to compare the effect of the leaked methane to that of one tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>, but rather to the 2.74 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> we would have produced by burning it. So, we divide 25 by 2.74 to get 9.1. Hence, a tonne of methane leakage has 9.1 times the global warming impact if it is leaked compared to if it is burned.

The final methane leakage adders, and their corresponding leakage rates, are included in the table below. Also included are the leakage adder values that correspond to a 20-year GWP for methane, which is calculated by multiplying the 100-year leakage adders by 2.88, the ratio between the 20-year and 100-year GWPs for methane (72 and 25, respectively). A toggle to switch between these two GWP calculations is included in the ACC; although the primary adopted value is the 100-year leakage adder (middle column).

*Table 38. Leakage Adders in the ACC and their Corresponding Leakage Rates*

Leakage type	Leakage rate (% of natural gas consumption)	Leakage adder, 100-year GWP (% of CO <sub>2</sub> e emissions)	Leakage adder, 20-year GWP (% of CO <sub>2</sub> e emissions)
Upstream in-state methane leakage	0.612%	5.57%	16.04%
Residential behind- the-meter methane leakage	0.415%	3.78%	10.89%

## 12.3 Refrigerants

The 2021 ACC uses the same methodology and inputs as the 2020 ACC for the refrigerant gases. The only update is to change the default selection from using a 20-year to a 100 year GWP, and updating the GHG Values to those used in the 2021 ACC.

Refrigerants are gases which can absorb and transfer heat. They have been used for many years in cooling systems such as refrigerators and air conditioners. They are also used in electric heat pumps, which are new, energy-efficient devices that supply electric space conditioning and water heating. As California pursues higher levels of building decarbonization, many more heat pumps will be purchased and used. All heat pumps use refrigerants, and most refrigerants used today are very strong greenhouse gases. The most

common refrigerant, R410-A, has a 100-yr GWP of 2,088 – more than 2,000 times the global warming impact of CO<sub>2</sub>.

Refrigerants only contribute to global warming when they leak, but leakage is inevitable, given current practices. Emissions from refrigerant leakage in all-electric buildings can be a significant portion of a building's lifecycle GHG emissions. Most refrigerant leakage occurs at an appliance's end of life, during the disposal process, although every appliance has some small amount of leakage that occurs during its useful lifetime. GHG emissions due to refrigerant leakage will be counted on a per-unit basis, rather than on a per-kWh basis.

## 12.4 Use Cases

This new avoided cost component has three different parts, or use cases, which will apply to different types of measures and affect different parts of the ACC. The use cases are described below, and details of the equations used to calculate them are discussed in the subsequent section.

**The avoided costs of refrigerant usage (use case #3 below) are calculated separately from the ACC in the “Refrigerant Avoided Cost Calculator,” which is available alongside the ACC on the CPUC website.** This is a separate tool from the ACC because avoided costs of refrigerant leakage depend on program-specific characteristics such as device type and refrigerant charge. However, the standardized refrigerant leakage values (such as annual leakage rates) are also contained in the ACC itself, for reference.

It is important to note that the refrigerant cost calculator can be used not only for avoided costs, but also to calculate incurred costs, such as when a program results in the installation of a device containing refrigerants. It is crucial, however, to make sure that both the avoided and incurred costs are properly accounted for, in situations such as when a heat pump is substituting for an air conditioner as a result of a fuel substitution program. Both heat pumps and air conditioners contain refrigerants, so it is crucial to account for the refrigerant leakage from both devices when cost effectiveness is being examined.

**Use case #1: Changes in electricity usage** – This use case would likely affect all traditional electric DER programs, since they almost always result in decreases in electricity usage. All electric energy efficiency measures (by definition), most demand response programs (except possibly some load shift demand response), and most customer generation programs, result in decreases in electricity use.<sup>43</sup>

Decreases in GHG emissions from electricity usage depend partially on the hours of the day and year the electricity reductions occur. For this reason, the value of GHG emissions is based on both hourly electricity reductions and the GHG intensity of the electric grid for that hour. For example, the GHG intensity of the grid is zero during any hour where the marginal generating unit is a solar resource.

In previous versions of the electric ACC, the value of avoided GHG of any particular DER in a given hour was calculated to be the product of the electric GHG adder, the GHG intensity of the grid during that hour, and the change in electricity usage. That calculation will remain essentially the same<sup>44</sup>, except that we add a

<sup>43</sup> “Electricity use” in this sense refers only to utility-supplied electricity. A customer who generates their own electricity may increase or decrease their total usage, but their utility-supplied usage will decrease.

<sup>44</sup> This does not include any other changes made to the method of calculating GHG emissions, such as the use of both short- and long-run GHG emission calculations.

term to reflect that reduced electricity usage results not only in reduced natural gas usage at the generator, but also reduced methane leakage in the natural gas system.

**Use case #2: Changes in gas usage** – This use case applies only to programs that change the amount of direct natural gas consumption in buildings. It would affect all traditional gas EE measures, as well as building decarbonization efforts that result in the removal of natural gas appliances.

In previous versions of the gas ACC, the value of avoided GHG of a gas EE measure was the reduced GHG emissions multiplied by the gas GHG adder, where the reduced GHG emissions are simply the lifetime decrease in natural gas consumption of the device (or program) multiplied by a constant which reflects the carbon intensity of natural gas. That calculation will remain essentially the same, except that we add two terms to reflect that reduced natural gas usage results in reduced upstream and behind-the-meter methane leakage. The upstream adder will be applied to all programs which directly reduce natural gas consumption, but the behind-the-meter adder will be applied only to programs that eliminate natural gas appliances from the building.

**Use case #3: Changes in refrigerant usage or type** – While this use case was developed primarily to estimate the GHG impact of building decarbonization, it would affect any existing EE measures that involve refrigeration or air conditioning, if those measures result in changes in equipment or refrigerant type, and therefore refrigerant leakage.

The calculations associated with this use case are new, and not reflected in any previous version of the ACC. Note that this calculation applies to measures which result in changes to the *amount* of refrigerant, or the *type* of refrigerant, or both, since either change results in a change in the GHG emissions from refrigerant leakage.

## 12.5 Use Case Equations

Details of the equation used to calculate each use case are shown below, and more information about each variable can be found in the table:

### 1. Change in electricity usage for device *i*

This use case will apply to all DERs that result in changes in electricity usage. The new GHG value is the change in GHG emissions, multiplied by a percentage increase to account for methane leakage, and then multiplied by the GHG adder. The change in GHG emissions, in tonnes of CO<sub>2e</sub>, is the hourly carbon intensity of the electric grid multiplied by the hourly change in electricity usage, summed over all hours. The percentage increase due to methane leakage is 100% + the upstream methane adder ( $\delta\%_{upstream}$ ), or 105.57%. Note that except for the addition of the upstream methane adder, this calculation is the same in the current value of GHG.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Value of change in electricity usage} &= \sum_h (CI_{grid,h} \Delta E_{h,i}) * (100\% + \delta\%_{upstream}) * P_{GHGe} \\ (\$) &= (\text{tonnes CO}_2e) \quad (\text{dimensionless}) \quad \left(\frac{\$}{\text{tonne CO}_2e}\right) \end{aligned}$$

### 2. Change in gas usage for device *i*

This use case will apply to all DERs that result in changes in direct natural gas usage in a building. The new GHG value is the change in GHG emissions multiplied by a percentage increase to account for methane

leakage, and then multiplied by the GHG adder. The first term in the equation below represents the change in GHG emissions, in tonnes of CO<sub>2e</sub>, and it is equal to the carbon intensity of natural gas multiplied by the change in gas usage of a particular device (or program). The second term is the percentage increase due to methane leakage, which is 100% + the upstream methane adder ( $\delta\%_{upstream}$ ) + the behind-the-meter adder ( $\delta\%_{BTM}$ ). For programs that reduce natural gas consumption, but do not eliminate natural gas appliances from the building, the behind-the-meter adder is zero. Note that with the exception of addition of the terms  $\delta\%_{upstream}$  and  $\delta\%_{BTM}$  this calculation is the same as the current value of GHG for gas EE measures. Hence, for gas EE measures which reduce gas usage, the GHG value will be increased by 100% + the upstream methane adder, or 105.57%, as compared with the current GHG avoided cost<sup>45</sup>. For programs that eliminate natural gas appliances from the building, the current GHG value will be increased by 100% + the upstream methane adder + the behind-the-meter adder, or 100% + 5.57% + 3.78% = 109.35%<sup>46</sup>.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Value of change in gas usage} &= (CI_{gas} \Delta G_i) * (1 + \delta\%_{upstream} + \delta\%_{BTM}) * P_{GHGg} \\ (\$) &= (\text{tonnes CO}_{2e}) \quad (\text{dimensionless}) \quad \left( \frac{\$}{\text{tonne CO}_{2e}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

### 3. Change in refrigerant leakage for device *i*

This use case was developed primarily to calculate the increases in GHG impact due to refrigerant leakage when new heat pump devices are installed. This calculation can also determine changes in GHG impact when high GWP refrigerants are replaced with lower GWP refrigerants, or when a new device replaces an older one with a different refrigerant charge, leakage rate, or refrigerant.

The value of any change in refrigerant leakage will be determined by the difference between the “old” value for refrigerant leakage and the “new” value, multiplied by the electric GHG adder. This allows us to estimate either increased or decreased GHG for any situation where refrigerant charge ( $M_i$ ), leakage ( $q_{ann,i} t_i + q_{EOL,i} (1 - q_{ann,i} t_{EOL,i})$ ) or refrigerant GWP ( $GWP_i$ ) has changed.

In the cases where a heat pump replaces a natural gas appliance, the “old” values will be zero, since natural gas appliances have no refrigerant. As a result, the value will be negative, as is appropriate for an appliance which is *adding* GHG emissions.

In the cases where the refrigerant charge, leakage rate, and/or refrigerant GWP change (e.g., when a new heat pump replaces an old heat pump or a refrigerant is replaced) the inputs to the equation can distinguish between the “new” and “old” values of refrigerant charge, leakage rate or GWP. If one or two of those values do not change, then the “old” and “new” values are the same. For example, if a refrigerant with a GWP of 750 replaces a refrigerant with a GWP of 2088, then  $GWP_{new} = 750$  and  $GWP_{old} = 2088$ , whereas all other quantities will remain the same (e.g.,  $M_{old} = M_{new}$ ). Note that because  $GWP_{old}$  is greater than  $GWP_{new}$  and all other quantities are the same, the resulting value will be positive, as is appropriate when a low-GWP refrigerant replaces a high-GWP refrigerant. Note that when a new heat pump replaces more than one appliance (such as when a new heat pump HVAC system replaces both an air conditioner and an

<sup>45</sup> This does not take into account any changes to the value of  $P_{GHGg}$ , the gas GHG adder.

<sup>46</sup> This does not take into account any changes to the value of  $P_{GHGg}$ , the gas GHG adder.

older heat pump), the calculation may be somewhat more complex, and may have to be done in a separate worksheet rather than a cost-effectiveness tool.

The term  $(q_{ann,i} t_i + q_{EOL,i} (1 - q_{ann,i} t_{EOL,i}))$  represents the fraction of refrigerant charge that is leaked into the atmosphere over the device's life. It includes both the operational leakage that occurs through normal use, and the end-of-life leakage that occurs at disposal. The operational leakage is equal to the annual leakage rate ( $q_{ann}$ ) multiplied by the device's expected useful lifetime ( $t$ ). The end-of-life leakage depends on both the end-of-life leakage rate for each device ( $q_{EOL}$ , which depends on the typical disposal practice for device type  $i$ ) and on the extent to which refrigerant that is lost during the device's lifetime is replaced (i.e., "topped off").

For example, disposal practices for residential heat pump devices often do not follow regulations requiring refrigerant recycling, and instead the refrigerant is generally vented (i.e., completely leaked) before disposal. If this occurs in 85% of the units disposed, then,  $q_{EOL,i} = 85\%$  for these type of device. If the device is never topped off (as is typical for some residential devices) then  $t_{EOL} = t - 20$  years. If the annual leakage rate ( $q_{ann}$ ) is 2%/year and the EUL ( $t$ ) is 20 years then the total leakage is

$$\begin{aligned}
 & q_{ann,i} t_i + q_{EOL,i} (1 - q_{ann,i} t_{EOL,i}) \\
 = & 2\%/year * 20 \text{ years} + 85\% [1 - (2\%/year * 20 \text{ years})] \\
 = & 40\% + 85\% (1 - 40\%) \\
 = & 40\% + 51\% \\
 = & 91\%
 \end{aligned}$$

Value of change in refrigerant leakage =

$$\begin{aligned}
 & M_{old,i} * (q_{ann,i} t_i + q_{EOL,i} (1 - q_{ann,i} t_{EOL,i}))_{old} * GWP_{old,i} * P_{GHGe} \\
 - & M_{new,i} * (q_{ann,i} t_i + q_{EOL,i} (1 - q_{ann,i} t_{EOL,i}))_{new} * GWP_{new,i} * P_{GHGe} \\
 & \text{(tonnes)} \quad \text{(dimensionless)} \quad \left( \frac{\text{tonnes CO}_2e}{\text{tonne}} \right) \quad \left( \frac{\$}{\text{tonne CO}_2e} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

Table 39. Refrigerant Leakage Calculation Variables

Quantity	Abbr.	Units	Where?	Notes
Carbon intensity of grid in hour $h$	$CI_{grid,h}$	tonnes/kWh	ACC	
Change in electricity usage in hour $h$ , device or program $i$	$\Delta E_{h,i}$	kWh	CE tool	Measure savings for EE; increased consumption for electrification; generation for solar, etc.
Upstream emissions adder	$\delta\%_{upstream}$	%	ACC	% change in GHG emissions to reflect change in methane leakage emissions
GHG electric adder	$P_{GHGe}$	\$/tonne	ACC	Adopted in IDER Decision



Carbon intensity of natural gas	$CI_{gas}$	tonnes/BTU	ACC	Use standard # from EIA
Lifetime gas savings	$\Delta G_i$	BTU	CE tool	Lifetime total gas savings for gas EE measures or gas usage for electrification of appliance $i$
Gas removal adder	$\delta\%_{BTM}$	%	ACC	Reflects additional avoided methane leakage when gas appliances are removed.
GHG gas adder	$P_{GHGg}$	\$/tonne	ACC	Adopted in IDER Decision; currently equal to the GHG electric adder
Refrigerant charge	$M_i$	tonnes	CE tool	Refrigerant contained in device $i$ .
Annual refrigerant leak rate	$q_{am,i}$	%/year	ACC*	Typical leakage rate for appliance $i$
Lifetime	$t_i$	years	CE tool*	Expected useful lifetime of appliance $i$
End-of-life leak rate	$q_{EOL,i}$	%	ACC*	Leakage rate for appliance type $i$ based on typical disposal practice
Number of years prior to end-of-life with no “top-off” refrigerant added to replace full charge	$t_{EOL,i}$	years	ACC*	Typical value for appliance type $i$ . Important because devices generally do not have a full refrigerant charge at end-of-life.
Refrigerant GWP for installed device $i$	$GWP_i$	$\frac{\text{tonnes } CO_2e}{\text{tonne}}$	ACC*	Global warming potential of refrigerant as compared with $CO_2$

\*data for this variable will come from CARB



While traditional DERs will mostly fall under either of the first two use cases, EE fuel substitution measures and building decarbonization programs would likely fall under all three. For example, replacing a gas hot water heater with an electric heat pump hot water heater would increase GHG emissions related to the electric grid (case #1), decrease GHG emissions related to natural gas usage in the building (case #2), and increase refrigerant use (case #3).


Estimating the total change in GHG emissions for building decarbonization requires this analysis because when switching from a mixed fuel to an all-electric home, GHG emissions related to natural gas decrease, but GHG emissions from refrigerants increase. Also, switching from a device that uses a high-GWP refrigerant to one that uses a low-GWP refrigerant decreases refrigerant emissions. These types of equipment changes represent a significant change in avoided cost that has not yet been quantified in the IDER framework. This avoided cost also applies to a number of similar situations, such as where the alternative technology is a standard air conditioner. Air conditioners are very similar to heat pumps, and often use the same (high-GWP) refrigerants.


## Appendix A. IOU Hourly PCAF Allocation by Climate Zone




Note: all hours listed are PST (hour-ending)




### PG&E


















**SCE**







SDG&E







## Appendix B. Comparison of 2020 ACC and 2021 ACC Inputs

### SERVM Prices

#### 2021 ACC: 2030 NP-15 Day Ahead Market Prices from SERVM

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	62	53	44	44	44	53	69	65	47	41	37	35	34	35	35	51	90	151	67	66	65	91	80	62	59
Feb	61	56	46	45	50	49	71	50	41	26	28	19	18	25	22	26	58	140	74	80	76	94	67	55	53
Mar	53	35	40	39	42	50	67	47	17	8	7	6	3	4	11	11	40	91	101	105	96	77	46	45	43
Apr	28	34	31	18	51	45	39	15	1	0	0	0	11	0	1	13	12	44	99	116	101	57	26	29	32
May	39	28	24	27	23	37	47	6	1	1	0	1	3	3	2	8	23	52	60	122	102	87	53	33	33
Jun	42	29	34	29	35	38	56	19	15	9	5	6	7	10	15	24	54	67	103	129	100	74	52	37	41
Jul	39	30	35	17	33	27	39	15	3	4	2	3	4	14	16	34	77	115	105	170	89	80	51	35	43
Aug	43	39	47	40	44	44	40	30	22	20	18	21	29	37	48	78	52	82	192	186	63	49	50	43	55
Sep	45	43	55	47	55	57	45	29	19	20	11	13	16	22	33	37	57	108	176	94	52	56	50	42	49
Oct	51	47	43	42	44	63	62	35	28	23	17	16	17	20	33	56	71	125	92	78	79	55	48	53	50
Nov	63	44	52	53	43	46	63	44	26	21	15	14	15	20	22	43	87	81	78	86	122	77	45	51	51
Dec	44	44	43	43	44	59	80	71	53	40	38	34	32	31	33	50	115	77	75	67	85	61	53	47	55
Avg	47	40	41	37	42	47	56	36	23	18	15	14	16	19	23	36	61	94	102	109	86	71	52	44	47

## 2020 ACC: 2030 NP-15 Day Ahead Market Prices from SERVM

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	Avg.
Jan	66	68	63	63	65	68	78	93	89	87	82	77	74	68	64	66	83	102	105	103	100	92	87	73	80
Feb	66	68	67	65	66	70	79	84	64	57	55	54	53	53	52	56	67	89	95	93	88	82	74	72	69
Mar	59	52	60	60	63	66	67	51	40	39	37	38	36	37	31	35	61	70	82	83	83	75	67	67	57
Apr	44	45	46	46	47	56	51	20	10	10	12	13	10	6	3	5	26	67	71	70	66	61	54	52	37
May	50	50	50	51	56	55	41	20	23	24	26	27	26	21	14	20	47	70	76	82	75	68	61	58	45
Jun	53	50	51	51	56	51	41	39	41	44	45	46	48	45	43	51	71	75	85	88	81	72	63	60	56
Jul	48	49	48	48	49	48	41	40	42	46	46	43	40	35	35	52	62	98	96	93	89	87	63	58	56
Aug	64	61	62	63	65	67	57	49	51	51	52	53	57	58	65	79	88	108	104	103	98	96	86	81	72
Sep	65	65	65	65	66	74	63	46	46	46	46	47	48	51	55	66	74	94	93	92	90	87	81	76	67
Oct	62	63	62	62	63	69	68	53	51	49	49	51	51	52	56	67	86	91	91	90	87	81	73	67	66
Nov	61	62	61	60	60	62	65	61	52	51	51	50	50	51	51	58	72	88	88	87	87	83	76	68	65
Dec	68	66	65	64	65	66	70	74	75	73	69	66	65	64	63	68	76	96	97	96	94	92	88	74	75
Avg.	59	58	58	58	60	63	60	52	49	48	47	47	47	45	44	52	68	88	90	90	87	81	73	67	62

## 2021 ACC: 2030 NP-15 Regulation Up Market Prices from SERVM

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg.
Jan	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.7	4.2	4.9	4.7	3.8	3.1	2.8	1.9	1.5	1.8	3.7	5.8	4.6	4.4	3.9	5.3	6.0	1.2	2.9
Feb	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.2	2.5	3.6	2.2	1.6	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.2	1.2	5.8	6.3	6.6	5.0	4.5	2.0	1.0	2.4
Mar	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.5	1.6	1.7	3.7	4.9	5.2	5.8	5.8	5.9	5.4	3.7	1.4	3.4	8.0	9.4	8.9	4.1	2.0	1.7	3.7
Apr	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	2.6	6.7	6.3	6.4	7.2	7.3	6.4	5.5	3.8	4.5	4.7	1.5	3.8	4.5	2.8	1.3	0.4	0.2	3.2
May	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.8	1.7	4.6	6.4	9.0	10.0	10.9	11.0	9.5	8.3	8.5	9.5	4.0	2.1	3.3	3.9	3.3	1.8	0.6	0.6	4.7
Jun	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.8	2.9	4.7	4.6	5.8	5.8	6.4	6.5	6.1	7.7	4.8	1.8	3.1	6.7	7.6	5.7	3.4	1.4	1.5	3.8
Jul	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.5	2.1	2.7	3.3	3.6	4.3	4.4	4.6	5.0	2.9	1.7	4.9	7.1	7.8	6.2	4.4	1.2	0.9	2.9
Aug	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.5	3.2	3.4	4.0	2.5	2.6	5.8	6.8	6.3	5.1	4.8	5.1	3.8	3.1
Sep	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	3.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.1	2.5	6.4	7.8	6.3	6.2	6.1	4.6	3.7	3.1
Oct	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.9	1.9	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	8.6	8.4	7.7	7.1	4.5	2.9	1.6	2.7
Nov	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.3	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.8	2.9	8.3	8.5	9.9	10.2	7.6	4.0	1.6	3.0
Dec	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.6	2.4	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.2	1.8	1.6	2.3	2.2	4.4	5.4	5.2	8.5	7.2	6.7	2.1	2.9
Avg	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.4	2.1	3.1	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.3	2.6	5.0	6.4	6.6	6.1	4.6	3.1	1.6	3.2

## 2020 ACC: 2030 NP-15 Regulation Up Market Prices from SERVM

M/H	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg.
Jan	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.5	2.8	8.7	9.4	9.9	7.9	6.4	5.4	3.8	2.7	2.8	5.5	8.2	9.2	8.5	7.7	8.9	10.2	2.5	5.3
Feb	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	2.2	4.2	7.1	4.1	3.4	3.2	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.6	1.8	1.8	8.1	10.7	11.3	9.4	7.0	3.2	2.0	4.0
Mar	1.5	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	2.2	2.6	2.1	4.5	5.3	5.2	5.7	5.3	5.4	3.2	1.9	2.1	6.0	10.7	11.0	10.8	6.7	3.9	2.6	4.3
Apr	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	1.3	4.6	5.1	3.7	3.8	4.1	4.5	3.8	2.1	0.7	1.2	1.5	3.1	4.9	5.7	4.1	2.6	1.3	0.4	2.5
May	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.3	3.2	3.2	4.5	5.0	6.4	7.0	8.3	8.8	7.8	6.2	2.4	3.6	1.9	3.5	5.2	5.0	4.2	2.5	1.1	0.9	3.9
Jun	1.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	1.5	0.9	2.3	4.9	5.5	6.6	6.9	7.3	7.8	5.8	4.6	3.4	2.5	5.2	9.4	9.8	7.4	4.9	2.5	2.6	4.4
Jul	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.3	3.1	3.3	4.2	4.6	5.2	5.9	5.8	2.7	2.8	2.0	9.8	9.8	9.3	8.8	7.8	2.8	1.9	4.0
Aug	3.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.8	1.5	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.5	5.0	5.7	4.3	4.5	11.5	8.9	9.1	10.1	10.0	9.3	7.2	5.0
Sep	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	7.0	2.6	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.8	4.2	4.5	3.9	3.9	9.0	10.3	10.6	11.5	9.7	9.5	7.5	5.2
Oct	2.2	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.7	3.4	3.2	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.0	2.9	12.7	12.8	13.1	12.8	9.9	6.2	2.8	4.7
Nov	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.6	2.9	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.2	3.0	4.3	12.3	12.7	14.5	14.7	13.2	8.4	2.8	4.8
Dec	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.4	2.2	3.5	5.5	5.2	4.6	4.0	3.7	3.1	2.7	3.5	2.8	7.7	8.2	9.5	13.4	13.4	11.8	3.1	4.8
Avg	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	2.4	2.9	4.0	4.3	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.1	3.1	2.9	3.0	8.1	9.4	9.8	9.6	8.0	5.9	3.0	4.4

## 2021 ACC: 2030 NP-15 Regulation Down Market Prices from SERVM


	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.8	5.1	5.1	6.0	5.0	4.4	3.6	2.7	2.1	1.9	2.6	2.6	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.6	5.5	1.8	3.1
Feb	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.8	2.8	4.7	3.7	3.8	3.2	3.3	2.8	2.2	2.6	1.9	1.5	3.7	5.6	5.8	5.6	3.6	2.0	1.4	2.8
Mar	1.2	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.6	2.3	8.0	8.4	8.5	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.0	5.0	2.1	3.0	4.4	3.4	3.7	4.3	3.1	2.0	4.1
Apr	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3	5.5	12.6	11.4	11.3	9.7	9.2	7.7	6.9	4.8	4.4	6.0	2.5	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.4	0.5	4.4
May	0.7	0.9	0.7	1.4	3.2	3.2	7.9	12.3	13.3	12.5	14.3	13.8	12.5	10.5	10.7	11.5	4.7	2.3	2.9	2.1	2.0	1.5	1.0	0.7	6.1
Jun	1.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.1	0.6	3.3	8.1	9.1	8.1	8.7	9.0	9.5	9.1	8.0	5.5	1.5	2.2	3.6	2.9	2.4	2.3	1.6	1.7	4.2
Jul	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	2.6	4.4	5.5	5.1	5.4	6.0	7.0	6.9	6.3	4.4	2.0	4.4	3.1	2.5	3.2	3.9	2.1	1.6	3.4
Aug	1.9	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.1	3.8	3.9	4.3	3.9	2.6	2.3	5.1	1.7	2.2	5.3	5.8	5.3	4.4	3.0
Sep	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	4.1	1.9	2.1	3.1	3.1	3.9	3.6	4.2	4.4	4.3	2.9	2.0	2.8	2.9	4.9	6.1	4.7	5.7	4.4	3.3
Oct	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.8	2.2	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.8	3.2	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.3	1.7	4.6	4.8	6.2	6.4	6.2	4.5	2.4	3.0
Nov	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.5	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.1	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.6	6.4	5.2	1.7	2.6
Dec	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.2	2.2	3.0	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	2.2	1.4	3.7	3.3	5.0	5.8	7.3	6.2	1.6	2.6
Avg	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.7	2.8	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.6	5.2	4.8	3.9	2.5	3.5	3.6	3.9	4.4	4.4	3.6	2.0	3.6

## 2020 ACC: 2030 NP-15 Regulation Down Market Prices from SERVM


M/H	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	Avg
Jan	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.8	4.0	4.2	4.6	4.0	3.7	3.2	2.6	2.2	2.2	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.3	4.5	5.4	1.7	2.8
Feb	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.7	2.6	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.3	3.6	2.3	1.7	4.4	5.3	5.6	5.1	4.1	2.2	1.5	3.0
Mar	1.5	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.8	1.9	3.3	11.4	12.9	13.6	13.6	14.0	13.8	15.0	10.1	2.6	2.6	5.7	5.8	5.7	4.1	2.8	2.0	6.2
Apr	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.1	6.3	21.5	20.7	20.7	19.3	18.3	15.9	15.1	11.3	11.0	13.1	2.5	3.2	3.6	2.8	1.9	1.3	0.5	8.0
May	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.3	2.4	3.5	12.9	21.6	25.2	24.6	27.1	26.0	23.3	20.7	24.6	24.7	9.9	2.4	3.2	2.9	2.8	1.9	0.8	0.8	11.1
Jun	1.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.4	1.0	5.5	10.7	11.5	10.7	11.2	11.8	12.2	13.1	15.2	10.6	2.3	2.6	4.6	4.8	4.0	3.2	1.8	1.8	6.0
Jul	1.1	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	4.3	5.9	7.8	7.4	7.7	9.0	9.6	9.9	12.8	7.0	2.7	2.8	4.0	4.1	4.0	3.8	2.0	1.7	4.6
Aug	2.4	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.2	1.7	3.2	3.4	3.8	4.1	4.7	5.0	5.3	5.1	2.8	2.3	3.3	3.0	2.8	4.1	4.2	4.7	3.9	3.3
Sep	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	3.7	2.1	2.7	3.4	3.6	4.2	4.5	4.9	5.1	4.8	3.0	2.3	3.4	4.1	4.3	4.9	4.4	4.6	3.8	3.5
Oct	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.2	2.3	1.8	5.5	5.5	5.8	5.8	4.9	3.5	2.0	3.0
Nov	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.9	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.5	5.4	5.5	6.4	6.6	6.2	4.4	1.7	2.8
Dec	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.6	2.3	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.6	1.9	3.2	3.4	4.1	5.9	6.2	5.7	2.0	2.7
Avg	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.8	3.7	7.0	8.3	8.4	8.6	8.7	8.3	8.1	8.6	6.8	3.9	3.4	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.1	3.3	1.9	4.7



## GHG Value

### 2021 ACC



### 2020 ACC



**Emission Intensity****2021 ACC****2020 ACC**

## Appendix C. DER ACC Model Files

DER ACC model files are available at:

- + <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/general.aspx?id=5267>, and
- + <https://www.ethree.com/cpuc-acc-downloads-page>, and
- + <https://willdan.box.com/v/2021CPUCAvoidedCosts>

File	Description
2021 DER ACC Documentation	This document. PDF summary of DER ACC inputs, assumptions and methods
2021 ACC Electric Model	8,760 hourly Avoided Costs for electricity
2021 ACC Gas Model	Avoided costs for natural gas
2021 ACC Net CONE	Calculation of system capacity value. Net Cost of New Entry for Energy Storage
2021 ACC SERVM Prices	SERVM production simulation model results and scarcity pricing adjustments
2021 ACC Refrigerant Calculator	Avoided costs and global warming potential for refrigerant gasses
Storage Dispatch Folder	Folder with .csv files of energy storage dispatch and revenue for each year 2020-2050
SERVM Modeling Folder	.csv files with SERVM modeling results for 2 weeks
Files Cited in ACC Folder	Copies of source files cited in DER ACC models

## Appendix D. Revision Log

Intentionally left blank. Future revisions to the 2021 ACC will be documented here.